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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is based primarily on the manuscript 
sources pertaining to the Leeward Islands station between 
1784 and 1812 found in the Public Record Office. Its 
thesis is quite simple: Discipline in the Royal Navy in
the age of sail was maintained in much the same fashion 
that law and order was enforced in the localities of 
eighteenth-century England. In short, justice afloat was 
administered according to the principles and practices 
used in the system of criminal law ashore.
PREFACE
i
The sea has long enchanted men of letters. The placid 
beauty of a calm or the fury of a tempest has provided a 
backdrop to the stories of authors ranging from 
Shakespeare to Forester. Unfortunately/ this very 
fascination has led to much misunderstanding of the 
history of maritime affairs. Since the latter part of the 
nineteenth century# romantic historians have embellished 
an already interesting topic by incorporating numerous 
legends into their work. In the field of the social 
history of the British navy# such practice has propagated 
the myth that the service's discipline in the age of sail 
was characterized by the almost inhuman brutality of the 
officer corps.
The leading advocate of this view was the poet, John 
Masefield. In a very influential book entitled Sea Life 
in Nelson's Time. Masefield challenged the smug 
complacency of the Edwardians by reminding his 
contemporaries that their high standard of living was not 
achieved without a tremendous cost in human suffering.
"There is no London merchant telling over gold in his 
counting-house," he wrote, "no man-of-war's man standing 
his watch at sea, who does not owe his gold or his rights 
to the men who lived wretched days long ago aboard old 
wooden battleships, under martinets."1 Thus, Masefield 
dwelt upon the horrific methods used to impose order 
afloat in the eighteenth century. In his opinion, 
barbarous punishments were inflicted with indiscriminate 
severity. Under the majority of captains, "the very 
slightest transgression was visited with flogging." 
Thirty-six, seventy-two, or even three hundred lashes were 
not uncommon. Moreover, those seamen fortunate enough to 
escape the horrors of the cat were still subject to the 
inhuman cruelties of running the gauntlet or being 
"started" with a rope's end. In short, British tars in 
the age of sail lived in constant dread of punishment. 
Pushed to the breaking point, they either deserted in
3
droves or mutinied.
Ijohn Masefield, Sea Life in Nelson's Time (1905; 
reprint, Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 
p. 217.
2Ibid.. p. 157
^Several of Masefield's contemporaries argued the 
same general thesis from much the same evidence. See Wm. 
Laird Clowes et. al., The Roval Navv; A History from the 
Earliest Times to the Present. 6 vols. (London: Sampson
Low, Marsh and Co., 1898-1901), vol. 5: pp. 27-31; and
H.W. Wilson, "Discipline in the Old Navy," MacMillan's 
Magazine 78 (June 1898): pp. 94-101.
Masefield's grim picture of Georgian naval discipline
was based almost entirely on the descriptions of corporal
punishment given by Jack Nastyface in his memoirs#
Nautical Economy or Forecastle Recollections of Events
during the Last War, which appeared in 1836. Yet
Nastyface# a deserter from H.M.S Revenge whose real name
was William Robinson# was hardly an impartial
observer. His reminiscences of life on the lower deck
were written with a definite political purpose. Indeed#
he stated his motive quite clearly in the preface:
The order of the present day, on land, it seems 
is reform:— then why should the sea-service have 
its imperfections remain unattended to? To bring 
about# therefore, a reform in that all-important 
department of the state# it is# that without 
being considered an improper intruder# I may be 
suffered to offer for public consideration my 
mite of information; trusting it may be useful to 
obtain so desirable an object. . .5
The reform of which Nastyface spoke was the abolition 
of the impress and the severe restriction# if not the 
complete prohibition# of corporal punishment. During the 
early nineteenth century# these goals were a favorite 
topic of numerous authors. The adherents of reform 
produced reams of propaganda promoting their
^C.G.P.J.# "The Indentity of 'Jack Nastyface'#" The 
Mariner's Mirror 39 (1953): pp. 136-138.
5William Robinson# Jack Nastyface: Memoirs of a
Seaman, with an introduction by Oliver Warner (first
published in 1836 as Nautical Economy; reprint Annapolis# 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973), pp. 16-17 [Hereafter 
this work is cited as Nastyface# Nautical Economy].
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adoption.® Typically the abolitionists portrayed the
British seaman as a noble patriot deprived of his rights
and liberties as an Englishman by the abominable practice
of impressment. Cast in bondage against his will, he was
persecuted continuously by tyrannical petty officers armed
with colt or rattan and subjected to the whims of sadistic
captains like Hugh Pigot or Robert Corbet, who flogged him 
7
unmercifully. As one contemporary observed, "some 
shocking bad cases" were presented to the general public
O
as daily occurrences aboard the king's ships. 
Representative is the following passage from a tract 
entitled An Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of 
Flogging ;
8For example, see Lieut [enant] Thomas Hodgskin, An 
Essav on Naval Discipline. Shewing Part of its Evil 
Effects on the Minds of the Officers, on the Minds of the 
Men, and on the Community; with an Amended System, bv 
which Pressing mav be Immediately Abolished (London: C
Squire, 1813); Robert Otway, On Naval Discipline, with 
Observations on the System of Impressment; pointing out 
the Practicability of raising Seamen for the Roval Navv. 
without Recourse to such a Measure (Plymouth Dock: 
Congdon and Hearle, 1823); and An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Effects of Flogging: The Manner of Inflicting it at
Sea: and the Alledaed Necessity for Allowing Seamen to be
Flogged at Discretion, in the Roval Navv and the Merchant 
Service. 2nd ed. (London: Hunt & Clark, 1826).
?Hugh Pigot was murdered by the crew of the Hermione 
during a mutiny in 1797. Robert Corbet's tyrannical 
behavior drove the men of the Nereide to rise against him 
in 1808.
8Captain Archilbald Sinclair, Reminiscences of the 
Discipline. Customs, and Usages in the Roval Navv. in "the 
Good Old Times"— 1814 to 1831 (London: Simpkin, Marshall,
and Co., 1859), p. 15.
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With such unrelenting severity has the lash been 
inflicted in the Royal Navy, that mutiny and 
murder have been resorted to in a spirit of 
retaliation! What was it which induced the crew 
of the Hermione to mutiny, to kill the captain, 
(Pigot), his officers, and the marines; and then 
to carry that ship into an enemy's port? Excess­
ive flogging and starting, which were inflicted to 
an excess surpassing human endurance, and render-, 
ing the prospective terrors of the yard-arm a 
comparatively trifling risk, when weighed with the 
tremendous evils from which the crew of the 
Hermione conceived they were about to extricate 
themselves. We do no believe it to be possible 
that any man can reflect on the mutiny of the 
Hermione, and the murders and hangings which 
resulted there-from, without feeling convinced 
that the whole was an effect, of which the cruel 
and wanton abuse of power, on the part of Captain 
Pigot and his officers, was most assuredly the 
cause. It is this conviction which, to a certain 
extent, mitigates our abhorrence of the cool- 
blooded murders which were committed by the 
mutineers of the Hermione on that lamentable 
occasion.^
It is in the context of abolitionist polemics that 
Nautical Economy must be seen. Despite its 
autobiographical guise, Jack's narrative is most 
definitely in this genre. All of the caricatures of the 
propagandists appear in his pages— sadistic commanders, 
tyrannical boatswain's mates, brutalized seamen, lacerated 
flesh and the like. As he frequently reminds his 
audience, his "anxious desire is to live and witness the 
adoption of some other system resorted to, for manning the 
navy and showing obedience, than impressment and
9An Inguirv into the Nature and Effects of Flogging, 
p. 10.
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unnecessary cruel punishment."10 Consequently, he 
describes the principal naval penalties in the worst 
possible light. Given the nature of these punishments, 
this is not a difficult task, but his account accentuates 
the suffering and implies that they were administered 
wantonly. For example, when discussing flogging at the 
gangway, he fallaciously claims that the "general number" 
of lashes imposed for most crimes was "three dozen" and 
suggests that His Majesty's captains could inflict such 
beatings upon individuals whom they disliked "everyday" if 
they so desired.11
Yet Masefield either failed to recognize the polemical 
tinge of Nastyface's prose or simply chose to ignore it. 
As a result, his monograph elevated the political 
propaganda of the navy's harshest critics to the level of 
historical truth. Indeed, so thoroughly did he 
incorporate the reformers' position into his 
interpretation that it is difficult at times to 
distinguish him from their number. Thus, when cataloging 
the horrors of the lash, the author asserts that it was 
"not uncommon" for the captain wielding this terrible and 
unnecessary instrument of pain to be such a sadistic ogre 
that he "kept his crew in an agony of fear, hardly knowing
lONastyface, Nautical Economy, pp. 20-21.
11Ibid.. pp. 145-147. cf. Chapter Three.
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12whether to kill themselves or their tyrant."
Nevertheless, Masefield's greatest disservice was not
that he accused the navy of inhumanity and oppression, but
that he defined the scope of the study of discipline on
board His Majesty's vessels so narrowly. Since the
publication of Sea Life in Nelson's Time, those students
of the British sailing fleet who have addressed the topic
have been concerned largely with the question of cruelty.
A few have used Masefield's general thesis to help to
explain specific incidents in eighteenth-century naval
history. G.E. Manwaring and Bonamy Dobree, for example,
have seen "the senseless brutality of many of . . . [the
king's] officers" as an essential precondition for the
13mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797. Some, like 
G.J. Marcus, have sought to moderate Masefield's extreme 
judgement by noting that whippings were meted out to 
English criminals ashore during the reigns of the early
12Masefield, Sea Life, p. 158.
12g .e . Manwaring and Bonamy Dobree, The Floating 
Republic (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1935; New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1966), p. 247. For a variation of 
Manwaring and Dobree's thesis, see Jonathan Neale, The 
Cutlass & The Lash: Mutiny and Discipline in Nelson's
Navv (London: Pluto Press, 1985). At the same time,
several writers have accepted Masefield's view more or 
less uncritically. See Scott Claver, Under the Lash: A 
History of Corporal Punishment in the British Armed Forces 
(London: Torchstream Books, 1954), pp. 98-140; and John 
Laffin, Jack Tar: The Storv of the British Sailor (London: 
Cassell, 1969), p. 53.
14Hanoverians. Others have challenged Masefield's
interpretation through deductive reasoning. Thus# Dudley
Pope has claimed that although the corporal penalties
inflicted in the service were harsh, they were probably
more tolerable to seamen than lesser forms of punishment
because, when he was in school, pupils normally preferred
the fleeting pain of a caning to the drudgery of copying
15passages from a book. And one scholar has attacked 
the basic assumptions upon which Masefield constructed his 
argument. According to Dr. N.A.M. Rodger, savagery was 
the bane —  not the boon —  of order afloat.16
However, the preoccupation of modern historians with 
the issue of brutality has obscured the most elementary 
feature of British naval discipline in the age of sail.
14G.J. Marcus, Heart of Oak: A Survey of British Sea 
Power in the Georgian Era (London: Oxford University
Press, 1975), p. 117. See also Christopher Lloyd, The
British Seaman. 1200-1860: A Social Survey (Rutherford,
N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1968), p. 240; 
and Lieutenant R.F. Colville, "Naval Personnel in the 
XVIIIth Century," Journal of the Roval United Service
Institution 87 (May, 1942): p. 160.
15Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navv (London:
George Allen St Unwin, 1981), p. 220. See also W.J.
Aylward, "The Old Man-of-War's Man: English Naval Life in
the Eighteenth Century," Scribner's Magazine 55 (January, 
1914): p. 37; Rear-Admiral J.F. Somerville, "The Lower
Deck, Past St Present, " Journal of the Roval United
Service Institution 81 (February, 1936): p. 114; and Peter 
Kemp, The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower 
Deck (London: J.M. Dent St Sons, 1970), pp. xi-xiii.
l^N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the 
Georgian Navv (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press,
1986), p. 211.
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Simply stated, the methods used to maintain harmony in the
king's £leet were similar to those of the
eighteenth-century English system of criminal justice.
Indeed, within its own clearly defined jurisdiction, naval
discipline was, in many ways, a microcosm of that system.
As on land, a draconian penal code was administered
moderately —  at times even humanely —  at both summary
and curial levels. Like quarter sessions and assizes,
courts martial enforced the law formally according to the
accepted judicial principles and practices of the day.
And captains, acting in much the same fashion as their
magisterial counterparts ashore, implemented the spirit,
if not always the letter, of the enactments regulating
life in the Royal Navy. In short, the precepts of the
unreformed system of criminal justice were applied at sea
17wherever feasible.
ii
In examining this branch of eighteenth-century English
17This view differs sharply from that of Dr. N.A.M. 
Rodger, the foremost authority on the social history of 
the British sailing fleet. In his opinion, "The 
eighteenth-century Navy experienced more problems in this 
[i.e. the suppression of crime] than it need have done 
because it largely lacked a developed legal code. The 
ordinary law of the land was almost never admitted to run 
on board men-of-war, but the Service had little that was 
effective to put in its place (Ibid.. p. 218)."
criminal law, the following arrangement has been adopted: 
Chapter One reviews the navy's penal code and the
I
disciplinary functions of the principal figures in the 
chain of command who enforced it. Chapter Two describes 
the theory and practice of naval courts martial. Chapter 
Three treats the punishments inflicted on board the king's 
ships. Chapter Four analyzes the methods of maritime 
management employed by captains in the summary 
adjudication of crimes. And Chapters Five and Six deal 
with the general treatment accorded the various offenses 
cognizable by justice at sea.
Before embarking on such a course, several 
observations need to be made. To begin with, the examples 
contained herein to support the general interpretation are 
drawn almost exclusively from the surviving evidence 
(logs, transcripts of courts martial and the like) 
generated on the Leeward Islands command between 1784 and 
1812. One of two permanent British naval stations in the 
Caribbean basin during the eighteenth century, the Leeward 
Islands command was defined by an Admiralty order dated 1 
May 1809 as the region extending "from Cape North on the 
coast of Guayana, in South America, in a north direction 
to the Tropic of Cancer, from thence westward in that 
parallel, to the 68th degree of W. Longitude then due 
south thro' the Mona Passage, from thence to run in a
18direct line to Cape Blanco, near la Guayra."
The Leeward Islands command has been selected as the
focus of the present study for a number of reasons. First,
the Lesser Antilles were of such vital economic and
strategic importance in the late eighteenth century that
they were a major theater of naval operations. Second, as
a foreign station which was approximately 3,500 nautical
miles from London, the Leewards were free from excessive
meddling by the Admiralty. Thus, if the rule of law was
to prevail there, it had to be instituted by the officials
on the spot rather than be imposed from above by a
powerful regulatory agency. Third, it has been suggested
occasionally that a certain lawlessness sometimes reigned
19in the fleet in the West Indies. Hence, the Leewards 
serve as something of a litmus test for the thesis to be 
argued.
A substantial portion of this thesis is based on the 
writings of contemporary defenders of the eighteenth- 
century system of naval discipline, for it is in their 
arguments that the rationale of the system is found. 
However, the point of view of the conservatives has not 
been accepted blindly. Whenever possible, their 
assertions have been tested against the statistical data
18ADM 2/156.
l^David Hannay, Naval Courts Martial (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1914), p. 106.
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gathered during the preparation o£ the study at hand.
Therefore# a good deal of what follows is quantitative.
This# of course# gives rise to the question of the
accuracy of the statistics to be cited. Needless to say#
the quantification of crime and punishment is a risky
business# but it becomes even more so when dealing with
summary adjudications aboard the king's ships in the age 
20of sail. As one leading student of eighteenth-century
criminal law has observed# Georgian Englishmen did not
possess the same monomaniacal zeal for measuring their
lives numerically that their descendants on both sides of
21the Atlantic have come to exhibit. Indeed# it is 
quite clear from the literary sources that minor forms of 
summary punishment were seldom, if ever# recorded in the 
logs. Moreover# it is equally clear from spot comparisons 
of captains' and masters' logbooks that not all clerks 
entered all instances of the infliction of major varieties 
of summary punishment in their journals.
Still, a reasonably accurate picture of the pattern of
20Tallying figures for courts martial is a much
simpler task. Here the only real danger is posed by lost
transcripts. However# in checking the references to
trials in admirals' journals and captains' logs against 
the Reports of Courts Martial# the present writer has been 
able to confirm only seven cases as missing, or less than 
two percent of the total number (369) heard in the
Leewards during the period under examination.
21Douglas Hay# "War# Dearth and Theft in the
Eighteenth Century: The Records of the English Courts#"
Past and Present 95 (May# 1982): p. 117.
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the principal summary punishments can be obtained if
proper precautions are taken. In selecting the ships to
comprise the present sample/ these criteria were
established: Only those vessels sent to the Lesser
Antilles between 1784 and 1812 for which a complete
captain's or master's log exists for the entire cruise
22were considered for inclusion in the survey. 
Moreover, of this group, only those men-of-war whose
complete book matches exactly the surviving portions of
!
its other log actually have been included in the
23sample. Thus, while there were 417 British warships 
dispatched to the Leewards during the period under 
discussion, just seventy-three of them make up the testing 
sample (see Appendix A).
Most of the calculations made from this sample are 
simple frequencies or percentages. In the few cases in
22The years 1784 and 1812 have been chosen so that 
periods of both war and peace would be encompassed by the 
survey. It also should be noted that since this is a 
study of the Leeward Islands station, all ships which did 
not spend at least seventy-five percent of their cruise in 
the Lesser Antilles have been excluded automatically. 
This percentage has been derived by dividing the number of 
months that a vessel was listed in ADM 8 as having 
remained in the West Indies by the total number of months 
that it was listed in Steel's Navv List as having been 
away from England.
22There is one exception to this rule. If both 
complete captain's and master's logs have survived for the 
entire cruise of a particular ship, then I have counted 
the total number of different punishments listed in the 
two books and included that vessel in the sample.
xxii
which more sophisticated computations have been 
undertaken, explanations of the methodology employed have 
been provided in the apparatus. Because the human 
experience cannot be reduced to abstract numbers, no 
attempt has been made to derive a Benthamic "felicific 
calculus" to quantify such intangibles as the pain of a 
flogging, the impact that the spectacle of corporal 
punishment had upon those who witnessed it, or the like. 
With these points in mind, it is now time to turn to the 
system of naval justice.
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONSTITUTION AT SEA
i
The Articles of War of 1749, as amended by an Act 
passed in the nineteenth year of George Ill's reign, 
constituted the fundamental code by which discipline was 
maintained in the British navy during the age of Nelson. 
This code was eminently suited to the exigencies of 
maritime existence. It provided a flexible system of
justice which lasted for well over a century. As the 
editor of the 1815 edition of Falconer's Universal 
Dictionary of the Marine put it: "In these Articles
almost every possible offense that can be committed in the 
royal navy is set down in explicit terms, and the 
punishment thereof annexed."'1'
William Falconer, A New Universal Dictionary of 
the Marine: being, a Copious Explanation of the Technical 
Terms and Phrases usually employed in the Construction. 
Equipment. Machinery. Movements, and Military, as well as 
Naval. Operations of Ships: with such Parts of Astronomy,
and Navigation, as will be found useful to Practical 
Navigators. "Modernized" and Enlarged by William Burney 
(London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1815), s.v. Articles of
War.
1
2The thirty-six naval ordinances applied the principles 
of eighteenth-century common law to military life at sea. 
"The Articles of War are an Act of Parliament/" observed 
Vice-Admiral Sir C. V. Penrose in 1824, "made for the 
government of the King's subjects serving afloat in his 
navy, as the laws of the land are for his subjects on 
shore." Consequently, the Articles were in many 
respects a rationalized and simplified version of the 
Georgian penal code. With the exception of those clauses 
dealing strictly with nautical questions, the crimes they 
enumerated were analagous to those found in the Statutes 
of the Realm. Indeed, John McArthur devoted an entire 
chapter of his classic treatise on naval and military
3
courts martial to- the development of this analogy. In 
a convincing manner, he demonstrated that the prohibitions 
against unauthorized intercourse with an enemy or rebel, 
for example, were equivalent to the statutes against 
treason. Similarly the proscription of mutinous 
assemblies was comparable to the Riot Act. Even the 
regulation against wastage of naval stores had its 
counterpart in the common law.
2Sir C. V. Penrose, Observations on Corporal 
Punishment. Impressment, and Other Matters Relative to the 
Present State of His Majesty's Roval Navv (Bodmin: J.
Liddell and Son, 1824), p. 16.
2John McArthur, Principles and Practice of Naval 
and Military Courts Marital. 4th ed., 2 vols. (London: A.
Strahan, 1813), 1: pp. 47-106.
3Like the common law, the Articles o£ War established 
the framework for "a system of selective terror" to 
enforce these ordinances. It was an axiom of the reigning 
penal theory of the day that criminals had to be dealt 
with severely to impress upon the rest of society the 
importance of obeying the law. "The terror of the example 
is the only thing proposed," declared Henry Fielding, "and 
one man is sacrificed to the preservation of
4
thousands." Consistent with this belief, more than one 
hundred and fifty new capital statutes were enacted 
between 1688 and 1820. It has been estimated that the 
Waltham-Black Act alone enumerated more than two hundred 
offenses punishable by death. Thus if the Articles of 
war, in the words of David Hannay, did "bristle with the 
pain of death" they did so in conformity with the 
conventional wisdom of the age.® Moreover, they assumed 
their sanguinary character for precisely the same reason 
that the penal laws did. According to Douglas Hay, the 
ferocity of the criminal code was designed to preserve the 
authority of the ruling classes who administered it by 
providing these men with legal devices of horror which
^James Heath, Eighteenth Century Penal Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 96.
^Sir Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English
Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750. 4 vols. 
(London: MacMillan, 1948-68), 1: p. 76.
6Hannay, Naval Courts Martial, p. xliv.
4could be used at the appropriate moments to intimidate the
n
lower orders into accepting their dominion. 
Correspondingly/ the bloodthirstiness of the Articles were 
intended to maintain the power of admirals and captains to 
command obedience which/ consonant with St. Vincent's 
famous dictum, was the essence of discipline. John 
Delafons, who had served as a deputy judge advocate at 
numerous trials, suggested as much in the preface to his 
study of naval courts martial:
Much has been urged of the severity of 
martial laws, of which proofs will probably occur 
in the perusal of this treatise. Undoubtedly, 
men who are amenable to military jurisdiction, 
submit to many privations, perhaps hardships; but 
these privations and hardships are indispensably 
necessary to the welfare of the country, in whose 
defense they are engaged. Whenever, discipline 
shall become relaxed; whenever officers shall no 
longer be competent to assert the power with 
which they are invested, for the maintenance of 
subordination and diligence; then, and not till 
then, will the British Navy, which has hitherto 
enforced respect and awe on surrounding nations, 
instead of proudly constituting the bulwark and 
glory of these kingdoms, become baneful at home, 
and despicable abroad;— the scourge of their own 
country, and the derision of their enemies.8
However, the "systems of selective terror" created by 
these codes did not leave those under their jurisdiction 
totally defenseless before them. Both systems implicitly
7Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the
Criminal Law," in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society
in Eiahteenth-Centurv England. Douglas Hay et al. (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 17-64.
8 John Delafons, Treatise on Naval Courts Martial 
(London: P. Steel, 1805), pp. ix-x.
5accorded defendants their rights as Englishmen by adopting
judicial procedures that were accusational, public and
conventionalized. Moreover, like the criminal law, the
Articles of War were held to be the safeguard of the lives
and property of the majority against the designs of the
minority. Referring the naval ordinances, Delafons
claimed: "These laws. . .certainly entitle the subjects
of their power to all the consideration and protection
that a liberal and opulent people can extend, to make
their situation comfortable to themselves, and beneficial 
g
to the state."
Finally, both the common law and the Articles of War 
incorporated large bodies of precedent. In the former the 
body of precedent was derived from ancient usage and the 
judicial principle of stare decisis: in the latter it
consisted of "the laws and customs of the sea." The 
origins of this corpus of maritime laws and customs are 
shrouded in medieval obscurity. The earliest known set of 
disciplinary regulations was promulgated in 1190 by 
Richard the Lionhearted.^ The proclamation of 
Richard's so-called Laws of Oleron began a tradition which 
was to survive for over four hundred and fifty years.
9Ibid., p. x.
lOTheodore Thring, and C. E. Gifford, Thrina's 
Criminal Law of the Navv. 2nd ed. (London: Stevens and
Sons, 1877), p. 6.
6Until the middle of the seventeenth century/ it was
customary for the commander of each expedition to
establish a series of ordinances governing the conduct of
his men. These rules applied only to the mariners
directly under his command and had authority only for the
length of his expedition. When the voyage terminated so
did the jurisdiction of the regulations. Naturally/ these
codes were far from uniform. Indeed/ they could be quite
idiosyncratic. Not only did they reflect the preferences
and experiences of the man who framed them they also
manifested the goals of his expedition.11 The
by-product of this disorderly practice was the development
of a considerable body of precedent. The thirty-sixth
Article of War illustrated clearly the close relationship
between this body of precedent and the naval ordinances.
By that clause all crimes not referred to specifically in
the preceeding sections were to be dealt with "according
12to the laws and customs in such cases used at sea."
llFor examples of these collections of ordinances 
see J. K. Laughton, ed.. The Naval Miscellany, vol. 1 
(London: Navy Records Society no. 20, 1901), pp. 54-57
and The Naval Tracts of William Monson. vol. 4, ed. M. 
Oppenheim (London: Navy Records Society no. 45, 1913),
pp. 3-12.
1222 Geo. II c 33. It should also be noted that 
it was from this body of precedent that the commanding 
officer of a British naval vessel derived his authority to 
punish summarily.
7• •
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The Articles of War defined four basic types of 
crime. First# several clauses proscribed contraventions 
against religion and morality. Officers were admonished 
to observe the Sabbath according to the rites of the 
Church of England. At the same time all members of the 
fleet were expected to maintain a high standard of 
decorum. Thus "profane oaths# cursings# execrations# 
drunkenness# uncleanness# or other scandalous actions, in 
derogation of God's honour# and corruption of good 
manners" were prohibited. Because these offenses were 
considered misdemeanors, the penalties attached to them 
were left to the discretion of the court. In fact# the 
only crime in this category deemed a felony was "the 
unnatural and detestable sin of buggery or sodomy with a 
man or beast." The horror with which the eighteenth 
century viewed this offense was reflected by the mandatory 
death sentence which accompanied it.
Second# there was the largest group of Articles which 
dealt with crimes against the king and his government. 
Because many of these crimes were of a much more serious 
nature than those in the first category# a far greater 
number of them were capital. All unauthorized 
communication with an enemy or rebel was punished with 
death. Any member of the fleet guilty of failing to
8report intercourse with an enemy or rebel/ spying, or 
aiding and abetting an enemy or rebel was liable to death 
or "such other punishment as the nature and degree of the 
offense" deserved. All persons convicted of mutiny,
mutinous or seditious expressions, or striking a superior 
officer received a compulsory death sentence. Those who 
incited disturbances, disobeyed lawful orders, or 
concealed mutinous plots could be sentenced to death if 
the court so decided. Finally, members of the fleet who 
"unlawfully" destroyed naval property were punished 
automatically with death.
However, not all crimes against the state carried such
i
severe penalties. There was no mention of capital
punishment in those Articles concerning attempts to 
defraud the government (i.e., embezzlement, signing false 
musters, etc.) or needless expenditure of stores. In most 
of these cases the sentence was left to the discretion of 
the court.
A third category of offenses consisted of 
infringements of the rights of individuals. Like the 
clauses dealing with most economic crimes, these Articles 
gave the court wide discretionary powers. Only murder 
carried a mandatory death sentence. In cases of theft the 
court had the option of taking the offender's life or 
imposing on him a lesser penalty "upon consideration of 
circumstances." Similarly, the court was granted
considerable latitude in determining the sentence for
9quarrelling and fighting. According to the Twenty-third 
Article: "If any person in the fleet shall quarrel or
fight with any other person in the fleet or use
reproachful or provoking speeches or gestures/ tending to 
> make any quarrel or disturbance, he shall, upon being 
convicted thereof, suffer such punishment as the offense 
shall deserve, and a court-martial shall impose." And,
persons guilty of plundering prisoners of ‘ war were subject 
to the will of the court.
Finally there were strictly naval infractions. While
i
the sections punishing crimes against individuals were 
relatively mild, those of a purely naval character were
not. Most of the clauses concerned with naval questions
were aimed at the officer corps. Articles Ten through 
Fourteen enjoined officers to adopt an aggressive posture 
when engaging an enemy. Any admiral, captain, or 
commander who disregarded the signal to prepare for 
action, did not encourage his men to fight, disobeyed 
orders during an engagement, refused to join battle with 
an opponent, did not "do his utmost to take or destroy" an 
enemy, failed to give every possible assistance to a 
friendly vessel in peril, or did not pursue a retreating 
foe was liable to death or such lesser punishment as a 
court martial thought fit to impose. Moreover, persons 
convicted of surrendering to an enemy in a "treacherously 
or cowardly" manner received mandatory death sentences. 
In addition to assailing the enemy vigorously, officers
10
were expected to perform their duty efficiently and 
humanely. By Section Thirty-three, officers guilty of 
"behaving in a scandalous, infamous, cruel, oppressive, or 
fraudulent manner" were to be dismissed from the service.
Other paragraphs were framed to prevent specific
abuses common among officers. Because some commanders
• *
used their vessels to transport items which they hoped to 
sell at a profit upon arrival at their destination, 
Article Eighteen prohibited the reception on board the 
king's ships of "any goods or merchandizes whatsoever, 
other than for the sole use of the ship or vessel, except 
gold, silver, or jewels, and except the goods and 
merchandizes belonging to any merchant, or other ship or 
vessel which may be Shipwrecked, or in imminent danger of 
being shipwrecked, either on the high seas, or in any 
port, creek, or harbour, in order to the preserving [of] 
them for their proper owners. . ." Similarly, because
convoy duty was a very unpopular task which many officers 
either sought to avoid completely or performed 
half-heartedly at best, Article Seventeen stated that 
those who failed to protect adequately the merchant 
vessels under their charge were to make reparation to 
those traders who sustained losses by their negligence in 
addition to being subject to death or other such penalty 
as a court martial thought fit to impose. Finally, 
because the navy was constantly in need of men, especially 
in time of war, officers were prone to accept deserters
11
from other ships to fill out their complements without 
reporting them to their former captains. Thus Article 
Sixteen stipulated that any commander who succumbed to 
this temptation was to be cashiered.
Only five paragraphs in this category discuss crimes 
likely to be committed by enlisted men. Any member of the 
fleet who deserted or enticed others to do so was to be 
punished capitally or by the will of the court if 
circumstances warranted a lesser sentence. At the same 
time/ persons guilty of sleeping on watch, of neglect of 
duty or of leaving their station were to suffer death or 
"such other punishment” as a court decided to impose. 
Moreover, all mariners who "through willfulness, 
negligence or other defaults" were responsible for the 
destruction of their ships were condemned to death or the 
lesser sentence of a court martial. Lastly, all 
misdemeanors not specifically mentioned in the Articles 
were to be dealt with according to maritime "laws and 
customs."
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The remaining clauses established the jurisdiction of 
the Articles of War. These paragraphs circumscribed the 
purview of the code. Only members of the fleet "in actual 
service and full pay of His Majesty's ships and vessels of
12
war" and people accused of spying or attempting to subvert 
the king's navy were subject to its authority. However, 
British mariners were liable to naval discipline only if 
they committed offenses in places where the common law did 
not have ascendency or if they were charged with crimes of 
which that law did not take cognizance. Any offense 
perpetrated afloat or in foreign lands was within the 
province of the Articles. Conversely, all crimes, except 
"mutiny, desertion or disobedience to any lawful command," 
committed on shore in any part of the realm fell within 
the sphere of the criminal code. Thus, if a sailor was 
party to a robbery at Martinique or at sea, his case was 
heard before a naval court martial; but if he committed 
the same offense ashore at Antigua, he was tried by the 
local magistrates.
The jurisdiction of the Articles of War over soldiers 
embarked on men-of-war was not as clearly defined as the 
code's authority over seamen. The prickly question of the 
amenability of land forces to naval discipline remained in 
contention throughout the eighteenth century. Although 
the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing into One Act 
of Parliament, the Laws Relating to the Government of His 
Majesty's Ships, Vessels and Forces by Sea specifically 
exempted members of the army deployed in transport vessels 
from the sovereignty of naval tribunals, it said nothing 
about the accountability of land forces employed in
13men-of-war. Because troops were substituted routinely
for marines on board British warships, the silence of the
statute on this matter was far from being a moot point.
Naval commanders steadfastly maintained their right to
punish soldiers stationed in their ships. However, enough
doubt remained in the minds of many military officers to
give rise to innumerable disputes.
The matter came to a head in 1795. In July of that
year, Lieutenant Gerald Fitzgerald of the Eleventh
Regiment of Foot, then serving on board the Diadem in the
Mediterranean, was court martialed for contempt and
"dismissed from His Majesty's service and. . .rendered
incapable of ever serving His Majesty, his heirs and
14successors, in any military capacity." Protesting the 
legality of the trial, Fitzgerald petitioned the Duke of 
York, then commander in chief of the army, for redress. 
In direct response to the lieutenant's predicament, the 
Duke, anxious to avoid a recurrence of such a troublesome 
incident, issued a controversial set of regulations 
defining the relationship of members of the army to the 
Articles of War. These regulations stripped naval 
officers of virtually all power to discipline troops at 
sea. The second paragraph stated quite clearly the 
proposed restrictions:
1322 Geo. II c 19. 
14ADM 1/5333.
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In case any officer or soldier of his 
Majesty's land forces. . .shall be guilty of any 
offenses against. the laws and regulations 
established for the government and discipline of 
the ship on board of which he may have been 
received/ the commanding officer of such ship is 
to cause him to be put under arrest or to confine 
him as a close prisoner, if circumstances and the 
naval articles shall require it, and if necessary 
to detain him in either of these situations as 
long as he shall remain on board, transmitting a 
report of the charges against him to his superior 
officer, or to the commander in chief of the land 
forces under whom he may be then placed in order 
that he may be proceeded against according to 
law, in case the offenses of which he may be 
accused are such as are cognizable by military 
courts martial.
The Admiralty, as eager as His Royal Highness to 
prevent further disputes between the two services over the 
subject of discipline, was inclined to accept these 
restraints initially. The only marginal comment to the 
letter containing the regulations read simply: "13
October order accordingly."1® However, a large and 
influential segment of the upper echelons of the seniority 
list was not disposed to be as accommodating as their 
Lordships. Indeed, to many senior officers few things 
could have been more inflammatory. Banding together, 
these men protested vehemently against the adoption of the 
Duke's regulations. On 1 November eight admirals at 
Portsmouth sent the Lord's Commissioners a round-robin 
which concluded:
!5a d m  1/4166.
16Ibid.
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We are of opinion the proposed regulations 
militate against the principles of the naval 
service, inasmuch as they appear to us to be in 
direct contradiction to the statute for the
government of His Majesty's ships, vessels and 
forces by sea and must. if endeavoured to be
carried into execution, inevitably cause the
total destruction of the navy of this country.^7
Faced with such strong opposition, the government
decided to let the whole affair die of natural causes.
Because the regulations- had never been officially
communicated to the junior officers in the army, the
Admiralty maintained the fiction that they had never been
promulgated. On 24 February 1796, Lord Spencer instructed
Vice-Admiral Cornwallis, one of the most outspoken
opponents of the measures, "to act as if no such
18regulation had been issued." In the end, the two 
services agreed to allow the officers involved in specific 
incidents concerning the liability of troops to naval 
discipline to determine the question of jurisdiction based 
on the merits of that particular case. However, during 
the latter stages of the Napoleonic Wars the army appeared
17ADD MSS 34,933 ff 84.
^ Private Papers of George. Second Earl Spencer. 
First Lord of the Admiralty. 1794-1801. ed. Julian S. 
Corbett, vol. 1 (London: Navy Records Society, no. 46,
1913), p. 214.
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to concede the point. By Section Twenty-three of the 
military Articles of 1812 officers and soldiers embarked 
on board naval vessels were expected to "conform 
themselves to the laws and regulations established for the 
government and discipline of the said ship, 
and. . .consider themselves. . .as under the command of
i >
the senior officer of that particular ship, as well as of 
the superior officer of the fleet (if any) to which such 
ship belongs."19
iv
Every level of the naval hierarchy participated in the 
enforcement of the Articles of War. The paramount
authority in this hierarchy was the Board of Admiralty. 
Executing the duties of the ancient office of Lord High 
Admiral, the Lords Commissioners wielded extensive power. 
As William Falconer put it: "They govern and direct the
whole royal navy, with power decisive in all marine cases, 
civil, military and criminal, transacted upon or beyond
sea, in harbors, on coasts, and upon all rivers below the
first bridge seaward."20
1952 Geo. Ill c 22.
2°Will iam Falconer, An Universal Dictionary of the 
Marine. 4th ed. (1780; reprint, New York: Augustus M.
Kelly, 1970), s.v. Admiralty.
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Thus it was the Admiralty that determined the general
policy of naval discipline. The basic guidelines were
laid down in the Regulations and Instructions Relating to
His Majesty's Service at Sea. Their Lordships promulgated
these Regulations and Instructions in book form "to
support and improve the discipline and good economy of the 
21navy." The original draft# appearing in 1731# went 
through thirteen impressions before being revised and 
expanded in 1806. Both editions provided sea officers 
with clear and concise reference manuals describing the 
responsibilities of every member of the fleet and the 
proper methods and procedures to be followed for virtually 
the whole gamut of naval activities.
The paragraphs specifying the "Rules of Discipline and 
good Government to be observed on board His Majesty's 
ships of war" were framed to supplement the Articles of 
War. In both editions many of the clauses simply 
reiterated various sections of the code. Captains were 
reminded of their duty to see that divine service was 
performed and their obligation to suppress "all profane 
cursing and swearing# all drunkenness# gaming# rioting and
2lDaniel A. Baugh# ed.# Naval Administration.
1715-1750 (London: Navy Records Society# no. 120# 1977), 
p. 63.
18
quarrelling, and in general everything which may tend to
the disparagement of religion or the promoting of vice and 
22immorality." In the revised volume they were also
instructed to maintain a strict observance of the Article
protecting prisoners of war.
Although the clauses in both editions had the same
purpose, there was a significant difference between them.
The wording of the Regulations and Instructions of 1806
was far less restrictive than that of the previous
compilation. Whereas the earlier volume stipulated that
no more than twelve lashes could be given except by the
sentence of a court martial, the latter stated only that
commanders were not to punish "with greater severity than
23the offense shall really deserve." Moreover, while 
the old collection prescribed specific punishments for 
swearing and drunkenness, the new rules simply enjoined 
the captain to do "the utmost of his power" to deter these 
petty crimes.
That the Regulations and Instructions of 1806 
seemingly gave commanders much more latitude in matters of 
discipline did not mean that the Admiralty had decided to 
leave them to their own devices. Indeed, quite the
^ Regulations and Instructions Relating to His 
Majesty's Service at Sea. 2nd ed. (London, 1806), p. 160.
23Reoulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 163.
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opposite was true. After 1806 the Board took several
steps to restrict their powers. Four months after the
revised manual was issued the Lords Commissioners
abolished the penalty of running the gauntlet in which a
culprit was scourged by the entire crew.24 In 1809, the
practice of starting, or beating a man with a rope's end,
was prohibited. And, ’ after March 1811 captains were
required to transmit quarterly to the Admiralty precise
records of punishments. The punishment books were to
include the name of the offender, his crime, the date it
was committed, the length of his confinement, and the date
25and type of punishment he received.
In addition to formulating the disciplinary policy of 
the Royal Navy, the Admiralty maintained a remarkably, 
close scrutiny of the implementation of that policy. The 
Regulations and Instructions obliged the commanders of 
foreign stations to supply their Lordships with a wide 
variety of detailed information. Not only were they 
expected to forward such routine forms as ship's logs, 
vouchers, journals, and musters, they were to report any 
noteworthy occurrences on their station. The Board 
examined and acted upon this voluminous correspondence 
with extraordinary efficiency. Even the smallest matters
24ADM 2/151.
25ADM 2/1083.
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did not escape its attention. When a review of the
punishment books submitted by Sir Francis Laforey for the
period ending 5 July 1812 revealed the general prevalence
of "excessive flogging," for example, their Lordships
directed the Rear Admiral to do everything in his power
"to check a practice fraught with consequences so
26injurious to His Majesty’s service."
The Admiralty was as equally diligent in investigating 
legitimate complaints. Allegations by merchants, seamen, 
civilians, and various governmental agencies were all 
taken seriously. Because the great distance between
foreign stations and London made it impossible for the 
Lords Commissioners to conduct the inquiries themselves, 
the actual investigations were left routinely to the
commanders in chief of the stations. In most cases the 
Board forwarded the accusations to the appropriate flag 
officer with a letter instructing him to look into the 
charges and inform their Lordships of his findings. The 
examination of Lieutenant Evelyn's conduct held at 
Carlisle Bay, Barbados in early 1811 typified the
procedure. On 20 December 1810 the Admiralty received a 
petition from Richard Elam and Sarah Clift expressing
26ADM 2/936
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their horror at what Evelyn allegedly had done to their 
27two sons. The following day the Board ordered Sir
Francis Laforey, who had recently been given command of
the Leewards, "to make a particular enquiry" into their
claim that the lieutenant had impressed their children and
several other boys out of the merchantman Roxburgh Castle
and had taken the young men to Carlisle Bay where he and
28his two brothers had sold the youths as chattel. 
Laforey's inquest took place on 16 February 1811; happily, 
it disclosed a far different story. It was with a sense
f
of satisfaction that their Lordships read Laforey’s report
that instead of selling the boys into slavery, Evelyn had
shown them great compassion by rescuing them at their own
request from the ill treatment of the master of the
Roxburgh Castle and by establishing them in
29apprenticeships in Barbados.
Because in this instance there was no evidence of 
wrongdoing, the Lords Commissioners did nothing more than 
express their approbation of Evelyn's conduct. However, 
when irregularities were exposed the Admiralty took 
appropriate steps to correct them. Serious crimes were 
turned over to courts martial. Lesser offenses were dealt
27ADM 1/4555.
28ADM 2/936 
29ADM 1/332.
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with more informally and usually resulted only in a 
reprimand from the Board. Thus, when Sir Alexander 
Cochrane's investigation of a complaint brought by several 
merchants against Lieutenant Stephen Briggs and Midshipman 
George Bayley of H.M. Brig Grenada revealed that Bayley 
had impressed the master's steward of the Ladv Penrvn 
improperly in April 1809, their Lordships informed 
Cochrane of their disapproval of the midshipman's behavior 
and directed him "to admonish the lieutenant to be more 
correct in his proceedings in such cases in [the] 
future."30
Yet the Admiralty did not regulate discipline simply 
by formulating policy and supervising its enforcement. 
The Board's capacity to appoint and dismiss officers also 
allowed it to deal with men who had violated the spirit —  
if not the letter —  of the law. In such instances the 
Lords Commissioners merely could refuse to post the 
culprit to another ship and thus effectively remove him 
from the service. Their Lordships exercised this power 
only in exceptional cases like that of Thomas Pitt, the 
second Baron Camelford. While never found guilty of any 
wrongdoing by a naval tribunal, Camelford was plagued by 
controversy throughout his brief career in the Royal 
Navy. The volatile young Lord sailed for the West Indies 
in June 1797. Several weeks after his arrival in the
30ADM 2/936.
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Leewards, he became involved in a misunderstanding with
the commanding officer of the British fortress at
Charlotte Town which culminated in the exchange of salvos
between his ship and the shore batteries. In November his
attempts to impress seamen in Carlisle Bay led to a melee
with the inhabitants of Bridgetown that left one man dead
and several others injured. Two months later he was
"honorably acquitted" of the murder of Lieutenant Charles
Peterson when the court ruled that the lieutenant had been
engaged in an, act of mutiny at the time Camelford shot him
in cold blood. Finally in March 1798 he was indicted by
the Court of King's Bench at St. John's, Antigua for
assaulting the Naval Officer at English Harbour. Shortly
after his indictment Rear Admiral Henry Harvey sent the
violent peer back to England for his own protection. Upon
his return to London, his brother-in-law, the influential
Lord Grenville, managed with considerable difficulty to
prevail upon the Admiralty to grant Camelford another
commission. However, once again this enfante terrible
became embroiled in controversy. In January 1799 he was
convicted of attempting to travel in France illegally.
Although pardoned by the King, Pitt's career was ruined;
for his pardon was made conditional that he never be
31allowed to serve in the navy again.
SlNikolai Tolstoy, The Half-Mad Lord: Thomas Pitt.
2nd Baron Camelford (1775-1804) (London: Jonathan Cape,
1978), pp. 38-83.
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The Admiralty's regulatory functions were supplemented
by its advisory role. The commanders in chief of the
various stations freely solicited the Board's opinion on
questions which defied clear-cut answers. Their Lordships
dutifully responded to all such queries no matter how
minute they were. For instance/ on 27 October 1812
Secretary Barrow wrote to Sir Francis Laforey: "In reply
to your letter no. 93 of the 30 August; I am commanded by
my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you
that the next senior officer who may be present on the
spot is eligible to assemble and preside at courts martial
with the meaning of the 7th section in that head."'*2
The Admiralty's highest ranking representative on
foreign stations was the commander in chief. The admiral
or senior captain who held this position bore many
responsibilities. As the central administrative figure on
the station, the commander in chief was accountable for
everything that occurred in the vessels under his
command. He was to see that all members of his fleet or
squadron performed their duties according to the
Regulations and Instructions, "never suffering neglect or
33inattention in anyone to pass unnoticed." Towards 
this end, he was required to familiarize himself with the
32ADM 2/936.
33Reaulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 13.
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qualities of the men and ships on his station as soon 
after taking charge as possible. And, he was to make 
personal inquiries into the health and discipline of the 
crews under him as often as circumstances allowed him to 
do so.34
At the same time the commander in chief was the agent 
* through which the Admiralty conducted much of its business 
on foreign stations. Their Lordships' correspondence with 
the Admirals in command of the Leeward Islands between 
1784 and 1812 reveals how dependent they were on these men 
for the implementation of their pleasure. Time and again 
this correspondence directed flag officers to investigate 
complaints, correct malpractices revealed in their reports 
or disseminate news of policy changes . among their 
subordinates. For example, on 28 July 1797 the Board's 
secretary sent the following circular letter to Rear 
Admiral Henry Harvey:
I am commanded by my Lords commissioners of 
the Admiralty to send ypu herewith printed copies 
of an act which passed the last session of 
Parliament entitled "an Act for the more 
effectually preventing the administering or 
taking of unlawful oaths" and I am commanded by 
their Lordships to signify their direction to you 
to cause one of the said copies to be sent to the 
captains and commanders of his Majesty's ships 
and vessels under your orders, directing them to 
cause the same to be read to their respective 
crews warning them at the same time of the danger 
to which they will be exposed by failing to pay 
proper attention thereto.3^
34ADM 2/117.
35ADM 2/1079.
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As time consuming as his administrative functions
were, the most important role played by the commander in
chief in matters of discipline was judicial. Although
Section Seven of the Consolidation Act of 1749 prohibited
him from presiding at naval tribunals when hi,s squadron
consisted of five or more vessels, the commanding officer
was the only official on a foreign station who could
convene courts martial legally. Moreover, the warrant
empowering him to do so gave him the discretionary power
to determine which cases were brought to trial and which
were not. According to John McArthur, the commander in
chief had the authority to dismiss all charges which were
3 6either frivolous or improperly drawn.
Once the commanding officer of the station had set the 
wheels of justice in motion, it was his duty to execute 
the sentence of the court. Because punishments were 
carried out by his warrant, the commander in chief, here 
too, possessed discretionary power. Usually he did little 
more than establish the time and place of the infliction 
of punishment. However, it was his prerogative —  if he 
chose to exercise it —  to mitigate the sentence either by 
remitting part of it or, with the exception of capital 
verdicts, by pardoning the offender completely. Thus,
36McArthur, Principles and Practice of Naval and 
Military Courts Martial, vol.l: pp. 220-226.
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after putting the ringleaders of the mutiny of the 
Excellent to death on 30 December 1802, Commodore Samuel 
Hood sent Captain John Nash the following memorandum:
Whereas I entertain a firm confidence the 
example made this day has been a sufficient one 
to deter others from the commission of acts of 
mutiny, for which those four unfortunate men have 
so justly suffered, and that the ends of public 
justice will be answered, and the good discipline 
of the navy, supported by a mark of clemency I do 
therefore grant a remission of the whole of the 
punishment awarded to Michael Farrel, Michael 
Brien, Michael Reily, John Cox, John Evans and 
Jonathan Saul, seamen belonging to his Majesty's 
ship Excellent by the sentence of a court martial 
held on board the Blenheim, on the 27, 28 and 29 
days of December 1802 and their punishment is 
hereby remitted accordingly.37
On a smaller scale, the captain of a man-of-war 
carried responsibilities similar to those of the commander 
in chief. Whereas the commander in chief was accountable 
for all incidents involving the Royal Navy that occurred 
on his station, the captain was liable for "the whole 
conduct and good government" of his vessel. The commander 
was the workhorse of naval administration. The Admiralty 
assigned him a wide variety of duties which touched upon 
virtually every aspect of life at sea. He was to see that 
his subordinates performed their tasks efficiently in 
conformity with accepted naval practice. He was to care 
for the health and well-being of his crew by making, sure 
that his ship was clean and his men were given their full
37ADM 50/36.
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allowances of provisions and clothing. He was to examine 
the ship's accounts and expenditures to prevent waste, 
fraud, and embezzlement. He was to inform the Lords 
Commissioners of the proceedings on board the vessel under 
his command by sending them logs and musters at specified 
intervals. In short, the captain was to do his utmost to 
see that his ship was managed in an orderly and economical 
manner conducive to the welfare of his men and the good of 
the service.
«
Though the Regulations and Instructions were quite
specific about the captain's duties, they provided little
detail in most cases about the methods by which he was to
discharge his functions. The broad boundaries fixed by
the Admiralty gave the commander considerable scope in the
management of his vessel. As long as he stayed within
these bounds he was free to run his ship by and large as
he pleased. In few aspects of his command did he exercise
more discretion than in his punitive capacity. Only a
small number of the provisions in each edition of the
Regulations and Instructions pertained directly to the
captain's duty tp maintain order on board the ship under
his charge. His primary responsibility was to uphold the
Articles of War by suppressing all acts "contrary to the
38rules of discipline and obedience." However, he was
38Reoulations and Instructions. 1st ed., p. 45.
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not to do so in an arbitrary or brutal manner. He was 
never to punish "without sufficient cause." Morover, he 
was to supervise all punishments personally to ensure that 
they were "properly inflicted." Above all, he was not to 
permit "the inferior officers or men to be treated with
O Q
cruelty or oppression by their superiors." For this
reason, he, and he alone, was given competency to punish
the members of his crew summarily.
The Regulations and Instructions placed only a limited
number of restrictions on the commander's punitive
authority. The most notable restraint was his inability 
to punish the commissioned or principal warrant officers 
serving on board his vessel for serious crimes. If one of 
these officers stood accused of a gross violation of the 
Articles of War the captain was to place him under arrest 
and petition the commander in chief to have him tried by 
court martial. The commander also was denied the power to 
levy the death penalty, for only a court martial could 
deprive a man of his life. His ability to punish was 
circumscribed still further by the limitations imposed by 
both editions of the Regulations and Instructions on the 
amount of corporal punishment he could inflict. Prior to 
1806 he was not to dispense more than twelve lashes for 
each offense; after that date he was not to flog a culprit
39Reoulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 163.
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"with greater severity" than the nature of his malfeasance
merited. Thus# theoretically at least, he was to turn
over all crimes which he thought deserved more serious
punishment to a court martial. Lastly, the earlier
compilation required him to apply certain penalties in
cases involving several minor infractions. For example,
if he found a seaman guilty of swearing, cursing, or
blasphemy he was to force the unfortunate tar "to wear a
wooden collar or some other shameful badge" for as long as
he deemed appropriate. From officers culpable of the same
misdemeanors he was to exact a fine according to the
schedule of "a commission officer...one shilling for each
40offense, and a warrant or inferior officer six-pence."
Despite these limitations the commander of a naval 
vessel still possessed tremendous discretionary authority 
in disciplining the men under him. Neither edition of the 
Regulations and Instructions placed any qualification on 
the frequency with which he could punish. Thus the number 
of punishments he meted out depended entirely upon his 
disposition. Furthermore, neither collection of 
instructions specified the penalties to be inflicted for 
the vast majority of offenses beyond vague references to 
"the usage of the sea.” Hence, it was the captain's 
prerogative to decide how to deal with most infractions.
^ Regulations and Instructions. 1st ed., p. 46
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At his pleasure, a thief, for instance, could be given a 
dozen lashes, be forced to run the gauntlet, or be brought 
before a court martial. Moreover, both collections failed 
to provide precise definitions for most of the 
misdemeanors enumerated by the Articles of War. By 
default, therefore, it was left to the captain to 
establish the specific acts constituting these crimes. As 
a result, what was criminal in one ship was tolerated in 
another. "There are, to be sure, printed directions for 
to be observed by all king's ships," recorded Robert 
Wilson in his journal, "but then, generally speaking, most 
officers have plans of their own which the crews over 
which they command do follow; and it's a common saying, 
'different ships, different- rules, ' for it • must be 
considered that every commanding officer of a vessel of 
war is like unto a prince in his own state and his crew 
may be considered as his subjects, for his word is 
law.
Following the lead of the commentators of the period, 
modern historians have laid great emphasis on the 
captain's ability to discipline his men. According to one 
of the more recent students of the social history of the 
navy, the commander "had more power over them than the
41Robert Mercer Wilson, "Remarks on board His 
Majesty's Ship Unite of 40 Guns," in Five Naval Journals. 
1789-1817. ed. H.G. Thursfield (London: Navy Records
Society no 91, 1951), p. 243.
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king —  for the king could not order a man to be
j| A
flogged." True his dominion was extensive, but it was 
not without parallel in eighteenth-century British civil 
administration. The jurisdiction of a captain in the 
Royal Navy bore a remarkable similarity to that of the 
Justice of the Peace. If the commander has been likened 
to a king, the local magistrate has been described as a
A O
law unto himself. Loosely supervised from above, the
Justice wielded considerable powers of summary punishment
which, like the captain, he exercised at his own
discretion. According to Bertram Osborne, the JP's
authority "was often summary jurisdiction in its most
literal form. The accused would be taken to a Justice's
house where the proceedings, if such a word can be used to
describe the travesty of a trial conducted in secret in
the Justice's parlour, might end in the imposition of a
44heavy fine or a sentence of imprisonment." In
addition to possessing the disciplinary powers of a naval 
captain, the magistrate administered many of the same
types of punishment that were at the commander's 
disposal. Like the commanding officer, the Justice could
42p0pe, Life in Nelson's Navv. p. 62.
^Bertram Osborne, Justices of the Peace. 
1361-1848: A History of the Justices of the Peace for the
Counties of England (Shaftesbury: The Sedgehill Press,
1960), p. 179.
44Ibid.. p. 203.
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condemn a person guilty of a misdemeanor to be whipped,
fined, imprisoned, or required to wear some mark of
dishonor. Moreover, in more serious cases, both officials
could present suspects before criminal tribunals.
The captain's principal deputy in the maintenance of
order afloat was the lieutenant. Possessing no ex-officio
jurisdiction to punish offenders, the lieutenant
functioned in a supervisory capacity similar to that of an
45eighteenth-century constable. His duty was to detect 
crimes and report them to the captain for adjudication. 
During his watch he was to remain continuously on deck to 
supervise the men in the performance of their tasks. He 
was to muster them frequently and provide the commander 
with the names of all who were absent from their 
stations. He was to be especially diligent in suppressing 
noise, confusion, and profanity among the ship's company.
45However the Regulations and Instructions of 1806 
did grant the senior lieutenant limited authority to 
discipline in the absence of the captain: "He may put
under arrest any officer whose conduct he shall think so 
reprehensible as to require it; and he may confine such 
men as he shall think deserving of punishment; but neither 
he, nor any other lieutenant who may, become commanding 
officer, is to release an officer from his arrest, nor to 
release, nor punish, any man who has been confined, which 
is to be done by the captain only; unless he be absent 
from the ship with leave from the Admiralty, or from the 
commander in chief, in which case it is to be done only by 
the senior lieutenant commanding the ship in his absence
(pp. 180-182)."
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At night he was to see that the master at arms and the 
corporals kept peace below the hatches by patrolling the 
vessel at regular intervals.
After 1806 the Admiralty officially sanctioned the 
lieutenant's role as superintendent of a division of the 
ship's complement. Developed in the middle of the
eighteenth century# the divisional system was employed on 
board individual vessels in a variety of forms, all of 
which had the common purpose of providing the captain with
i
greater control over his crew by organizing the men into
small manageable groups under the supervision of
lieutenants and petty officers. The scheme eventually 
adopted by their Lordships was set forth in the
Regulations and Instructions of 1806:
He [i.e., the captain] is, with the
assistance of the officers, to divide all the 
ship's company, exclusive of the marines, into as 
many divisions as there are lieutenants allowed 
to the ship; the divisions are to be equal in 
number to each other, and the men are to be taken 
equally from the different stations in which they 
are watched. A lieutenant is to command each 
division; he is to have under his orders as many 
master's mates and midshipmen as the number on 
board, being equally divided, will admit: he is
to sub-divide his division into as many 
sub-divisions as there are mates and midshipmen 
fit to command them under his orders, and he is 
to give the command of a sub-division to each of 
them. The lieutenants are to be attended [sic] 
to, and to be responsible for, every thing 
relating to the conduct of the men of the 
divisions they command. They are to attend to 
all their exercises; to examine into the state of 
their clothes and bedding; to see that they keep 
themselves as clean as the duty of the ship will 
admit; to prevent swearing, drunkenness, and 
every other immorality: they are to see that the
master's mates and midshipmen are attentive to
35
the exercising and superintending of their
sub-divisions, and they are to report to the 
captain whatever men they find ignorant, idle,
dirty or profligate, that they may be instructed, 
exercised or punished as circumstances may 
require.46
Like the lieutenant, the host of warrant and petty
officers serving on board a naval vessel were expected to
inform the captain of any wrongdoing that they
discovered. In this way, they all played a direct part in
the enforcement of discipline. However, only two of these
officers, the boatswain and the master at arms, were
assigned specific disciplinary functions by the
Regulations and Instructions. With the aid of his mates,
the boatswain was to make sure that the crew discharged
their duties "with alacrity and without noise or 
47confusion." The master at arms was charged with much
more extensive responsibilities. Assisted by the ship's
corporals he was to make the rounds of the ship twice an
hour "to prevent, or put to an end, all improper drinking,
48all quarrelling, rioting or other disturbances." He 
was to be present whenever another vessel came alongside 
the ship to thwart desertion and smuggling. And, on ships
46Reaulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., pp. 
143-144.
47ibid.. p. 227.
46Ibid.. p. 375
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which did not carry marines/ he was to train sentinels and
post them in appropriate places.
In most ships, however/ there were marines to serve as
sentries. Usually the captain placed several o£ these
red-jacketed sea soldiers outside of his cabin and at
important points below deck like the spirit room and the
magazine. Yet the marines did not act simply as guards.
During the French Revolutionary and Napleonic Wars they
were used routinely to put down disturbances among
seamen. In his essay, "Some Naval Mutinies/'1 David Hannay
relates a "traditional exchange" which colorfully
illustrates this role of the marines:
"What is the use of you lobsters?" said the 
bluejacket to the marine. "You don't know 
nothing, and you ain't no good." "The use of 
us," said the marine with solemn brevity, "is to 
keep you from mutinevina."49
Time and again during the turbulent years around the turn
of the century they were called upon to suppress shipboard 
50rebellions. And, on the whole, they performed this 
unpleasant duty admirably. The members of the court 
martial which tried the mutineers of the Excellent, for 
example, were so impressed with the conduct of the marines
49David Hannay, "Some Naval Mutinies," Blackwood's 
Magazine. 187 (April, 1910): p. 497.
50See Colonel C. Field, "The Marines in the Great 
Naval Mutinies, 1797-1802," Journal of the Roval United 
Services Institution. 62 (November, 1917): pp. 720-746.
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during the mutiny that they sent the commander in chief 
the following memorandum:
The court is highly sensible of the active 
exertions of the officers of His Majesty's ship 
Excellent in quelling the late mutiny on board 
her, and also of the officers, non-commissioned 
officers and private marines of his Majesty's 
ship Excellent who by their firmness in resisting 
the attempts to seduce them from their duty and 
in opposing men in actual mutiny have proved 
themselves to be. well deserving of the late 
distinguished mark of his Majesty's favor.51
Indeed, the great disciplinarian, Lord St. Vincent, was 
such a firm believer in the marines' value in maintaining 
order afloat that years after the wars had ended he 
claimed: "I never knew an appeal made to them for honour,
courage, or loyalty, that they did not more than realize 
my highest expectations. If ever the hour of real danger 
should come to England, they will be found the country's 
sheet anchor.''52
Such was the structure of naval discipline in the late 
eighteenth century. Like the English criminal code, the 
Articles of War created the framewdrk for a "selective 
system of terror" which was administered at both summary 
and curial levels. And it is to the theory and practice 
of curial proceedings that the second chapter is devoted.
SlADM 1/324. In April of 1802 George III granted 
the corp the title "Royal Marines."
52Quoted in Major General J.L. Moulton, The Roval 
Marines (London: Leo Cooper, 1972), p. 20.
CHAPTER TWO 
"MATURELY AND DELIBERATELY"
i
i
Few institutions of the eighteenth-century Royal Navy 
have received less attention from modern historians than 
the court martial. Indeed, the only scholarly monograph 
treating naval tribunals to appear since the turn of the 
the century is David Hannay's Naval Courts Martial which 
was published in 1914. However, Hannay was less 
interested in examining these tribunals as instruments of 
law, than in culling from the transcripts of the trials 
information that would shed light on various aspects of 
life at sea during the age of sail. As a result, his 
study tends to create the impression that courts martial 
were composed of men unlettered in jurisprudence who, 
through a nebulous sense of fair play, somehow managed to 
render "justice" in the majority of cases.1
^•Hannay, Naval Courts Martial, pp. 192-206.
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Since its appearance, Hannay*s view of courts martial 
has enjoyed general acceptance by students of the Royal 
Navy. It has been echoed most forcefully in one of the 
more recent social histories of the fleet. In Life in 
Nelson's Navy. Dudley Pope cites several disparaging 
comments by Captain Frederick Chamier, the paucity of 
regulations establishing trial procedure and a supposed 
lack of text books on naval law as proof of the primitive 
nature of naval tribunals. In his opinion, "the system 
by which a seaman or officer was court martialled had much 
in common with an errant man brought before the elders of 
his tribe, who dispensed justice not from written
3
precedents but on the basis of how it seemed to them."
Yet to equate naval courts martial to gatherings of 
tribal elders is to misinterpret them completely. Far 
from being amateurish assemblies of officers with little 
—  if any —  knowledge of legal forms and proceedings, 
these tribunals manifested many of the characteristics of
2The author claims that there were not "any useful 
books on court-martial law and precedent until 1813, when 
John McArthur, who had been secretary to Admiral Lord 
Hood, wrote two volumes called Principle and Practice of 
Naval and Military Courts Martial (p. 242.)." In point of 
fact, the first edition of McArthur's work appeared in 
June, 1792. By 1813, it had been revised and expanded 
four times. Moreover, Delafons' Treatise was published in 
1805. Thus for much of the period there were reference 
materials available.
3Pope, Life, p. 242. See also Rodger, The Wooden 
World, p. 223.
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the eighteenth-century British criminal courts. Not only 
did they pay remarkably close attention to the established 
judicial procedures of the day, they administered the law 
in much the same fashion as it was enforced on shore. In 
short/ the principles and practices of the common law were 
applied to justice at sea wherever possible.4
Eighteenth-century naval jurisprudence was rooted 
firmly in the traditions of the common law. Beyond 
adapting many of the forms of the English legal system, it 
observed most of that system's conventions. No man could 
be brought before a court martial unless he was charged 
with specific crimes. Trials were held in public before 
an impartial panel of jurists to allow the prisoner the 
chance to confront his accuser in open court. All 
evidence was given viva voce in the defendant's presence 
which enabled him to dispute the statements of the 
prosecution's witnesses. Only facts relevant to the 
particular allegations against the accused were accepted 
as valid evidence by the court. When all the testimony
4For British criminal courts in the eighteenth 
century, see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, vol. 4, Intro. Thomas A. Green (1769; reprint, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 336-382;
J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England. 1660-1800 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.
314-449; John H. Langbein, "The Criminal Trial before the 
Lawyers," University of Chicago Law Review 45 (Winter, 
1978): pp. 263-316; and idem. "Shaping the
Eighteenth-Century Trial: A view from the Ryder Sources,"
University of Chicago Law Reveiw 50 (Winter, 1983): pp.
1-136.
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Table 1
General Types of Crime Adjudicated by Courts Martial
Category of Crime N % of Total
Absence/Desertion 120 25.2
Alcohol 43 9.0
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer 17 3.6
Disobedience 38 8.0
Disturbances/Uncleanness 13 2.7
Immorality 6 1.3
Insolence/Contempt 28 5.9
Loss of Ship 32 6.7
Mutiny/Sedition 60 12.6
Miscellaneous 31 6.5
Neglect 24 5.0
Property 31 6.5
Tyranny and Oppression 11 2.3
Violence 21 4.8
Total N 477
Source: Sample
had been heard# a decision was rendered by majority vote 
solely on the basis of what had been presented during the 
trial. Finally all guilty verdicts theoretically were
5
subject to appeal and royal review.
^According to Delafons# defendants could appeal 
unfavorable verdicts to the King and his privy council. 
However# this was done very infrequently. Delafons# 
Treatise, pp. 25-27.
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Like the procedure in criminal cases, naval due
process accorded the defendant considerable protection.
He could not be forced to incriminate himself; he could
not be tried twice for the same crime; and he could not be
prosecuted for any offense that was committed more than
three years prior to the request for the trial. Moreover,
♦
witnesses for the prosecution could not sit as his judges 
even though their rank and seniority might qualify them to 
do so. Furthermore, the presumption that he was innocent 
until proven guilty was implied by the axiom that a court
i
equally divided on the verdict resulted in automatic 
acquittal.
Indeed the only major difference between the two
legal systems was .the absence of a true jury composed of
the defendant's peers at naval courts martial. Under
naval jurisprudence the functions of judge and jury were
combined in the body of officers who constituted the
tribunals. As a result seamen and petty officers were
denied their theoretical right at common law to be tried
by a group of their equals. The denial of this basic
right was based on the assumption that juries made up of
men of lesser rank than commander would be likely to
render verdicts that would subvert discipline and
justice. As one eighteenth-century student of criminal
law in the navy put it:
If the inferior officer be admitted on the trial 
of an inferior officer, why not a seaman or 
soldier on the trial of his brother seamen or
43
soldiers? And it is obvious to every person, 
acquainted with the practical jparts of a naval 
and military life, that this measure would defeat 
the ends of its formulation, and, by a 
confederacy between the parties, that the power 
of punishment would be annihilated, and, 
subordination, the very soul of discipline, be 
destroyed. We must recollect too, that a jury so 
framed, would be in direct opposition to the 
principle of impannelling [sic] juries in our 
courts of law, where impartiality and disunion of 
interest are the leading features.
ii
Because naval law was subordinate to the common .law, 
courts martial had a very limited jurisdiction. Only the
offenses presented by the Articles of War were cognizable
1
by naval tribunals. Moreover, with the exception of the
provisions for spies contained in Article Five, these
crimes had to be committed by members of the fleet "in
actual service and in full pay" to be amenable to naval 
7
justice. Hence, although he had behaved in an 
"insolent and overbearing manner" to Rear Admiral Sir 
Samuel Hood on the night of 18 October 1803, Lieutenant 
Edward Tobyn could not be brought to trial because at the 
time the incident occurred Tobyn was on the half pay list 
employed as the second mate of a Guineaman anchored in
6McArthur, Principles and Practices, vol. 1, pp.
140-141.
722 Geo II c 33.
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O
Carlisle Bay.
Yet if only members of the fleet "in actual service
and in full pay" were liable to courts martial, they could
be forced to stand trial only for those offenses listed in
Article Thirty-four (mutiny, desertion, or disobedience of
orders) which were not violations of the criminal code
when committed on shore in His Majesty's dominions or for
infractions of the Articles of War perpetrated in areas
where the common law did not have jurisdiction. As
defined by the Consolidation Act of 1749, there were .but
two areas where the common law did not have precedence.
The first was "upon the main sea, or in great rivers only,
beneath the bridges of the said rivers nigh to the sea, or
in any haven, river or creek within the jurisdiction of
the admiralty." The second in compliance with Article
Thirty-five was all places which did not acknowledge the
9sovereignty of the British monarch. Thus Barachias 
Glascott, John Plane, John Townsend, and Joseph Holmes of 
H.M.S. Winchelsea were tried on 22 April 1794 for stealing 
several hundred gold coins from a house on Guadaloupe 
because that island was not formally a British
®ADM 1/324. Half Pay was a remuneration paid to 
commissioned officers and masters and surgeons when they 
were not on active duty. In effect, it was a retainer.
922 Geo II c 33. In cases involving the crime of 
murder another distinction was made. If the victim 
received his wound and died in an area beyond the 
jurisdiction of the common law, his murderer was tried by 
a court martial. However, if he either received his wound
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possession.10 However the case against Lieutenant John 
Butler, who was accused of conduct unbecoming an officer 
and a gentleman by an inhabitant of Bridgetown, Barbados, 
was dismissed by a naval tribunal on 6 September 1805 on 
the grounds that since Butler had been "upon the shore, on 
leave.... in His Majesty's dominions" when ( his alleged 
misbehavior had taken place the court was not authorized 
by the statute regulating naval justice to proceed against 
him.11
Finally, the jurisdiction of courts martial was 
restricted by the temporal limitation imposed by Section 
Twenty-three of the Consolidation Act. By that clause no 
member of the fleet could be tried for any offense that 
was committed more than three years prior to the 
submission of the formal letter of complaint containing 
the allegation. "Hence we perceive the wisdom and 
humanity of the legislature," wrote John McArthur, "in 
guarding against acts of oppression and malice, by keeping 
charges against any offender in reserve for too long a 
period, and afterwards bringing them forward collectively,
in His Majesty's dominions and died at sea or received his 
wound at sea and died in His Majesty's dominions, his 
kijler was tried by the criminal courts. McArthur, vol. 
1, pp. 276-278.
10ADM 1/5331.
ADM 1/326, Cochrane to Admiralty, 10 September
1805.
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12when he may be deprived of the means of exculpation."
Although the maximum time limit was three years,
often charges were dismissed if it appeared that they had
been harbored maliciously for much shorter periods.
Indeed it seems that the general unwritten rule was that
letters of complaint were to be drawn up and submitted at
the earliest possible opportunity if they were to lead to
courts martial. For example, on 15 August 1805, Peter
Devese, the boatswain of H.M.S. L'Africaine. formally
accused his captain, Thomas Manby, of having used
"oppressive language" when speaking to him on several
occasions. However Manby was not brought to trial as a
result of these allegations because a committee appointed
by Sir Alexander Cochrane to investigate them ruled that
the incidents had occurred too far in the past to warrant
the assemblage of a naval tribunal. In the opinion of the
committee, Devese's "complaints against Capt[ain] Manby
being so long since as April and July 1803 and May 1804
ought long before the present time to have been
represented as the ship has been often in port where if
the boatswain really had occasion to complain, he might 
13have done so."
Commanders in chief frequently employed such courts 
of inquiry to determine the validity of complaints or to
12McArthur, vol. 1, p. 263.
13ADM 1/326.
•i
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resolve disputes between officers that did not entail 
violations of the Articles of War. Usually these courts 
were called to examine only particularly complex 
questions. Assembled by the authority of the commander of 
the station, they investigated cases and assessed the 
probable guilt or innocence of the parties involved. 
However, they could render no legally binding verdict 
based on their assessment nor could they inflict any 
punishment. All they could do was advise the commanding 
officer whether or not there were sufficient grounds for a 
cause to be brought before a naval tribunal. Thus they 
functioned in much the same capacity as a grand jury. As 
John Delafons put it: "Courts of inquiry may be described
as in some degree similar to grand juries, who are 
convened in order to decide on the truth of a bill of 
indictment."14
Since none of the Acts regulating naval jurisprudence 
provided for them, courts of inquiry had no statutory 
basis. Nevertheless, it had long been customary to 
convene them and it was from this tradition that their 
legitimacy derived. Despite their questionable 
constitutional position, such courts were very popular 
with the commanders of foreign stations because they 
provided a convenient means to avoid many of the problems 
associated with naval tribunals. According to John
14Delafons, pp. 57-58.
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McArthur, "the original intent of them appears to have
arisen from a lenient wish not to give unnecessary
trouble, either to the person whose conduct is the subject
of enquiry, or to the assemblage of members necessary to
compose a court martial and which assemblage might
sometimes cause delays, highly injurious and detrimental
*
to the service."15
As extra-constitutional devices, courts of inquiry 
were much less formal than naval tribunals. Generally 
they were composed of from three to five officers 
depending on the complexity of the case under
examination. Like the members of courts martial, these 
men heard the facts relevant to the cause presented orally 
in their presence. However they were not encymbered by 
the procedural guidelines adhered to at nautical trials. 
Witnesses did not give their testimony under oath.
Moreover those with knowledge of the matter in question 
could not be forced to relate what they knew about the 
charge. So relaxed were the rules governing the conduct 
of courts of inquiry that Delafons claimed that it was
well within the power of an inquest to deny the defendant
the right to confront his accuser.16
When a court had gathered what it considered to be
15jicArthur, vol. 1, p. 115.
16Delafons, pp. 46-47.
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enough evidence upon which to base a recommendation for or 
against a trial# it concluded its proceedings and reported 
its findings to the commanding officer of the station. 
The reports submitted by courts of inquiry varied greatly 
in both content and detail. Some offered painstakingly 
clear pictures of the evidence which led them to their 
conclusions. The memorandum exonerating Captain Edward 
Scobell of any criminal involvement in the death of a 
troublesome former French slave on board the Vimiera on 22 
September 1809# for example, contained several letters 
from that sloop's doctor, the opinion of a committee of 
surgeons charged with determining the cause of the unfor­
tunate freedman’s demise, and Scobell's lengthy explan-
17ation of the events surrounding the incident. Others
merely consisted of a terse statement of the inquest's
judgment. The report of an inquiry into allegations
against one of the lieutenants of a third rate ship of the
line on 2 October 1804, for instance, declared simply:
The court, in pursuance of orders from Commodore 
Hood Commander in Chief etc, etc, etc to us 
directed, dated the 7th September 1804,
proceeded to enquire into the conduct of
Lieutenant Howard of His Majesty's Ship Centaur, 
on charges exhibited against him by John
Baldwin, private marine of the said ship and 
having examined with attention the different 
witnesses are of opinion that the charge is
1?ADM 1/331. Because courts of inquiry were 
informal bodies, minutes of the testimony given before 
them were not required and seldom kept.
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totally unfounded and that there is not the 
least ground for a court martial.18
While courts of inquiry could recommend that members
of the fleet be brought to trial, they had no authority to
convene naval tribunals. During his tenure of office,
only the commander in chief had the jurisdiction to
assemble courts martial on foreign stations. Moreover the
standard warrant from the Admiralty commissioning him to
do so granted him considerable discretionary power in
calling them. Every license to hold naval tribunals
issued to the various admirals who presided over the
Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 1812 began with
the following clause: "For the better maintaining a
proper government and strict discipline in the squadron
under your command, we do hereby authorize and empower you
to call and assemble courts martial as often as you shall 
19see occasion." Therefore, the commanding officer was 
free to accept or reject petitions for trials at his 
pleasure —  even if they were endorsed by the 
recommendations of courts of inquiry.
In the absence of the commander in chief, this 
tremendous authority was assumed temporarily by the 
senior officer remaining on the station. Section Seven of 
the Consolidation Act of 1749 specifically provided that
18ADM 1/5367.
1^ADM 2/117.
in the event of his death, recall, or removal the officer
upon whom the command devolved was to have "the same power
to call and assemble courts martial as the first commander
in chief of the said fleet or squadron was invested 
20with." Thus, when Rear Admiral Sir Richard Hughes 
returned to , England ,in June 1786, Horatio Nelson, as 
ranking member of the fleet in the Leewards though only a 
twenty-seven year old post captain at the time, exercised 
the jurisdiction to convene naval tribunals until Hughes's 
replacement arrived in the West Indies.
In addition to making allowance for the absence of 
the commander in chief from the station, the statute 
regulating naval jurisprudence stipulated several other 
special situations in which courts martial might be called 
by his subordinates. Should five or more ships happen to 
meet "in foreign parts," the ranking officer had the 
authority to convene tribunals for the duration of the 
rendezvous. Furthermore Section Eight of the Act enjoined 
the commanding officer of a foreign station who detached 
any part of his flotilla "to impower the chief commander 
of the squadron or detachment so ordered on such separate 
service (and in case of his death or removal, the officer 
to whom the command of such separate squadron or 
detachment [devolved]) to hold courts martial during the
2022 Geo. II c 33.
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21time of such separate service."
However, commanders in chief or those designated to
act in their stead had no legal authority to determine the
composition of the judicial bodies they convened. All
naval tribunals were to consist of no more than thirteen
or no less than five members. Within this range, the
actual number of men who heard a given case was to be
equal to the sum of flag officers and post captains who
were "next in seniority" to the president of the court and
who were at hand to be empaneled at the place where the
22trial was to be held. To guard against the
21Ibid.
22Occasionally circumstances were such as to give 
rise to some confusion about conforming with the letter of 
these regulations. One instance occurred on the Leeward
Islands station in 1794 while the reduction of Martinique 
was in progress: "At Fort Royal, during the siege of Fort
Bourbon, several courts martial were assembled on board
the Vengeance. Commodore Thompson; some on subjects of 
small moment, but others on crimes of a very serious
nature: doubts arose about the legality of those courts;
as none were summoned to sit, or did attend to take their 
seats, but the captains of such ships as were at Fort 
Royal; which were the Vengeance, the Irresistable. the 
Boyne. the Veteran, and the Asia: the commodore being
president. But the objections were overruled: and, as
little doubt was made that the strictest justice would 
attend the decisions of the court (though not composed 
strictly according to law), and as the exigencies of the 
service would not have made it very wise to call from 
their duties the captains of the different ships, who were 
detached from the flag, (though in sight at Cul de Sac,
Cohe, and at Case Navire) the courts were holden without
farther delay." A Naval Officer, "Journal of the
Proceedings of a Squadron of his Majesty's ships, under 
the Command of Sir John Jervis, K.B. employed in 
conjunction with a Body of Troops, under the Command of 
Sir Charles Grey, K.B. to reduce the French colonies in 
the Leeward Islands, 1794 and 1795," Naval Chronicle 18 
(1807): pp. 45-46.
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possibility of a packed court still further, the
thirteenth clause of the statute regulating naval
discipline expressly declared: "That nothing herein
contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to
authorize or impower the lord high admiral, or the
commissioners for executing the office of lord high
admiral, or any officer impowered to order or hold courts
martial, to direct or ascertain the particular number of
persons of which any court martial, to be held or
appointed by virtue of this present act, shall 
23consist." In short, no qualified officer could be 
denied his seat at a naval tribunal arbitrarily.24
Nevertheless, there were legitimate instances when 
senior officers could be passed over in favor of their 
juniors. The most obvious of these was "in case of 
sickness or other extraordinary and indispensable
2322 Geo. II c 33.
24while no court martial convened on the Leeward
Islands station between 1784 and 1812 was composed of less
than five members, most did not exceed the requisite 
minimum number. A random survey of fifty tribunals
reveals that forty of them consisted of five officers, 
four consisted of six officers, five consisted of seven
officers, and one consisted of eleven officers. Moreover, 
it should be noted that the number of judges constituting 
a court was not a function of the seriousness of the case 
to be adjudicated. Whereas the trial of the mutineers of
the Excellent was held before five captains on 27-29
December 1802 (ADM 1/5362), the fate of Peter Ross, a 
seaman belonging to H.M.S. Arethusa who was accused of
desertion, was decided by eleven commanders on 14 April
1796 (ADM 1/5335).
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25occasion." Any potential member of a tribunal wishing
to be released from his judicial duty was required to
petition the president of the court for a dispensation
prior to the commencement of the trial. And, in matters
of infirmity, the invalid's reason for not attending and
its verification by a naval doctor were to be included in 
%
the minutes of the proceedings of the court martial.
Hence, prior to the examination of witnesses for the
prosecution at the trial of three officers of H. M. Sloop
Hawke on 18 July 1798, Robert Christie, surgeon of the
Prince, was called to testify that his captain, Adrian
Renou, had "Admiral Harvey's leave of absence to go into
the country on account of bad health" and thus was unable
26 1
to hear the case.
At the same time the defendant had a very
circumscribed right to challenge prospective members of
naval courts martial. According to both editions of the
Regulations and Instructions a ranking officer was to be
disqualified without exception from sitting on a tribunal
27if he had a vested interest in the case to be tried. 
"Here we again discover the wisdom and precaution of the
2519 Geo. Ill c 17 sec. 2.
26ADM 1/5345.
^ Regulations and Instructions. 1st ed., pp. 4-5;
Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 405.
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common law closely adhered to;" observed McArthur, "it
being an unalterable rule o£ law, that no man can sit as a
28judge in his own cause." Similarly, no officer who had 
served on a court of inquiry could adjudicate issues 
resulting from that particular court's findings. As 
Delafons pointed out, this was entirely consistent with 
the practice followed at criminal proceedings. Drawing 
the analogy, he remarked: "no indictor, or grand juror,
i
can be put upon a petty jury, for the trial of the same
cause, if challenged by the prisoner so indicted; nay, if
one of the indictors be returned upon the petty jury, and
29does not challenge himself, he is liable to be fined."
That the right of challenge was extremely restricted 
and very infrequently exercised in the eighteenth-century 
Royal Navy was due in large part to the limited number of 
qualified officers usually available at any given location 
to hear a case. Under such circumstances a liberal power 
to contest potential members could have resulted in a 
fatal paralysis of the whole system of justice. This was 
especially true on foreign stations, where, as it was, 
trials often were postponed for considerable periods for 
want of the minimum number of captains and commanders 
required to make a quorum. For example, Edward Davis, the
28jjcArthur, vol. 1, p. 226.
29Delafons, p. 123.
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master of H. M. Sloop Scorpion, spent nearly seven months
in confinement before he was dismissed from the service on
4 August 1788 for neglect of duty, disrespect,
30drunkenness, and unofficer-like behavior. It was
precisely to avoid a similar delay that Rear Admiral 
Cochrane ordered the trial of Captain Edmund Heywood, the 
officers and crew of H. M. S. Astrea for the loss of that 
vessel to convene in Carlisle Bay, Barbados on 11 June 
1808 instead of returning these men to the Jamaica station 
to face a tribunal at Port Royal. "It was my intention to 
have sent the whole to Jamaica to be tried by a court 
martial there;" he explained to their Lordships, "but 
Captain Heywood having represented to me that there were 
seldom five ships assembled together at that Port, I 
thought it would be proper and more convenient for the 
service that he [sic] should be tried here."^1
30ADM 51/873.
31ADM 1/324. Section Fourteen of the Consolidation 
Act reduced the difficulty of convening courts martial on 
foreign stations to some extent; but it did little to 
eliminate the problem. By that clause the president of a 
court, held at a place where at least five post captains 
could not be assembled, was authorized to empanel a 
maximum of two commanders below the rank of post captain 
to make the requisite minimum - provided that the other 
three members of the tribunal were "of the degree and 
denomination of a post captain or of a superior rank." 22 
Geo. II c 33. However, as long as the number of officers 
eligible to hear cases remained so narrowly restricted, 
postponement of trials was inevitable. As "Britanicus" 
remarked in a letter to the editor of the Naval Chronicle 
soon after the end of the Napoleonic Wars; "...it is 
quite obvious, that with such a reduced force as we at
It was not without good reason then that courts 
martial on the Leeward Islands station tended to be held 
in clusters. For the sake of convenience, cases awaiting 
trial usually were handled successively at roughly the 
same time. A survey of the surviving Reports of Courts 
partial reveals that of the 362 individuals whose cases 
were adjudicated in the Leewards from 1784 to 1812, 240, 
or eighty-one percent were heard within forty-eight hours 
of someone else1s. During a six-day period in June 1801 
ten members of the fleet, who had been arrested 
separately, were brought to trial for a variety of 
offenses ranging from drunkenness to desertion.32 
Moreover, in many instances men who stood accused of 
conspiring to commit the same crime were tried jointly. 
Thus the three seamen charged with participating in an 
attempted mutiny on board the Garland collectively met the 
tribunal called to deal with the affair on 25 November 
1800.33
present have on foreign stations, it must be a matter of 
extreme difficulty very often to bring a sufficient number 
of captains together: on the Leeward Islands station, for 
instance, there are only seven; and how very seldom can 
five of these be expected to be at Barbados, Antigua, or 
any other rendezvous." Naval Chronicle 37 (1817): p. 302.
32ADM 1/5356.
33a d m  1/5354. Trial of Thomas Gallaspie, Matthew 
Morrison and Peter Hook.
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Once convened, courts martial were governed by a very 
formal procedure. At the commencement of every trial the 
order for assembling the tribunal was read publicly by the 
officer appointed to serve as judge advocate. After 
reciting his warrant to act as such, he then administered 
the following oath individually to each member of the 
court:
I A. B. do swear, that I will duly administer 
justice, according to the articles and orders 
established by an act passed in the 
twenty-second year of the reign of his majesty 
King George the Second, for amending, 
explaining, and reducing into one act of 
parliament, the laws relating to the government 
of his Majesty's ships, vessels, and forces by 
sea, without partiality, favour, or affection; 
and if any case shall arise, which is not 
particularly mentioned in the said articles and 
orders, I will duly administer justice according 
to my conscience, the best of my understanding, 
and the custom of the navy in the like cases; 
and I do further swear, that I will not upon any 
account, at any time whatsoever, disclose or 
discover the vote or opinion of any particular 
member of this court martial, unless thereunto 
required by act of parliament.34
When he had sworn in the last member, the judge advocate, in
turn, vowed not to "disclose or discover the vote or opinion
of any particular member of this court martial, unless
35thereunto required by act of parliament."
3422 Geo. II c 33 sec. 16.
35Ibid .
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During the course of a trial, the judge advocate 
performed many functions. In addition to administering 
oaths to both the members of the court and the witnesses 
called to testify, he was to take minutes of the 
proceedings in writing and "read the same to the court in 
his hearing" so that errors could be amended, "advise the 
court of the proper forms," render an opinion on any 
problems encountered during the trial, and direct the 
deliberations on the verdict and sentence. In a word, he 
coordinated the activities of the tribunal and ensured 
that they were conducted according to accepted legal 
practice. As McArthur so aptly described his role: "The
judge advocate may be said to be the primum mobile of a 
court martial, as not only impelling it to action, but as 
being the person on whom, in great measure, depends that 
harmony of motion so necessary to constitute a regular 
court."36
Naturally the men who acted in this capacity were 
expected to be well versed in naval law —  particularly on 
foreign stations where courts frequently were composed of 
junior officers with little judicial experience. Usually 
those who performed the duties of a judge advocate were 
either the secretaries of the various commanders in chief
36McArthur, vol. 1, p. 279.
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or senior pursers with a reputation for being
knowledgeable about the principles and practices of
37military tribunals. Often the man appointed to
fulfill this office held the position for a considerable
time. In the Leewards it was not uncommon for him to
serve for several years. William Balhetchet, for example,
remained the station's judge advocate for almost half a 
3 8decade. Thus, although individual officers may have 
lacked extensive legal training, they were not bereft of 
counsel.
Having taken his oath, the judge advocate thereupon
read the letter of complaint containing the charge or
charges against the prisoner. This letter was analagous
' 39..to an indictment at criminal proceedings. Hence it
was to be drawn as precisely as possible to enable the
person on trial to prepare his best defense. It was to
state clearly the offense with which the prisoner was
accused and the specific time and place at which the
alleged infraction had occurred, "particularly so the
40defendant could claim an alibi.”
^Delafons, p. 155.
38ADM 1/333.
39McArthur, vol. 2, p. 6.
40Reaulations and Instructions. 1st ed., pp. 4-5; 
Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 405; McArthur, 
vol. 2, pp. 7-8.
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Vague or inaccurate charges routinely led to the 
dismissal of a case. Errors discovered in letters of 
complaint constituted an important grounds for acquittal 
at naval courts martial oh the Leeward Islands station in 
the later eighteenth century.41 For example, because 
Captain William Roberts's petition against Lieutenant 
Michael Raven simply accused him of "sleeping on his 
watch," the tribunal assembled to try the cause on 9 June 
1810 ruled:
that in consequence of the 2nd Article of the 
2nd chapter, section 12 under the head of Courts 
Martial, in the General Printed Instructions, 
the court was not authorized to proceed to 
trial: as it is there directed that 'All
representations or complaints intended as the 
foundation of a court martial are to be made in 
writing, setting forth the particular facts when 
and where, and in what manner the same were 
committed."42
Similarly, Daniel Brennan, the gunner of the Madrass. was
acquitted of a charge brought against him by Captain John
Dilkes of "having in breach of the 23rd Article of War
violently struck Mr. George Dali" on the night of 25
August 1797, when it was established by the court that the
incident in question had occurred ten days earlier than
43the date Dilkes claimed it had.
4^Of the sixty-eight men found innocent by
tribunals in the Lesser Antilles during the period under 
discussion, six, or approximately nine percent, were
exonerated because of inaccuracies in the indictment.
42ADM 1/5406.
42ADM 1/5343.
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The only instance in which inaccuracies in the letter
o£ complaint did not result in the dismissal of a case was
that of misnomer. As at the common law, if either the
Christian or surname of the defendant or victim was given
erroneously in the indictment, then a new warrant was to
be drawn up on the same charge and the trial was to
44proceed de novo. Of course, it goes without saying
that this mistake was made very infrequently. In fact, 
there is but a single example of it to be found among the 
surviving courts martial records from the Leewards during 
the period under discussion. On 18 June 1806, Rear 
Admiral Cochrane ordered Captain John Harvey to assemble a 
tribunal to adjudicate the causes of two seamen accused of 
participating in the mutiny of the Dominica armed sloop. 
In this order he listed the men's names as William Proctor 
and William Manson. However during the first day of the 
trial, it was discovered that neither of the prisoners was 
called William. According to the Dominica's muster book 
Proctor's forename was Henry and Manson's was John. When 
informed of his error, Cochrane consulted the Attorney 
General of Barbados who advised him that consonant with
criminal proceedings the defendants could still be brought
to justice. Thereupon the Admiral amended the original 
warrant, the court reconvened, and Proctor and Manson
44Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 4, pp. 328-329.
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subsequently were convicted and sentenced to death.45
After the letter of complaint had been read, the 
tribunal began the examination of witnesses. The 
invariable practice at courts martial was to call all 
persons in support of the charge followed by all those 
against it. Every deponent testified individually under 
oath before the entire audience, so that witnesses' 
"exceptions... [could] be publicly stated, and openly and 
publicly allowed or disallowed by the court."46 If his 
testimony was to be given in favor of the accusation, the 
attestant was examined first by the prosecutor, if any, 
then by the court, and finally by the defendant. If he 
was summoned to discredit the allegations he was 
questioned in exactly the opposite order.47
Like the criminal courts, naval tribunals relied 
primarily on parole evidence. As a general rule oral 
testimony given openly in the presence of the prisoner was 
preferred to declarations taken privately in long hand and 
read at the trial. It was an axiom of both naval and
45a DM 1/5374.
46Delafons, p. 227.
47Both sides had the prerogative to muster as many 
attestants as they pleased. However, it was potentially 
dangerous for the prosecution to subpeona a large number 
of witnesses. As McArthur cautioned: "it would be to no 
good purpose to call too many to establish the same facts, 
as this could only tend unnecessarily to protract the 
trial, and perhaps ultimately to elude the justice of the 
case." McArthur, vol. 2, p. 107.
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common law that verbal disclosures were a much more
effective means of attaining the facts of a case than were
the written depositions used at continental proceedings.
Not only was this method deemed a protection against false
witness, but it was seen as a guarantee of the defendant's
4 8right to challenge his accuser. So firmly imbedded in
naval jurisprudence was the practice of viva voce
testimony that, except in the most unusual of
circumstances, courts martial refused to accept the sworn
affidavits of people unable to appear before the
tribunal. For example, the assembly convened on 15 March
1804 to try Lieutenant James Edward Smith of His Majesty's
Brig Express for the death of an inhabitant of Trinidad
ruled that the "sundry depositions" recorded by the
Alcalde of that island could not be introduced as evidence
"as the persons of the deponents were not in court to
attend the trial and of course could not be confronted
with the prisoner, and which depositions would if admitted
have deprived the prisoner of the right which every
British subject has: that of interrogating each witness
49respectively."
During their examination witnesses were required to 
state only the facts relevant to the particular case under 
adjudication. Sworn to tell "the truth, the whole truth
48Blackstone, vol. 3, pp. 373-374.
48ADM 1/5365.
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and nothing but the truth," they were to be as precise in
their testimony as possible. To the best of their
knowledge, they were to describe in detail the actions
perpetrated by the defendant and to quote the exact words
he had spoken. "Whatever is given in evidence must be the
very fact or point at issue, either on one side or the
other, and no other evidence ought to be allowed;"
observed Delafons, "nor should collateral matter be
introduced, unless conducive or introductory to the main 
50point." In short, attestants were expected to confine
their remarks to the specific incident in question and to 
relate to the court all they knew about it regardless of 
whether this proved to be favorable or unfavorable to the 
cause of the party by which they had been summoned.
Representative of this style of interrogation is the
following exchange between the prosecutor and David 
Campbell during the trial of Commander William Ferris, who 
stood before a tribunal on 15 June 1803 accused of cruelty 
and oppression to the purser of the Drake;
Prosecutor - Do you recollect hearing
Capt[ain] Ferris tell me, 'I was
embezzling the king's money, and
that he might as well trust it to 
the care of a thief?'
Answer - I recollect the former, but not
the latter part of that speech.
Prosecutor - Do you recollect hearing, at the
same time, Capt[ain] Ferris say,
50Delafons, p. 212.
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that 'he would wring my nose!/ 
exclaiming/ "If I had been Mr. 
Brown, I would have run you 
through," and ask Mr. Brown 'why 
he did not'?
Answer - I recollect hearing him say, "was
it not for degrading the rank I 
hold,' (or words similar) "I 
would wring your nose." I 
recollect hearing the words, 'run 
through' spoken by Capt[ain] 
Ferris, but do not recollect any 
thing further.51
To insure that they obtained the facts of a case,
naval tribunals adopted the methods of inquiry followed at
criminal trials. The interrogation of each witness was
divided into two stages. In the initial phase, which was
known as "the original examination" or "the examination in
chief," the attestant was questioned by the party who had
called him in its behalf. During this inquisition the
examiner was not to pose leading questions which were
phrased in such a manner as to indicate a desired
52response. Therefore, the prosecutor, for example
could not ask someone testifying * in support of the 
charge: "Did you not see the defendent do such and such?"
or "Did you not hear the prisoner say this or that?," for, 
by including the word "not" in his query, he was prompting 
an affirmative reply. And, on the whole, courts were 
scrupulous in observing this convention. A random sample
51ADM 1/5363.
52McArthur, vol. 2, p. 39.
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of the transcripts of fifty trials reveals that it was 
violated at only five tribunals.
When the person who had summoned the witness had
received an answer to his last question, the interrogation
entered its second phase which was termed "the
cross-examination." In this stage the party not calling
the attestant and the members of the court had the
opportunity to probe the veracity of the statements made
in the original examination. During the
cross-questioning, the inquisitor was free to couch his
queries in whatever grammatical construction he chose.
"The prisoner in cross-examining the witnesses produced in
support of the charge, the prosecutor in cross-examining
those in behalf of the accused, and the members of the
court in examining either," explained McArthur, "can with
propriety frame their questions with the negative particle
not, and even blend them with collateral circumstances
connected with the fact under investigation, so as the
answers extracted from the witness may go to the whole
truth, with every extenuation or aggravation of the
53offense." Hence, at his trial for contempt,
disobedience and quarreling on 1 May 1796, defendant Henry 
Bayley was well within the bounds of acceptable practice 
in asking Samuel Whiteway: "Have you not said that
53ibid.. p. 42.
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L[ieutenan]t Pitman since this business has happened 
desired you to say to the court martial that you must say 
such and such things, which you then said you did not 
recollect."54
Any attestant daring to impede the discovery of the 
truth was liable to the judgment o£ the court. Consqnant 
with the criminal code, the Consolidation Act of 1749 gave 
naval tribunals the authority to punish witnesses who lied 
during their testimony, refused to render their evidence, 
or willfully distorted it in an attempt to pervert the 
ends of justice. By Section Seventeen of that Act those 
guilty of the first two offenses were subject to up to 
three months imprisonment, while those perjuring them­
selves could "be prosecuted in his Majesty's court of
King's Bench by indictment of information" under the
55various criminal statutes against false witness.
From the few instances found in the Reports of Courts 
Martial on the Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 
1812, it appears that these crimes were treated with the 
utmost legal severity. In every one of the six cases the 
maximum sentence was applied. For example, Thomas Moss 
was condemned to ninety days confinement in the Marshalsea 
prison for refusing "to give his evidence" during the 
trial of a member of the Excellent's carpenter's crew for
54ADM 1/5336.
5522 Geo. II c 33 sec. 17.
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mutinous expressions on 12 August 1802.56 Similarly, on 
23 October 1800 Thomas Morris, William Brown and George 
Spence of H.M.S. Hydra, having equivocated "grossly" when 
called to testify on behalf of a seaman accused of 
striking his superior officer, each received three months 
incarceration.57
Following the interrogation of the last witness in 
support of the allegation, the prisoner began his 
defense. , To enable the accused to plead his cause as best 
he could, the revised Regulations and Instructions of 1806 
stipulated that he was to be notified formally in writing 
of the charges against him "not less than twenty-four
C Q
hours before the trial." Moreover, if this proved to
be too short a time for him to prepare himself adequately,
it was customary for the court to adjourn the proceedings
upon his request. As a case in point, Captain William
Combe was granted a three-hour adjournment on 6 November
1807 to organize the evidence on his behalf against
accusations that he had not done his utmost during an
59engagement with a French corvette. In a word, the 
defendant was given every reasonable opportunity to 
exculpate himself.
56ADM 1/5362. Trial of John Barry.
57ADM 1/5354. Trial of Thomas Gayner.
^ Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 405.
59ADM 1/5384.
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Generally the rigour with which an individual
defended himself depended primarily upon the specific 
circumstances of his case. If his guilt seemed manifestly 
obvious, normally he did not address the charge directly. 
Instead he introduced collateral material intended to 
mitigate the severity of his sentence; or he simply threw 
himself upon the mercy of the court. For instance, seaman 
Charles Coleman of H.M.S. Excellent, who was tried for 
quarrelling and fighting on 6 July 1802, informed the tri­
bunal at the beginning of his defense that he would "not 
take up much of your time in attempting to do away what 
has come out in evidence" and simply reminded his judges 
of his advanced age and more than thirteen years of ser­
vice in the Royal Navy before soliciting character refer­
ences from several of his officers.60 However, if it 
appeared that the prisoner could vindicate himself by
pleading his cause strongly or if he was on trial for a
particularly heinous crime carrying with it an almost 
certain death penalty, then he routinely attempted to 
challenge the testimony brought forward by the prose­
cution. Thus, Captain Edward Woolcombe of the Hippomenes 
sloop, who was acquitted of "wasteful expenditure of His 
Majesty's stores" on 24 January 1807, presented a detailed
60ADM 1/5362. The solicitation of character 
references by defendants was a common practice at criminal 
trials as well. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, pp.
440-449.
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explanation of his actions and the reasoning behind them
and recalled several of the prosecutor's key witnesses for
rather lengthy examinations.61
Yet if defenses varied according to the circumstances
of the individual case, they did not correspond to the
prisoner's rank or level of literacy. Several of the
%
strongest rebuttals made at the trials held in the 
Leewards during the period under discussion were 
presented by illiterate seamen; some of the weakest were
offered by commissioned officers. For example, Robert
♦
Joblin, who was acquitted of "uncleaness and making an
unnatural attempt on the person of Joseph Saxby" on 12
August 1808, called eight witnesses on his behalf and had
the judge advocate. read a prepared statement for him —
even though his deposition was signed with "x his 
62mark." Lieutenant Michael Mackey, on the other hand,
went no further in defending himself against a charge of
"drunkenness and ungentlemanly behavior" on 29 July 1799
than to express "most fervently" his hope that "one act of
misconduct" would not ruin his otherwise unblemished 
63career.
That men of poor education or low rank were not 
handicapped in defending themselves was due in large part
61ADM 1/5377.
62ADM 1/5388.
63ADM 1/5350.
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to the safeguards accorded the prisoner by naval
jurisprudence. One of the most important of these
protections was the custom of allowing the defendant to
receive legal advise during his trial. "It is .... the
practice at courts martial/" McArthur observed, "to
indulge the prisoner with counsel or at least amici
curiae (or Friends of the Court), who may sit or stand
near him, and instruct him what questions to ask the
witnesses, with respect to matters of fact before the 
64court..." It goes without saying that a skilled,
counselor could be of inestimable value to the party on
trial. For instance, it was the good fortune of Charles/
Claridge of the Ariade to have his ship's doctor act as 
his advisor when his case came before a tribunal on 6
August 1796. According to a young officer familiar with 
the case, "the surgeon being a talented man, drew up the 
defence (sic), which proved an able one: and when the
court heard all the charges against Claridge, who was only 
an Acting Master, they were astonished at such being 
made. The proceedings dropped to the ground...*'65
Moreover, if the accused elected to be solely 
responsible for his own defense, the court itself was
64McArthur, vol. 2, p. 44-45.
S^sir William Dillon, A Narrative of Mv 
Professional Adventures (1790-1839). ed. Michael A. Lewis, 
vol. 1 (London: Navy Records Society, no. 93, 1953) p.
248.
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obliged to supply him counsel. Delafons was quite adamant 
about this point. In his view, the president of the court 
was to advise the defendant whenever the occasion arose. 
"He it is" claimed the author, "who never omits to 
admonish him as to the propriety or impropriety of the 
questions he prefers; who interferes to prevent him from 
unnecessary self-crimination; who faithfully directs him 
both to with-hold or withdraw those precipitate 
discoveries, either by question or reply, which might
g 6
contribute to his personal injury." And, apparently, 
presiding officers took these duties seriously. Thus the 
tribunal assembled in Fort Royal Bay, Martinque on 27 
March 1797 to ajudicate the case of a young marine 
indicted for creating a violent disturbance on board the 
Eurus decided to delete the testimony of three witnesses 
he had called in his favor from the official transcript of 
the trial because "the narrative they had entered into 
respecting the charge against the prisoner tended rather 
to criminate than acquit him."®^
When all the evidence both for and against the charge 
had been heard, the court was cleared and the tribunal 
began its deliberation on a verdict. After the assembly 
had weighed carefully all the testimony presented at the
66Delafons, p. 167.
6?a d m  1/5338. Trial of Martin Keane.
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trial, the judge advocate, progressing in ascending order
from the junior most officer to the president of the
court, asked each member the principal question: "Are you
of the opinion that the charge against the prisoner is
68proved or not proved?" As at common law proceedings
in which more than one justice sat, this issue was decided
69by a simple majority of voices. Hence, if more than 
half of those canvassed voted against the defendant's 
cause he was found guilty. Conversely, in the event that
the greater number ruled in his favor, he was
acquitted.70
Having reached a verdict, the tribunal acted upon it 
accordingly. It goes without saying that all members of 
the fleet found innocent of the charges brought against 
them were acquitted automatically. In such instances, the 
court simply reopened and announced its decision. Because
courts martial were held to be "courts of honor" as well 
as judicial bodies, it was customary to couch statements
68McArthur, vol. 2, p. 261. This question was 
posed to the junior members first to prevent their 
decisions from being influenced by those of their senior 
officers.
69McArthur, vol. 1, p. 259.
"^However, if the court remained equally divided 
following a second poll, then a "favorable construction" 
was to be applied. Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., 
p. 409. As Delafons explained: "Since it requires a
majority of voices to condemn, an equality should of 
course acquit; as it neutralizes the opinion of the 
judges, who can come to no decision." Delafons, p. 247.
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exonerating officers (but not seamen) in the strongest
possible language to preserve the defendant's good name
and free him from the onus of any wrongdoing. As Delafons
put it: "The word unanimous is frequently inserted in
sentences of acquittal/ in order to give greater energy
and weight in restoring the officer to the good opinion of
his country, and efface the stain, or tarnish, his
reputation might have suffered from the accusation brought
71against him; from which he is honorably acquitted." 
Moreover, in the event that the allegations proved totally 
unfounded, it was not uncommon for tribunals to express 
their disapprobation of the plaintiff's motives. In "most 
honorably and unanimously" absolving Captain Richard 
Matson of having committed "crimes highly scandalous and 
detestable," for example, the court on 18 July 1799 
indignantly described the complaint against him as 
"malicious, malignant, groundless and vexatious in the 
fullest extent."72
If, on the other hand, the defendant was judged to be 
guilty as charged, the court then considered the type of 
disciplinary action to be taken against him. In many 
cases this decision was predetermined by the law, for a 
substantial number of the offenses proscribed by the 
Articles of War carried mandatory penalties. For example,
71Ibid.# p. 279.
72ADM 1/5350.
76
a judicial body had no recourse but to condemn to death a 
man convicted of murder. Similarly# all officers deemed 
to have signed false musters were to "be cashiered and 
rendered incapable of further employment in his Majesty's 
naval service." In such instances# all that the court 
could do to ameliorate the sentence# if it so desired# was 
to indulge in a practice frowned upon by the Admiralty of 
including any mitigating circumstances in its report which 
in its opinion made the prisoner a fit object of mercy. 
Thus, although the tribunal that heard Lieutenant Michael 
Mackey's case on 29 July 1799 found him guilty of a breach 
of the thirty-third Article and therefore had no 
alternative but to dismiss him from the Royal Navy# it 
expressed its belief that in consequence of his long 
servitude and....many wounds" he be "allowed to enjoy Half 
Pay."73
However# not all of the Articles of War levied 
mandatory penalties. Indeed most of them left the variety 
and extent of the disciplinary action to be taken against 
a guilty party to the discretion of the tribunal. 
Therefore# in adjudicating cases in which the defendant 
was found to have violated one or more of these clauses# 
the court was obliged to resolve additional questions 
before it could pass sentence. Simply stated the issues
73ADM 1/5350.
to be decided were: "'Is the offence capital?' —  if not
so, 'what is the quantum, nature, or degree of punishment,
74to be inflicted?'" Like the verdict, both points were
determined by a majority of voices. Yet due to the
silence of the laws regulating naval jurisprudence on this
matter there appears to have been some confusion about who
♦
was to be allowed to vote on them. Delafons argued that
only those opting to convict the prisoner were to
75establish the penalty. Taking the opposite view,
McArthur claimed that all members —  regardless of their
opinion of the principal question —  were entitled to
76participate in the decision. Unfortunately it is
impossible to estimate with any accuracy which of the two
methods enjoyed a wider acceptance because the transcripts
of naval trials uniformly and intentionally concealed the
deliberations of every tribunal from public knowledge.
Whatever method they used to fix the sentence, naval
courts martial were to be certain that the punishment fit
the crime. The Articles of War were very emphatic about
this point. Time and again they contain clauses
cautioning tribunals to impose only such penalties "as the
77nature and degree of the offense" warranted. As a
74Delafons, p. 270.
75Ibid.
7*>McArthur, vol. 2, pp. 312-313.
77See Chapter One, pp. 7-11.
78
result, the sentences given to commissioned officers were
V
usually very different from those meted out to members of
the lower deck. Delafons explained the dissimilarity in
the following manner:
Considerable distinction should obtain in the 
mode of inflicting punishments of an inferior 
kind, on officers and seamen: what may be
regarded as a slight penalty inflicted on the 
one, would be considered ' as of great magnitude 
to the other. Habits and education create 
essential differences in the minds and manners 
of men. To dismiss an officer from his 
Majesty's service, would be esteemed a heavy 
punishment; whereas a common sailor would look 
upon it, in many cases, as a favor conferred 
upon him. Corporal punishment, which seldom 
operates on the feelings of a common seaman or 
soldier, must affect a petty officer (such as a 
midshipman), so sensibly, if he has the 
sentiments of a gentleman, as to render his 
future life a burden to him.'8
Once the verdict had been reached and the sentence 
fixed accordingly, the decision was drawn up in writing 
and signed by each of the justices in conformity with the 
Regulations and Instructions. The court then reopened and 
the audience and the defendent were readmitted to hear the 
pronouncement read publicly by the judge advocate. 
Thereupon the proceedings concluded and the tribunal was 
dissolved. Prisoners found innocent were freed 
immediately. Those found guilty were placed in the 
custody of the provost marshall until the time set by the 
commander in chief for their punishment.
78Delafons, pp. 271-272.
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At the conclusion of the trial the judge advocate was
"to send the original sentence, and an attested, copy of
the minutes of the evidence and proceedings of the court,
to the Secretary of the Admiralty, by the first 
79opportunity" These documents were collected and
stored in Whitehall where they could be consulted by their
Lordships at a later date if the need arose. Because of
the tremendous bearing the judgment of a naval tribunal
had on an officer's career, the Board was particularly
attentive in noting the decisions rendered at the courts
martial of men who walked the quarter deck. The names of
all convicted warrant and commissioned officers, their
crimes and the sentences they received were entered in a
80compendium known as "the Black List." Arranged
chronologically by rank, this list was intended to provide
an easily accessible reference guide for the Navy's
81subsequent dealings with those on it.
Despite their Lordships' diligence in gathering and 
preserving the records of tribunals, some transcripts 
inadvertently were lost. Either through the negligence of 
judge advocates, maritime disaster, or clerical oversight,
^ Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., pp.
409-410.
88See ADM 1/323, Duckworth to Admiralty, 10
November 1801.
81ADM 12/27.
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minutes occasionally failed to find their way into the
repository at the Admiralty building in London. While
such losses had little, if any, effect on the lives of
average seamen, they could have a devastating influence on
the fortunes of officers. In a doleful letter to Captain
Robert McDouall dated , 2 December 1796, for example,
Lieutenant Francis Sergeant, who was dismissed from his
ship for neglect of duty on 14 October 1795, recounted the
problems which he had experienced as a result of the
disappearance of the report of his court martial:
On my arrival in England (now more than twelve 
months) I applied at the Admiralty for 
employment, but was rejected on the ground of 
those minutes not having come to hand; I almost 
daily repeated my applications, and also wrote 
to [First Secretary,] Mr. Nepean, on the 
hardship of my situation, but was still informed 
nothing could be done till those documents 
arrived. My arrears of pay too were fore [sic] 
the same reason withheld, nor can my agent, even 
get me put on the Half Pay List, till the matter 
has regularly transmitted to their Lordships.
Thus cut off from those pecuniary supplies so 
necessary to my subsistence, I am daily 
encountering the severest distress.82
iv
As well as exhibiting many of the characteristic 
forms and practices of the common law, British naval 
tribunals applied the Articles of War in much the same 
manner that the penal code was enforced by the English
82ADM 1/2131.
81
courts. In a seminal article on the administration o£
criminal justice in eighteenth-century England/ Douglas
Hay argues that the law was an ideological system based on
"the lessons of Justice, Terror and Mercy" which was
formulated to secure the authority of the aristocracy
without resort to a domestic constabulary or a large
standing army. By dexterously manipulating these lessons
with the appropriate selectivity, the country's governors
were able to maintain the fabric of society which was so
essential to their own position. In a word, "the ideology
of the law was crucial in sustaining the hegemony of the
83English ruling class."
Because this ideology was held to be so effective in 
preserving the squirearchy's hegemony, it is not
surprising that every aspect of it was incorporated into 
British naval jurisprudence to uphold the authority of the 
officer caste. Like criminal proceedings, trials at sea 
were staged as much, if not more, for the benefit of their 
audiences as for the parties involved. The judicial
system of the Royal Navy was contrived to convey the 
majesty and strength of the state to the various segments 
of the maritime community through a measured combination 
of solemnity and ritual. The underlying theory was that 
simple mariners, having witnessed these spectacles, would
S^Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" 
in Albion's Fatal Tree, p. 56.
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be left trembling at the prospect that such tremendous 
force —  the power of life and death —  one day could be 
used against them in the event that they violated the 
law. Indeed, Delafons described the essential "respect­
ability" of courts martial as: "that awe and dread which
such a tribunal is calculated to impress on the minds of 
seamen, and by which they will continue to be influenced, 
so long as men are brought to trial on solid and assured 
grounds; the punishment inflicted becoming a beacon to
warn and deter others from pursuing the same course, and
84getting aground on the shoals of disobedience."
Therefore the sense of terror which naval courts 
martial deliberately attempted to instill in the 
impressionable men of the lower deck was intended to act 
as a strong deterent to those members of the fleet with 
criminal tendencies. According to the dominant penal 
theory of the age, the few were to serve as horrifying 
examples for the many. Captain Henry Mitford expressed 
this conviction very clearly on 19 December 1797 in his 
petition to Admiral Harvey for the trial of four sailors 
who had run from the vessel under his charge. "The numbers 
which have deserted from His Majesty's ship Matilda during 
the time of my command amount to such an alarming evil,"
84Delafons, pp. 179-180.
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he wrote# "that I feel myself bound in duty to take this 
harsh step to endeavor in some measure to put a stop to 
it.-85
The element of terror found in naval jurisprudence 
was achieved by a combination of majesty and the ever­
present threat of horrible retribution. Majesty was the 
product of solemnity and ritual. Courts martial were 
weighty affairs. Lest that fact be lost on those in 
attendance, everything possible was done to accentuate the 
gravity of the situation. On the morning of a trial a gun 
was fired and a Union Jack was flown from the top of the 
mainmast to assemble the tribunal. During the trial, the 
stern and somber judges, in full dress uniform, sat at a 
long table on either side of £he presiding officer ' in 
descending order of seniority. Throughout the examination
of witnesses, the provost martial, with sword drawn, stood
86along side the defendant. And, at the culmination of
the proceedings it was customary for the members of the
court to cover their heads as their decision was read by
87the judge advocate.
At times the intensity of the situation could be 
tremendous. At his trial for desertion on 26 June 1810,
85ADM 1/5342, Trial of James Morgan, et al., 21 
December 1797.
86R. R. S. Fisher, "Courts Martial," Mariner *s 
Mirror 56 (1970) p. 239.
87Pope, Life, p. 243.
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Samuel Morgan, a seaman belonging to H.M.S. Caesar.
' 88 "almost fainted when the sentence was pronounced." In
a similar vein, Horatio Nelson, who as the young captain
of the Boreas served as the president of several tribunals
on the Leeward Islands station, complained to his wife on
23 April 1786:
This must be a very short and very dull letter 
for I have a violent headache. Having been 
sitting day after day for near a week at courts 
martial we are now trying L[ieutenan]t Johnson , 
for the loss of the storeship but I hope it will 
be finished tomorrow or Tuesday at farthest.89
The intense atmosphere created by the majesty of
courts martial underscored the power at their disposal.
Virtually all of the penal clauses of the Articles of War
gave tribunals the authority to terminate life or inflict
some other terrible penalty. Hence, the peril of death or
ruination hung over naval proceedings like an ominous
cloud. The dread inspired by this peril was so great that
sometimes it caused commanders to hesitate to bring
charges against villains who were unmistakably guilty of
despicable acts. In requesting the trial of a petty
officer of the Vengeance who had robbed the chest of a
88Wi n  iam Richardson, A Mariner of England: An
Account of the Career of William Richardson from Cabin Bov 
in the Merchant Service to Warrant Officer in the Roval 
Navv Q780 to 18191 as Told bv Himself, ed. Colonel 
Spencer Childers, (London: John Murray, 1908), p. 292.
"George P. B. Naish, ed., Nelson’s Letters to his 
Wife and Other Documents. 1785-1831. (London: Navy
Records Society, no. 100, 1958) p. 31.
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deceased shipmate. Captain T. M. Russell confided to 
Admiral Harvey on 19 June 1797: "A variety of
circumstances, together with a wish to reduce Edmund 
Nowland to justice and retribution without trying him (for 
his life perhaps) prevented me from sending you the
enclosed letter [containing the allegations] from Mr.
90Jones, First Lieutenant of this ship, sooner..."
However, as counter productive as the sense of dread 
might have been on occasion, those administering the law 
deliberately'cultivated it. Every precaution was taken to 
prevent the terror of tribunals from becoming 
commonplace. Only men alleged to have committed extremely 
serious crimes were brought before judicial bodies at 
sea. Of the 477 crimes tried in the Leewards during the 
period under consideration, 270, or roughly fifty-seven 
percent, were either desertion or some form of challenge 
to authority like mutiny, disobedience or contempt (see 
Table 1). Moreover, due to such extraconstitutional 
expedients as courts of inquiry, normally only cases in 
which there were sufficient grounds for prosecution came 
to trial. As a perceptive student of naval jurisprudence, 
McArthur clearly understood the logic of this 
selectivity. "It is a subject of regret," he observed, 
"that courts martial being frequently assembled for 
trivial offenses, and the charges at times unsupported by
90ADM 1/5340.
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♦
proof, are thereby rendered too familiar to the minds of
officers and men, and consequently lose that solemnity and
91efficacy intended by the legislature."
Terror was just one aspect of English criminal
judicature in the eighteenth century. "Justice" was
another. But* justice in that era did not have the strict
"egalitarian" character that it was to assume in a later
age. According to Hay, the ill-defined term meant
something approaching "equality before the law" in all
case save those involving property. Nevertheless the
theoretical ramifications of this doctrine were still
wide-ranging. The causes of all men were to receive due
process. Magistrates were to conduct themselves in a
dispassionate and knowledgeable manner, paying close
attention to the established judicial procedures of the
day. At the same time no Englishman was above the law.
Villains from every strata of society were liable to its
jurisdiction. Finally, the penal code was to protect the
92basic inaliable rights shared by all social classes.
Like quarter sessions and assizes, courts martial 
paid more than mere lip service to these precepts. On the 
whole, the naval judiciary was remarkably scrupulous in 
its observance of them. Tribunals were far from kangaroo 
courts. At the vast majority of trials great care was
^McArthur, vol. 1, p. 116.
92Hay, pp. 32-39.
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taken to see that due process was maintained. Indeed so
great were the lengths to which most tribunals went to
insure a prisoner £air treatment that it was not unknown
for them to suspend proceedings to consider his
objections. Hence/ when John Davis/ the Boatswain of the
Busy, challenged the prosecution's attempt to call Thomas
Reid as a witness at his trial on 17 November 1801 for
"mutinous/ insolent and contemptuous conduct/" the "court
[was] cleared" before Reid "was called in and the evidence
was admitted."93
In addition to protecting the constitutional
liberties of the accused/ justice at sea adhered to the
principle that no man was above the law. Admirals and
landsmen alike were subject to the jurisdiction of the
Articles of War. In fact, thirty-five percent of the
royal mariners tried on the Leeward Islands station
between 1784 and 1812 were either warrant or commissioned 
94officers. And of this group, a little more than three
quarters were convicted, with some of these men receiving
95harsh sentences. Lieutenant Thomas Connell for
instance, was condemned to death (albeit with a
33ADM 1/5359.
94of the 362 men indicted, 126 walked the
quarter-deck.
950f the 126 warrant and commissioned officers 
brought before tribunals, ninety-six were found guilty.
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recommendation for mercy) on 29 April 1807 for contempt
and dueling.96 Although Connell was pardoned/ not all
officers were so fortunate. If the penal ordinances
occasionally claimed a Lord Ferrers or a Reverend Dr.
Dodd, the naval code produced with a similar frequency a
97Lieutenant Berry or a Lieutenant Gamage.
That no man was above the law implied that all men 
were protected by it. True to this maxim, naval justice 
provided legal recourse for common seamen as well as 
officers. However infrequently, prosecutions were under­
taken on behalf of the men of the lower deck. Generally, 
these cases arose from incidents of cruelty. Lieutenant 
William Richards, for example, was dismissed from His
Majesty's service on 20 July 1809 for illegally punishing
9 8a supernumerary on board the sloop under his command. 
"The grand object of the legislature, when establishing 
laws for the regulation and discipline of the naval forces 
of this realm," claimed Delafons, "was not to impart to 
any individual however eminent, an extensive coercive
96ADM 1/5380.
97Lawrence Shirley, Lord Ferrers, was executed in
1760 for murdering his steward. The Reverend Dr. William 
Dodd, the tutor of Lord Chesterfield, was hanged in 1777 
for forgery. Lieutenant William Berry was shot on board
the Hazard in 1807 for "a breach of the 2d and 29th
Articles of War." And Lieutenant Richard Stewart Gamage 
went before a firing squad on 23 November 1812 "for
stabbing a sergeant of marines, which caused his death." 
McArthur, vol. 2, pp. 448, 451.
98ADM 1/5397.
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authority, that had not the general welfare for its sole
99and legitimate basis." As a result, the king's
sailors enjoyed many of the legal rights and protections
at sea that their civilian counterparts did on shore.
In guaranteeing the legal rights and protections of
all members of the fleet, naval jurisprudence mollified
%
the severity of the Articles of War. Indeed the
observance of these rights and protections produced a rate 
of acquittal at naval tribunals which approximated that at 
criminal proceedings on shore. Whereas Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz calculates that roughly one in four of those 
indicted in England and Wales between 1805 and 1810 were 
found innocent, a survey of the surviving reports of
t
courts martial from the Leeward Islands station during the
period under discussion reveals a slightly lower ratio of
, 100 about one in five.
An even more powerful leaven to the ferocity of each
collection of penal ordinances than due process was the
third tenet of the eighteenth-century ideology of the law
—  the principle of mercy. According to this ideology
mercy was needed to temper terror. Not only would
clemency earn the rulers the lasting gratitude of the
ruled, but it would prevent the horror of the example from
^Delafons, p. xi.
lOORadzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law,
vol. 1, p. 93. Of the 362. men tried in the Lesser 
Antilles, sixty-eight were fully exonerated.
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becoming too timeworn to have a strong influence on the
minds of men. Most importantly, it would have the happy
effect of enabling judges to take into account aspects of
particular cases ignored by the rigidity of statutes.
Asserted Archdeacon William Paley, a leading defender of
the unreformed system:
the mitigation of punishment, the exercise of 
lenity, may, without danger, be intrusted to the 
executive magistrate, whose discretion will 
operate upon those numerous, unforeseen, mutable 
and indefinite circumstances, both of the crime 
and the criminal, which constitute or qualify 
. the malignity of each offense. Without the 
power of relaxation lodged in a living 
authority, either some offenders would escape 
capital punishment, whom the public safety 
required to suffer; or some would undergo this 
punishment, where it was neither deserved nor 
necessary.
Often mercy came in the form of a royal pardon. As
at common law, the pardons given to naval convicts were
either free or conditional. A free pardon granted the
prisoner a complete remission of his punishment. A
conditional pardon commuted the sentence to some lesser
penalty. Of the two, full pardons were far more prevalent
in the system of justice at sea than they were in criminal
judicature on shore where banishment was the general
102substitute for execution. In fact all but one of the
101William Paley, The Principles of Moral and 
Political Philosophy (Boston: John West and Co., 1810),
pp. 399-400.
102Beattie, pp. 431-432.
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fourteen bestowed on men serving on the Leeward Islands
station between 1784 and 1812 were of the former variety.
Only Matthew Keagan, "a Boy belonging to the Statira."
received anything less than "His Majesty's most gracious
and free pardon;" his sentence being abridged from hanging
"into transportation for life."
Pardons were granted to naval felons with the same
frequency and for many of the same reasons that they were
given on shore. Hay estimates that approximately fifty
percent, of those sentenced to death by the English
criminal courts in the eighteenth century escaped
104execution through royal mercy. The surviving records
from the Leewards for the period under examination
demonstrate a similar rate of clemency in the Royal Navy.
Of the twenty-six seamen condemned to suffer the ultimate
penalty on the station, fourteen, or fifty-four percent,
were spared their lives by the crown. As in cases at
common law, these men were shown amnesty because of their
youth and inexperience, their good conduct, or some other
105mitigating factor peculiar to their cause. For
example, Thomas Ray, who was adjudged "to be hanged by the 
neck...at the fore yard arm of His Majesty's ship the 
Unicorn" on 18 August 1784 for deserting twice was
103ADM 2/936.
104Hay, p. 43.
105Beattie, pp. 430-449.
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recommended as a fit object of lenity "in consideration of 
his gallant services during the [American] War, and his 
good behavior upon many occasions, and the exceeding good 
character which he [bore] from officers under whom he 
served. •
Consonant with the practice of the criminal law, the
right to pardon felons condemned to death was the sole
possession of the monarch. Under the naval constitution,
tribunals could recommend mercy but commanders in chief
could do nothing more than grant a prisoner a reprieve
until such time as the sovereign's decision on the court's
recommendation became known. Although the crown
invariably acted favorably upon the advice of its
justices, it guarded its prerogative jealously. All
attempted usurpations of the king's authority were dealt
with in a stern and forceful manner by the Admiralty. For
instance, when the Lords Commissioners received Sir John
Laforey's letter of 15 March 1792 informing them that he
had "thought it expedient to pardon" James MacDonald, they
directed the First Secretary:
observe to him that although the commanders in 
chief of His Majesty's ships on foreign stations 
may suspend the execution of sentences of death 
until they receive superior orders no right of 
pardoning in matters of a capital nature are 
vested in them; that their Lordships will 
therefore lay the minutes and sentence of the 
court martial before His Majesty, and if it shall
106ADM 1/5324.
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be his most gracious pleasure to pardon the 
culprit/ a warrant £or the same shall be sent to 
him by the first opportunity afterwards.
While the crown enjoyed exclusive control of the
prerogative to pardon those under sentence of death,
commanders of foreign stations exercised the right to
remit corporal punishments in part or completely.
Normally commanding officers used this authority when they
thought the desired effect of the sentence of a court
martial had been achieved. Thus, Admiral Henry Parker
gave ’ Robert Manley only one hundred of the four hundred
lashes prescribed by a court on 22 February 1798 because
he "conceived the punishment already inflicted on him had
served as a sufficient example and would prevent him from
108being guilty of similar or other crimes in future."
Correspondingly, Commodore Stopford recorded in his
journal on 20 August 1802: "In consequence of the good
behavior of the Excellent and Emerald's ships companies
remitted the remainder of the punishment of John Barry of
109the Excellent and William Renburd of the Emerald."
Beyond pardons and remissions of sentences, there was 
a third, more subtle way in which mercy entered into naval 
jurisprudence. Courts martial exhibited a marked
107a d m  1/315. MacDonald was given "His Majesty's 
most gracious and free pardon" on 14 June 1792. ADM 
2/1117.
108adm 1/321, Parker to Admiralty, 10 March 1798. 
109ADM 50/33.
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hesitancy to impose the death penalty. Only twenty-six of 
the 232 men convicted of capital offenses in the Leewards 
during the period under discussion were given death 
sentences. Almost any mitigating circumstance was seized 
upon as reason enough not to inflict the ultimate 
retribution. Though found guilty of riotous and mutinous 
behavior and striking his superior officer on 27 March 
1797/ Martin Keene/ a marine private belonging to H.M.S. 
Eurus was adjudged to receive but fifty lashes because the 
tribunal took "into consideration the youth and 
inexperience of the prisoner and the good character given 
him by his captain and likewise by Lieutenant Parsons, 
commanding the party of marines on board the Eurus. 
and...[found] that. he...[was] often afflicted to almost a 
degree of madness by a very small quantity of 
liquor."110 Similarly, Dr. William Tullidge, who was 
"severely reprimanded...mulcted of six months 
pay...and...placed at the bottom of the list of surgeons" 
for disobedience of orders and contempt on 14 April 1806, 
avoided a date with the hangman "in consideration of the 
short time he... [had] served in the navy and his previous 
character being very good."111
Hence courts martial were far from gatherings of 
tribal elders. Occasionally, individual tribunals might
110ADM 1/5338.
111Ad m  1/5373.
have £ailed to comprehend one legal maxim or another. 
But, on the whole, naval judicial bodies applied the law 
—  as a standard phrase used in the reports of their 
proceedings put it —  "maturely and deliberately." Not 
only did they follow the principles of the common law, 
they administered the Articles of War in much the same 
fashion that the criminal courts enforced the penal 
statutes. Like the civilian bench, courts martial 
implemented a harsh code moderately —  even humanely. And 
it is to the penalties sanctioned by that code that the 
next chapter is devoted.
CHAPTER THREE 
PUNISHMENT
i
When treating the methods of punishment used in the 
Royal Navy during the age of sail, social historians of 
the fleet have concentrated almost exclusively on physical 
retribution. Taking the lead of the harshest critics of 
these methods during the early nineteenth century, modern 
students have done little more than catalogue the major 
forms of corporal penalties and emphasize the pain and 
suffering resulting from them. Quoting liberally from the 
memoirs of Jack Nastyface, G. J. Marcus, for example, 
describes such horrors as flogging, running the gauntlet, 
and gagging, among others and observes that, although 
scourging was a fairly common practice on shore during the 
eighteenth century, "there was a marked increase in 
severity throughout the Service as the century advanced: 
particularly after the outbreak, in 1793, of the 
Revolutionary War."1 In a similar vein, Christopher
1-G. J. Marcus, Heart of Oak, p. 117.
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Lloyd restricts the £ocus of his discussion to the issue
of brutality and argues that, while naval punishments must
be placed in the context of their times, they were
2
nevertheless "savage.”
Certainly, from the vantage point of the twentieth 
century, a large number of the punishments administered on 
board the king's ships were extremely brutal if not truly 
barbaric. To say anything less is to deny the evidence. 
Even the most fervent advocates of corporal retribution of
3
the Regency era more or less conceded the point. 
However, the various types of physical correction
inflicted in the Royal Navy were not manifestations of an 
institutional sadism. Rather they were sanguinary 
indications of the draconian nature of the dominant penal 
theory of the eighteenth century. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the arguments marshalled in support of 
their continued existence, for most of these contentions
were identical to those used by the defenders of the
unreformed criminal code.
2Lloyd, The British Seaman, pp. 229-248. See also 
Masefield, Sea Life, pp. 157-169; Neale, The Cutlass & The 
Lash, pp. 23-40; and Pope, Life, pp. 213-230. Needless to 
say, scholars are correct in making this point. The 
noose, the whip, the pillory and so forth were employed 
frequently in the British Isles during the eighteenth 
century (Beattie, Crime and the Courts, pp. 450-618). For 
comparison of civilian and naval usages, see Chapter Five.
3See Oceanus, Letter to the Editor, 11 March 1814, 
Naval Chronicle 31 (1814); pp. 314-317.
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Consistent with conservative penology of the day, the 
champions of corporal punishment maintained that 
evil-minded men could be discouraged from indulging their 
appetites only by the dread of painful correction.4 
Hence it was imperative to establish and keep inviolate a 
system of terror to prevent the excesses of the wicked 
from destroying the communal order and infringing upon the 
rights of law-abiding subjects —  especially in a society
like that of the navy where a considerable segment of the
1
population was drawn from the prisons of Newgate and 
Bridewell. As Admiral Philip Patton put it: "by a very
mistaken policy, the most abandoned and daring miscreants 
have been released from their confinement, and sent to 
serve in His Majesty's ships, where, though the pernicious 
effects of their contaminating example could not be 
prevented, they have been kept within the bounds of good 
order by the fear of detection, and the certainty of a
5
dozen lashes upon the bare back." Therefore, the whole 
system was intended to cow the scoundrel, not terrify the 
respectable tar. "In fact, good men on board ship stand 
as little in awe of the whip," claimed the Earl of 
Dundonald, "as the good people on shore of the rope in
^For eighteenth-century penal theory, see 
Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, vol. 1, 
pp. 231-267; and Hay, "Property, Authority and the 
Criminal Law," pp. 17-26.
^Philip Patton, Strictures on Naval Discipline and 
the Conduct of a Ship of War, p. 84.
Table 2
Punishments Inflicted in the Leewards
Punishment
Courts Martial Summarv Actions Total
N % of 
Courts 
Martial
in SamDle
N % of 
Summary 
Actions
N % Of 
Total
Death 26 7.9 0 0.00 26 0.34
Flogging Round the Fleet 134 40.9 0 0.00 134 1.72
Flogging at the Gangway 22 6.7 6,776 91.21 6,798 87.64
Running the Gauntlet 0 0.0 48 0.64 48 0.62
Dismissal 34 10.4 0 0.00 34 0.44
Removal 18 5.5 0 0.00 18 0.23
Demotion 39 11.9 25 0.34 64 0.83
Fines 17 5.2 0 0.00 17 0.22
Imprisonment/Confinement 9 2.7 14 0.19 23 0.30
Censure 29 8.8 2 0.03 31 0.40
Stoppage of Grog 0 0.0 6 0.08 6 0.07
Not State 0 0.0 558 7.51 558 7.19
TOTAL 328 100.0 7,429 100.00 7,757 100.00
Source: Sample
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which malefactors are hanged."6
However, to instill that awe in mariners disposed to 
crime, horrible examples were to be made of those caught 
violating the Articles of War, and this could be achieved 
only through severe corporal punishments. Thus the agony 
wreaked by physical retribution was meant to impress upon 
potential lawbreakers the likely consequences of their 
misbehavior. "It should...be recollected," Delafons 
proclaimed, "that all punishment is inflicted more as an 
example and warning, to deter others from the commission 
of crimes, than from any desire to punish or bake revenge
7
on the party, for his offence." Moreover because its 
deterrent value was held to be so great, flogging could 
almost be seen as a humanitarian gesture. According to 
Delafons, "a few examples of severity, well timed, might
p
in effect be a merciful act...."
But the advocates of the ancient usage were well 
aware that the effect of its example easily could be lost 
by overexposure. As a result, they did not favor its 
wanton application. Indeed, their position was quite the 
contrary. In their opinion, physical punishment was to be 
applied judiciously. Some of them even went so far as to
6The Earl of Dundonald, Observations on Naval 
Affairs (London: James Ridgway, 1847), p. 23.
7Delafons, pp. 265-266
8lbid.. p. 265.
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suggest alternative methods of correction. "Denying
permission to the crew to go ashore, by a general order.
divests the captain of a great check on them;" wrote an
anonymous correspondent to the Naval Chronicle in 1808,
"as sometimes a man might be added to the list of those
who are not to have such leave, instead of assigning him
to corporal constigation, which, I cannot repeat too
often, should be as much as possible reserved in terrorem.
g
and for urgent cases only."
ii
The most severe corporal punishment inflicted in the
Royal Navy was death. Capital sentences could be adjudged
only by courts martial and carried out on the authority of
a warrant of the Admiralty or the commander of a foreign
station. Although high ranking officers were brought
before a firing squad, the standard method of execution
for seamen was hanging from a yard-arm. All executions
«
were held publicly "as a dreadful spectacle and an 
example" to provide those who observed them with a grim 
lesson about the fatal consequences that could accompany 
serious violations of the Articles of War.10 For this 
reason, hangings were staged with great ceremony.
9Naval Chronicle 20 (1808), p. 24.
•^McArthur, vol. 2, p. 344.
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On the appointed day# a yellow flag —  "the signal of 
death" —  was flown from the masthead of the ship on which
the execution was to take place. A party under armed guard
from each vessel in the squadron was dispatched to attend 
the punishment. Meanwhile, the rest of the ships' companies 
were turned out on deck in formation to witness the 
spectacle. Once assembled, their commanding officers read 
the Articles of War to them and explained the crime for * 
which the prisoner was to forfeit his life. Upon completion 
of these rituals the crews stood in silence as the condemned 
man was made ready to meet his demise. When the fatal
moment had arrived, a gun was fired and the unfortunate 
mariner was run up a yard-arm. As was the practice at 
hangings on shore, the corpse remained suspended for several 
hours as a macabre warning to others of the fate which could 
befall those disposed to commit comparable offenses.1'1'
The impact that this chilling spectacle had on the men 
who witnessed it must have been tremendous. Despite the 
high incidence of infant mortality, the lower strata of
English society in the eighteenth century did not take death 
lightly. The seriousness with which artisans and laborers
i;LSave for the actual execution, this whole 
ceremony also was played out in cases involving men who 
were to be pardoned. Hence, Captain John Harvey recorded 
in the log of the Amphitrite on 11 June 1801: "at 6
[a.m.] made the sig[na]l for punishment, at 6:30 read the 
Articles of War and led the prisoner, Mr. John Davidson 
Acting Boats[wai]n of this ship, to the scaffold, at 7 
fired the gun & delivered the prisoner from death by 
reading his reprief [sic] (ADM 51/1375)."
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viewed the passage of life is reflected by the whole
litany of rituals and superstitions surrounding public
hangings on shore. Among the more prevalent popular
notions were "the widespread belief in the therapeutic
powers of the malefactor's corpse, the view that the
spirit of the dead could return to the living, and the
12treatment of a hanging as a wedding." To these must
be added the almost mystic element found in naval
executions. As the victim was launched into eternity the
deafening roar of cannon and a cloud of smoke signaled his
departure. Tersely describing the eerie scene, Samuel
Leech wrote: "Two guns were fired and when the smoke
cleared away, two men were seen dangling from the
13fore-yard arm."
Mercifully, such scenes were' rare on the Leeward 
Islands station between 1784 and 1812. Death sentences 
constituted slightly less than eight percent of the 
punishments adjudged by courts martial during this period 
(see Table 2). Moreover, of the twenty-six mariners 
condemned to suffer the ultimate penalty, only twelve 
actually were deprived of their lives. All of these 
victims were members of the lower deck and all had
12peter Linebaugh, "The Tyburn Riot Against the
Surgeons," in Albion's Fatal Tree, p. 115.
■^Samuel Leech, Thirty Years From Home: or. A Voice
from the Main Deck (London: J.S. Pratt, 1845), p. 50.
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committed heinous crimes. Nine were found guilty of
mutiny, two were convicted of buggery and one had shot and
14seriously wounded his superior officer.
Far more frequently inflicted than the death penalty 
was the punishment known as flogging round the fleet. In 
fact, flogging round the fleet often was used by courts 
martial as a substitute for execution. By this form of 
retribution a man who was sentenced by a naval tribunal to
receive a substantial number of lashes was given a portion
<
of the scourging alongside each ship in the squadron. The 
number of strokes the prisoner was to endure at any 
individual vessel was determined by the commander in chief 
of the station. Normally he divided the total number of 
lashes stipulated in the judgement of the court by the 
number of men-of-war expected to be present when the 
punishment was administered to derive the precise figure. 
Following this formula on 27 November 1800, Rear Admiral 
John Thomas Duckworth distributed ordinary seaman Edward 
Herrick's sentence of five hundred lashes among six 
different ships anchored in Fort Royal Bay, Martinque,
eighty-five alongside the prisoner's own vessel and
15eighty-three at each of the other five.
14fly contrast, more than eighty-four percent of 
those hung on shore had been convicted of property 
offenses (Beattie, p. 430).
15nm m, Duckworth Papers, Duc/33.
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Like executions, floggings round the fleet were 
conducted publicly according to a solemn, formalized 
ritual designed to make horrible examples of the victims 
and leave lasting impressions on those who witnessed 
them. On the morning of the day of the punishment, a 
yellow flag was unfurled from the foremast of the 
commanding officer's ship. In response to this signal, 
each vessel in the squadron sent a boat manned by a party 
of seamen and a detachment of armed mariners under the 
direction of a lieutenant to participate in the 
proceedings. Then the prisoner, accompanied by the 
provost marshal and a surgeon, was placed in a launch, 
stripped above the waist, and bound to a triangular 
grating specially constructed for the occasion. After all 
was made ready, the little flotilla formed a line and, as 
a fifer and drummer struck up the Roque's March, proceeded 
to the first man-of-war at which punishment was scheduled 
to take place. In the vanguard of the procession was a 
dispatch boat heralding the culprit's impending arrival.
When the launch had reached its destination, the 
sentence of the court martial was read in a loud voice to 
the ship's company and two boatswain's mates were sent on 
board to inflict the designated number of lashes. 
Standing near the delinquent with sword drawn, the provost 
marshal counted the blows. Upon the completion of this 
grisly task, the surgeon examined the criminal. If he was 
deemed fit to undergo additional stripes a blanket was
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thrown over his wounds and the procession moved on to the
next ship, where the entire ceremony was repeated. And so
it continued from vessel to vessel until either the
punishment was completed or the unfortunate mariner was
unable to endure further suffering. As one observer noted
the whole ordeal could drag on "sometimes to several
hours."16 '
Needless to say, the bodily suffering caused by this
ordeal was, as one opponent of the practice described it, 
17"barbarous." But how well a man withstood the
experience depended totally on his physical stamina. Some
mariners were able to endure an enormous number of strokes
at a single infliction. Thomas Gaynor, for example,
"received the whole of his punishment" of two hundred and
18fifty lashes on 24 October 1800. Others could bear 
but a portion of their sentences at one time. William 
Wilson, for instance, "fainted" alongside the Boreas on 12 
July 1784, after being given seventy-two of the five
18A Surgeon's-Mate of 1803, "Sketch of the Naval 
Punishments to which Common Seamen and Marines are Liable 
in the Royal Navy," Colburn's United Service Magazine and 
Naval and Military Journal, part 2, 49 (1844), p. 526.
17W.X.Y.Z., "Flogging Round the Fleet," The United 
Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine, part 2 
(1830), p. 705.
18ADM, 50/35.
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hundred blows with a Cat o£ Nine Tails adjudged him by a 
19court martial. *
In the event that a man was unable to undergo his
entire punishment on the appointed day, the surgeon in
attendance called a halt to the proceedings and the
prisoner was sent to sick quarters. When the unfortunate
mariner had recovered sufficiently to suffer more of his
sentence, he was sent through the fleet a second time. If
he collapsed again prior to being given the total number
of blows designated by the court this process was repeated
anew. In extreme cases, the whole ordeal could take
several months to complete. One hapless seaman belonging
to the Bonetta was flogged on three separate occasions
between July and October 1790, before he received the last
of the five hundred lashes adjudged him by a tribunal in
20English Harbour, Antigua.
Between 1784 and 1812, almost forty-one percent of
19ADM 51/125; ADM 51/8; ADM 1/5324. Occasionally, 
floggings round the fleet resulted in the deaths of the 
men undergoing them. An anonymous contributor to a 
nineteenth-century military journal related one fatal 
instance which occurred on the Leeward Islands Station in
1805. After enduring a considerable number of the three
hundred lashes he was to receive for desertion, the young 
victim's "back became so badly lacerated, that the flesh 
quivered under every stroke of the whip —  the head of the
sufferer fell senseless upon his bosom —  the punishment
was suspended —  the criminal removed to the hospital, 
where the heat of a tropical climate produced gangrene, 
and in two days afterwards he expired! (W.X.Y.Z., 
"Flogging Round the Fleet," p. 708.)"
20ADM 51/958.
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the members of the fleet convicted at courts martial in
the Lesser Antilles were sentenced to endure this
excruciating ordeal (see Table 2). Each of these
unfortunate mariners was either a petty officer, a seaman
or a marine. Moreover, all of them had perpetrated
serious crimes. Approximately sixty-six percent had
deserted, an additional twenty percent were found guilty
of some form of challenge to authority like mutiny,
treason or assaulting a superior, another eleven percent
had committed acts of thievery and the remaining three
percent had committed infractions ranging from buggery to
21drunkenness and rioting while on duty ashore.
Of shorter duration but equally as brutal was the 
practice of flogging at the gangway. Unlike floggings 
round the fleet, this punishment could be ordered solely 
at the discretion of the commander of a naval vessel. In 
a manner prescribed by custom, a criminal was stripped 
naked to the waist and whipped across his bare back with a 
device named the Cat of Nine Tails. "The Cat," as most 
mariners simply called it, was "composed of nine pieces of 
line or cord, about half a yard long, fixed upon a piece
21The number of lashes adjudged by tribunals in the 
Leewards varied from one hundred to six hundred. As noted 
in Chapter One, commanders in chief were empowered to 
remit all or part of these sentences. However, due to the 
patchiness of the surviving Admirals' journals, it is 
impossible to assess the frequency with which they 
exercised this authority.
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o£ thick rope for a handle, and having three knots on each
22at small intervals, nearest one end." Because each of
its strokes left nine separate lacerations, the agony it
caused was horrific. One observer likened the wounds
resulting from its infliction to "roasted meat burnt
23nearly black before a scorching fire."
I
Like most other forms of naval retribution, this
sanguinary punishment was conducted ritualistically in
public to heighten the terror of the victim's example.
The ceremony started with the boatswain and his mates
solemnly ordering the ship's company to muster by watches
on either side of the main deck. The marines were turned
up in formation with bayonets unsheathed and the officers
assembled at the vessel's stern "in their cocked-hats and
side arms." At this point the prisoner, escorted by the
master at arms or the ship's corporal, appeared before the
24captain to plead his case. After the man had been 
given an opportunity to defend himself the commander 
rendered a verdict and explained it to the crew. If the
22a  New Universal Dictionary of the Marine. 1815 
ed., s.v. Cat-O'Nine-tails.
23samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home, p. 38.
24jt was not a foregone conclusion that the accused 
would be adjudged to endure the lash. Indeed, Robert 
Wilson likened these exchanges to "a Court of Judicature 
("Robert Wilson's Journal" in Five Naval Journals, p. 
256)." Hence there was more than a grain of truth to be 
found in a humorous poem appearing in the Naval Chronicle 
(8, p. 498) in 1802:
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defendant was found guilty and sentenced to be flogged, he
was stripped to the waist and bound by his legs and wrists
to two specially constructed wooden gratings situated at
the gangway. Once he had been secured, the relevant
Article of War was read aloud, the officers uncovered
their heads, and the captain directed a boatswain's mate
to begin to administer the blows. As all eyes fell upon
the delinquent, lash after lash was inflicted relentlessly
and methodically —  a new Jack Ketch assuming the gruesome
task every twelfth stroke if the thrashing exceeded a
dozen. When the scourging was completed, the wretched
25mariner was cut lose and led below to recuperate.
The Captain of one of the British Frigates, a 
man of undaunted bravery, had a natural 
Antipathy to a Cat. A Sailor, on Account of his 
misconduct, had been ordered a Flogging, from 
which he saved himself by presenting to his 
Captain the following Petition.
By your honour's command,
A culprit I stand,
An example to all the ship's crew,
I am pinion'd and stript,
And condemned to be whipt,
And if I am Flogg'd 'tis my due.
A cat I am told,
In abhorrence you hold,
Your Honour's aversion is mine;
If a cat with one tail,
Can so make your heart Fail,
O save me from one that has nine!
25For descriptions of flogging see: Jack
Nastyface, Nautical Economy, pp. 145-147; and A Surgeon of 
1803, "Sketch of the Punishments," pp. 531-533.
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One of the few chroniclers from the lower deck to
record the emotions he experienced as he saw the gory
exhibition unfold before him was Samuel Leech. "Sad and
sorrowful were my feelings on witnessing it;” he declared,
"thoughts of the friendly warnings of my old acquaintance
filled my mind, and I inwardly wished myself once more
26under the friendly roof of my father, at Bladen." 
Only the most hardened of men must have failed to share 
similar sentiments. No doubt all but particularly knavish 
criminals were viewed with some degree of compassion by 
their shipmates. Articulating that sense of pity, seaman 
Robert Wilson confided in his journal; "When a poor 
fellow is being punished, his agonizing cries pierce you 
to the soul."27
Despite their sympathy for individual victims of the 
lash, it appears that most seamen accepted their 
superiors' claim that there was no alternative to whipping 
serious offenders at sea. Significantly, the mutineers at 
Spithead and the Nore did not include the abolition of the 
Cat among their list of grievances. Nor did they show 
much aversion to resorting to it. Giving expression to 
the general attitude of British mariners, Archibald 
Sinclair wrote:
A certain indefinite amount of flogging was
considered a necessary evil, without which the
26Leech, p. 39.
27"Robert Wilson's Journal," p. 256.
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machinery would go all wrong; - like the eels, 
the sailors had got [sic] used to it, and did 
not think about it. When the punishment was 
over, the debt was paid: as the stripes healed,
the recollection upon their minds faded away, 
and no blot was considered to have been left 
upon the escutcheon of the man, always provided 
the offence for which he had suffered was not 
such as thieving, skulking, or considered by 
themselves in any way disgraceful or unbecoming 
a man. A deviation from sobriety, in which 
state the culprit may have given some superior 
officer a little more of his. mind than was 
thought compatible with strict discipline, was 
thought nothing of. It would be said, 'serve 
them both right. It was quite true of the 
officer, but Jack ought to have kept his opinion 
to himself.'28
While the majority of the members of the lower deck
seem to have recognized the necessity of at least some
corporal punishment, not all those condemned to receive "a
red checked shirt at the gangway" chose to submit to their
fates without incident. A few mariners tried to play upon
what they presumed to be the credulity of their officers.
While being flogged on board H.M. sloop Rattler on 7 April
1784, for his part in a conspiracy to pilfer wine,
boatswain's mate Jeremiah Wood "supposed to pretend to
29faint away," after only four lashes. Others followed 
a much more aggressive course of resistance. David 
Laughton, another member of the Rattler's crew, was given 
twelve additional strokes for "behaving with so much
28Sinclair, Reminiscences. pp. 15-16.
2^ADM 51/762.
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sedition a£ter he was punished and released" on 26 August 
301785. An even greater outrage was perpetrated by
Joseph Carney on 1 June 1790. Just as he was about to be
scourged for a theft on the Bonetta sloop, he "publicly
declared" that the lieutenant who had reported him "had
attempted to commit on him an unnatural crime" the
31previous January.
Notwithstanding occasional acts of defiance, flogging
at the gangway seems to have been a powerful deterrent to
crime —  at least for the individuals who had been
subjected to it. This conclusion is suggested strongly by
the low rate of recidivism found among the men serving on
board the seventy-three men-of-war surveyed for the
present study. Of the mariners punished on these vessels,
only about twenty-one percent committed additional
offences during the remainder of the time they spent on
32their respective ships. Thus George Watson, who was 
flogged for fighting with the captain of the maintop of
the Eaale. probably captured the attitude of most of the 
victims of the lash in a passage of his memoirs describing 
the experience. "I felt them so keenly, being the first
30ADM 51/770.
31ADM 1/5328. Trial of Joseph Carney, 10 July 1790.
320f the 5,538 men who ran afoul of the law, 1,178 
were punished more than once. Of this number, 775 were 
corrected twice, 238 were corrected three times, 
eighty-nine were corrected four times and seventy-six were 
corrected five times.
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and the last time they scratched my back," he wrote# "that
I thought I would rather let the rogue that caused what I
endured kick me overboard another time# than have those
unnatural devil cats at my shoulders."
Floggings at the gangway were ordered by both courts
martial and captains acting summarily. Such floggings
constituted just under seven percent of the penalties
imposed by naval tribunals (see Table 2). All of the men
adjudged by the courts to suffer this punishment were
either seamen# marines or petty officers. Like the
culprits sentenced to be flogged round the fleet# most of
these mariners had been found guilty of desertion or some
34challenge to authority. In about seventy-three
percent of the cases# however# circumstances were such
that a more severe scourging was unwarranted. For
example, Benjamin Williams# who was convicted of running
from the Solebav on 9 April 1787# received only fifty
lashes in consideration of his "long and faithful
servitude to His Majesty and his exceeding good 
35character." In the remaining twenty-seven percent of 
the instances# the whipping formed but part of the
33ceorge Watson# Adventures of A Greenwich
Pensioner quoted in Henry Baynham# From the Lower Deck:
The Roval Navy. 1780-1840 (Barre# Mass.: Barre Publishers#
1970)# p. 116.
34of the twenty-two men so punished# eighteen were 
guilty of these crimes. The number of lashes inflicted
ranged from twelve to sixty.
35ADM 1/5325.
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retribution. Thus, Edward Wilkes of the Hermione. who was
condemned for abusiveness, drunkenness and rioting by a
judicial body assembled at Carlisle Bay on 13 March 1784,
was "degraded from his office of master at arms" as well
3 fias being given fifty strokes.
While court-ordered floggings at the gangway were
I
rare, those meted out solely at the behest of captains 
were not. In fact, there were well over six-thousand of 
them inflicted on board the ships in the survey (see Table 
2). Such beatings were administered for the whole gamut
of offenses committed by seamen or petty officers.
37Generally lashes were laid on in multiples of six. 
Although the number of strokes imposed upon the culprits 
in the sample ranged from one to ninety-six, almost sixty 
percent of the scourgings consisted of twelve blows or
36ADM 1/5323.
37The raw numbers are:
1 to 5 49 30 - 51
6 314 31 to 35 9
7 to 11 141 36 - 448
12 - 3,552 37 to 41 5
13 to 17 52 42 7
18 201 43 to 47 5
19 to 23 33 48 - 147
24 - 1,661 Over 48 - 80
25 to 29 18
38A s noted in Chapter One, prior to 1806 the 
Regulations and Instructions enjoined captains to give no 
more than twelve strokes at a single infliction. While 
this restriction was not observed universally, it did have
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Summary flogging at the gangway was a penalty
reserved largely for members of the lower deck. Of the
5,823 victims of the lash on board the vessels in the
survey whose ranks have been discovered, 5,813, or more
than ninety-nine percent, were either petty officers,
seamen or marines. Moreover, contrary to the assertions
of the advocates of the abolition of corporal punishment
and several modern historians, at least fifty-five percent
of the men who suffered this brutal correction were 
39volunteers. At the same tijme, over ninety percent of 
the beatings were inflicted on subjects of the crown.40 
Finally, approximately seventy percent of such whippings
a moderating influence on the general severity of 
floggings. Whereas 1,487 of the 4,520 scourgings in the 
sample administered before 1806, or thirty-three percent, 
were of more than a dozen blows, 1,189 of the 2,253 meted 
out after 1806, or fifty-three percent, were of like
proportions.
39See preface, n. 13. 
determine the original means 
men, the raw totals are:
Volunteers - 2,924
Prest - 507
Quota - 45
Turned Over - 1,664
Substitute - 34
^ T h e  raw numbers are:
England -2,267
Scotland - 355
Ireland -1,226
Wales - 91
Isle of Man - 11
Channel Islands - 5
The Empire - 99
While it is impossible to 
of entry for "turned over"
Prison - 12
Cartel - 17
Returned Deserters - 60
Per Warrant - 10
Not Stated - 2,148
USA - 193
Europe - 175
Asia - 3
Africa - 15
South America - 12
Not Stated -2,969
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were meted out to mariners under the age of thirty.41
Although flogging at the gangway was the most common
form of corporal punishment inflicted summarily upon
seamen and petty officers serving aboard the king's ships,
it was not the only variety of physical retribution at the
disposal of commanders in the Royal Navy. Until it was
abolished by an Admiralty order on 28 April 1806, the
practice of running the gauntlet was made use of by some
captains. However, because this agonizing ritual
customarily was held in reserve for crimes deemed to be
particularly odious to the sensibilities of the members of
the lower deck, it was seldom performed (see Table 2). In
fact, the log books consulted in the preparation of the
essay at hand contain only forty-eight references to it,
all but four of which were the consequence of some act of 
42thievery. Landsman William Lindsey of H.M.S. Saturn, 
for instance, endured its painful effects on 22 February 
1802, for "robbing the chest of a dead man."43
41The range of ages was from eleven to sixty-six.
The raw totals are:
Under 20 - 118
20 to 29 - 3,007
30 to 39 - 1,006
40 to 49 - 294
Over 50 - 39
Not Stated - 2,957
420f the four other cases, two were for cruelty and
two were for buggery.
42ADM 51/4497.
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In the manner of most of the other corporal
punishments used in the Royal Navy, running the gauntlet
was conducted publicly according to a solemn conventional
rite designed to enhance the terror of the victim's
example. Before the ceremony began, the entire crew was
arranged in two columns facing each other around the
perimeter of the 'main deck. Once the men were in
formation, the prisoner was brought to the fore and
ordered to remove his shirt. At this point, a drummer,
the master at arms and a surgeon's mate formed a small
cortege to escort the culprit through the lane outlined by
the ship's company. When all was ready, the Roaue's March
was struck up and the procession began its slow, tortuous
step. Every man along the delinquent's route flailed him
with a short piece of rope punctuated by several knots,
known as a "knittle." To compound his agony, he was
"sometimes tripped up and very severely handled while
44incapable of proceeding." After the victim had
completed three journeys down this frenzied ‘ path, the
ordeal traditionally ended and he was sent below to
recover from the severe wounds he had sustained to his 
45upper torso.
44A New Universal Dictionary of the Marine. 1815 
ed., s.v Gantlope.
45por descriptions of running the gauntlet see: 
Ibid.: Nastyface, pp. 143-145; and A Surgeon of 1803, part 
II, p. 59.
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Another punishment highly injurious to the upper body 
vwas starting. In this form of summary correction, a 
boatswain's mate, at the order of the commanding officer, 
beat a recalcitrant seaman with a colt, rattan or rope's 
end. Although these beatings were not entered in the 
ships' logs, it appears that men were started only for 
apparent laziness or neglect. According to William 
Burney, it was "frequently resorted to for want of 
alacrity in hoisting the top-sails to the mast-head; and 
to quicken.. .efforts in getting boats in and out, also in 
hoisting in beer and water, and in performing such like
A C
duties." As part of the effort to ameliorate the
condition of seamen, the practice was abolished by an
Admiralty directive in 1809.
It goes without saying that being started was a very
painful experience. In many cases, it resulted in bruises
to the man's head and arms as well as to his back and
shoulders. One victim graphically described the sensation
in the following manner:
It was on one ocasion [sic] of these beloved and 
beprized amusements of the boatswain's mates, 
that I, as with the rushing herd I mounted the 
deck, received one of the blows across my 
shoulders, which sent the blood at once whizzing 
and boiling back upon my heart; for the blow 
seemed to fall through my bones into my breast, 
so ponderous was the stroke. I reeled, and 
became sick and faint; this gave him opportunity 
for repeating the blow, and it was too delicious 
a pleasure to be lost; my limbs bowed under me
46a  New Universal Dictionary of the Marine. 1815 
ed., s.v. Starting.
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as if they were rushes, and I sank down on deck, 
senseless; and I felt, then, nothing of the kick 
with which he sent my body out of the way of 
those who were following, and I know not who, or 
how many, trampled on me. But I da remember 
that an hour after I recovered, there was a 
dismal drumming in my ears, my brain seemed 
compressed within hard bandages, and a hoop of 
iron was welded round my brow, and I stood in 
stupor gazing down towards the deck, trying to 
look at something which was not there.47
However pernicious its infliction may have been for
the person upon whom it fell, starting seems to have acted
as a strong inducement to others to perform their duty
quickly and efficiently. This happy result is evinced
quite clearly by an incident recorded in Sir William
Dillon's Narrative of his life at sea. As a junior
lieutenant of H.M.S. Cresent. Dillon was required to make
his vessel ready for a voyage to the West Indies in
September 1799. Anxious to avoid delay, the young officer
ordered the surgeon to examine those on the sick list for
malingerers. When the physician's examination revealed a
marine fit for service, he had the man started with
several blows. In Dillon's opinion the punishment had a
very beneficial influence on the rest of the crew. As he
put it:
This starting of the marine had its effect upon 
the Ship's Company, as they became aware that
skulking would not be tolerated by me. 
Consequently, they worked with spirit and
47Charles Reece Pemberton, The Autobiography of 
Pel. Ver-iuice (London: The Scholartis Press, 1929), pp. 
142-143.
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alacrity/ by which means the ship was very soon 
prepared for sea.48
Whereas starting was intended to hasten a mariner's
behavior, gagging was designed to subdue it. While
instances of gagging were not recorded in the logs, it
seems that this corrective measure was employed only
49"under the most aggravating circumstances." Usually
it was inflicted on members of the lower deck who became
50riotous or insolent while in confinement. In such
cases, a metal or wooden rod of varying thickness was
inserted in the delinquent's mouth and fastened securely
by ropes drawn tight around the back of his head. There
it remained like the bit on a bridle until the captain
ordered it removed or until the rowdy sailor was "nearly 
51exhausted." Since most men subjected to the
punishment did not submit to it peaceably, there was
tremendous potential for severe damage to the victim's
52jaws and teeth. Indeed, occasionally its application 
even resulted in death.
48Dillon, A Narrative of Mv Professional Adventures, 
vol. 1, p. 363.
48A New Universal Dictionary of the Marine. 1815 
ed., s.v. Gagging.
SOibid.
SlNastyface, p. 149.
52A Surgeon of 1803, part II, pp. 60-61.
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One fatal instance took place on the Leeward Islands 
Station in 1808 and led to the dismissal from the service 
of the officer who had ordered the correction. Shortly 
before noon on 27 November, John Robinson, a supernumerary 
on board H.M. sloop Dart who was prone to drunkenness, was 
discovered "intoxicated upon deck making a riotous noise;" 
for which crimes he was taken below and confined. A few 
hours later, while still in irons, Robinson "began cursing
and swearing and blaspheming —  damning the navy and all
«
the officers in it." Hearing the commotion, Lieutenant 
William Richards, upon whom command had devolved during 
the captain's absence on shore, ordered the prisoner
gagged. When this failed to silence him, a new, thicker 
restraint was placed between his jaws. Yet Robinson
continued to disrupt the peace of the ship. Finally, 
about eight o'clock that night Richards himself muzzled 
the vexatious mariner with a bolt almost three inches in 
diameter. Within less than an hour Robinson went into 
convulsions and died moments after being released from his 
bonds. According to one eyewitness, "his lips were very 
black and the froth ran out of his mouth —  the corners of 
his mouth was much cut." Although Richards was acquitted 
of the murder of the deceased, the ensuing court martial
found the lieutenant's conduct "oppressive and cruel in
53making use of so large a gag" and cashiered him.
53ADM 1/5397, 20 July 1809.
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Not all o£ the corporal punishments administered in
the Royal Navy were as sanguinary as the ones discussed so
far in this chapter. Indeed some were quite tame by
comparison. Though seldom (if ever) registered in the
captains' or masters' journals, ordinarily the milder
forms of physical retribution were inflicted summarily
upon members of the lower deck for petty offences like
54swearing and slovenliness. Among the more common of
them appear to have been practices such as ducking, the
spread eagle, the wooden collar, and carrying the capstan
bar. Ducking entailed putting a culprit on a small batten
with his feet weighted down by shot and hoisting him
rapidly up one of the yard arms only to drop him suddenly
into the sea. The spread eagle consisted of tying a man
by his outstretched hands and feet to the standing rigging
of the mizenmast and leaving him in that position during
the captain's pleasure. The wooden collar, as its name
suggests, called for a delinquent to wear a cumbersome
lumber yoke laden with approximately sixty pounds of
cannonballs for a few hours in a conspicuous part of the
vessel. And, carrying the capstan bar required the
malfeasant "to carry a heavy beam of wood, and walk fore
and aft upon the weather gangway, for a period of a watch,
55or about four hours."
54A Surgeon of 1803, part II, p. 61. 
55ibid.
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Several minor summary punishments (again unrecorded
in the logs) were inflicted for petty offenses primarily
on one class of mariner, the midshipmen. Since the young
gentlemen were often mere boys, these forms of correction
had almost a juvenile quality about them but were anything
but mild. Kissing the gunner's daughter, for instance,
v was analagous to strapping. According to this usage, the
youthful offenders had "their breeches or trowsers put
down" and were tied to the carriage of a gun and "punished
on their breech by the infliction of a half dozen or dozen
56with a cat-of-nine-tails." Similarly, mastheading was
the naval equivalent to standing in the corner. By this
practice, a precocious lad was ordered to climb up to one
of the platforms mounted on the masts and remain there for
57a designated period of time.
iii
In addition to a wide variety of corporal 
punishments, the navy administered an array of nonphysical 
penalties. The stiffest of these was dismissal from the 
service. Only warrant and commissioned officers could be
56William Spavens, The Seaman's Narrative (Louth: 
Sheardown and Son), p. 115.
57See, for example, Jeffery Baron de Raigersfeld, 
The Life of a Sea Officer with introduction and notes by 
L.G. Carr Laughton (printed privately, 1830; London: 
Cassell and Company, 1929), pp. 34-35.
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cashiered/ and then exclusively by the authority of a
C p
court martial. Dishonorable discharges constituted a
little more than ten percent of the sentences imposed by
naval tribunals in the Lesser Antilles between 1784 and
1812 (see Table 2). Usually commissioned officers
received them for acts deemed to be particularly
scandalous. Lieutenant Thomas Walsh of H.M.S. Arethusa.
for example, was expelled on 9 January 1797, "for having
neglected his duty by falling asleep on his watch on the
night of the 2nd inst. when the ship was in a critical
situation expecting to fall in with the land and also for
behaving in a riotous and mutinous manner while under 
59arrest." Warrant officers, on the other hand,
generally were dismissed for habitual improprieties. The 
master of the Terror bomb vessel, for instance, was 
drummed out of the fleet on 17 October 1796, because he 
was "found guilty of frequent intoxication.
A second form of non-corporal punishment inflicted on 
warrant and commissioned officers by courts martial was 
the removal of the offender from one ship to another.
5&Not all men adjudged to suffer this punishment 
were banned permanently from further employment as 
officers in the Royal Navy. For example, Captain Robert 
Tucker of the Surinam sloop, who was deemed "guilty in 
part of unofficer-like conduct at Curacoa" by a tribunal 
on 21 March 1804, simply was "rendered incapable of 
serving again during the present war. (ADM 1/5365)."
59ADM 1/5338.
60ADM 1/5337.
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Comprising less than six percent of the total number of 
sentences rendered at naval tribunals in the Leewards 
during* the period under discussion (see Table 2), removal 
usually was imposed for indiscretions caused ultimately by 
personality clashes.61 Thus Richard Coates, who was 
convicted of behaving in a disrespectful and contemptuous 
manner to his captain on 14 March 1809, was "dismissed
C O
from his situation as lieutenant of H.M.S. Surinam."
In ten of the eighteen cases examined for the present
study, court-ordered relocation was accompanied by some
other minor penalty like the forfeiture of all or part of
the seniority the culprit had accumulated on the navy list
63compiled for his rank. To cite but one instance,
Master Peter Inskipp of the Castor, who was found guilty
of "contempt to his officers, neglect of duty...using
threatening language to his captain and drunkeness" by a
tribunal on 9 March 1810, lost "three years rank” as well
64as his post on board that vessel.
^Fifteen of the eighteen men receiving this 
punishment were convicted of disobedience, contempt or 
unofficer-like conduct.
62ADM 1/5394.
63An officer was entered on these lists 
chronologically by the date he had achieved the rank. 
Because seniority played a large part in promotion, a 
reduction on the roll could cause a considerable delay in 
professional advancement.
64ADM 1/5403.
127
While removal normally entailed some diminution of
the culprit's status in the navy, it was much less drastic
than the degradation imposed by actual demotion. In
general, demotion was administered as a consequence of
disobedience, drunkenness, negligence, contempt, sedition,
65riotousness or absence without leave. Like so many 
other naval punishments it could be prescribed for warrant 
and commissioned officers only by the judgement of a
tribunal. Demotions accounted for almost twelve percent
♦
of the penalties inflicted by courts martial on the 
Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 1812 (see Table 
2). Each of the twenty-three warrant officers stripped of 
his rank was forced to serve before the mast. For 
example, John Davis of H.M. Brig Busy, who was tried in 
Fort Royal Bay, Martinique on 17 November 1801, "for 
mutinous, insolent and contemptuous conduct," was 
sentenced "to be broke from his employment of boatswain 
and serve as able seaman on board such one of His 
Majesty's ships or vessels as Rear Admiral Sir John Thomas 
Duckworth K.B. Commander in Chief...[thought] fit to 
direct."66 Correspondingly, every one of the six
S^The thirty-nine men receiving this penalty were 
convicted of fifty-two crimes, forty-eight of which were 
the offenses just noted.
66ADM 1/5359.
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commissioned officers was reduced to a petty officer.
Thus Lieutenant Charles Thackeray of the Thorn was
disrated to midshipman on 15 January 1789/ as a result of
being found guilty of disrespect to his captain and
68neglect of duty. In particularly serious cases, the 
delinquent often was banned from the quarter deck either 
for a ' specified number of years or for life. In addition 
to being turned in the rank by a court martial on 27
November 1800, the carpenter of the Severn was "rendered
%
incapable of serving as an officer in the naval service of
69His Majesty, his heirs or successors."
Though the captains of the king's vessels could not
degrade warrant and commissioned officers, they could
demote the petty officers under their command. The
Regulations and Instructions of 1806 expanded this
classification to include "the master at arms, sailmaker,
caulker, rope maker, armourer, armourer's mate and ship's
cook" as well as midshipmen, coxwains, yeomen of the
70powder room and the like. Summary demotions
constituted less than one percent of the punishments 
recorded in the logs of the seventy-three vessels in the 
present survey (see Table 2). In twenty-one of the
67Ten petty officers also were demoted by naval 
tribunals. Eight of these men were given floggings or
jail terms as well.
68ADM 1/5327.
69ADM 1/5354. Trial of John Darton.
^ Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 121.
twenty-five instances, the culprits were flogged before
they were disrated. For example, the master of H.M.S.
Latona made the following entry in his journal on 1 August
1785: "Punished William Shilton with two dozen lashes for
insolence and disobedience of orders and Charles Allen
with one dozen for quarrelling, both having been quarter
71masters were turned off the quarter deck." Thus,
shipboard degradations often were intended to add insult
to the injury sustained by corporal retribution. Richard
Bickerton, the commander of the Svbi1. suggested as much
when he recorded the punishment of a marine in the
frigate's log on 5 September 1789. "Punished Michael
Murphy, corporal, with twelve lashes for neglect of duty,"
72he wrote, "and disgraced him by breaking him."
Not only was demotion damaging to the delinquent's 
esteem within the naval community, it was detrimental to 
his financial status as well. Because a British mariner's 
wages were related directly to his rank, degradation could 
have substantial economic consequences. The income of a 
disrated warrant officer belonging to a third rate ship of 
the line was reduced by approximately sixty percent per 
mensem. By the same token, a petty officer serving on 
board one of the larger vessels stood to lose at least
71ADM 52/2369. 
72ADM 51/873.
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twenty percent of his monthly earnings. Needless to say,
on long voyages the accumulated losses could be
considerable. Oliver Lloyd, who was demoted from ship's
corporal of the Majestic to able seaman fourteen months
before that man-of-war returned to England in June 1786,
73was deprived of more than £4. Correspondingly, Thomas
Taylor, a boatswain's mate on the Scourge stripped of his
office for mutinous expressions and neglect of duty on 22
74August 1797, lost £3 16s over the next three years.
Amercement could cause an even greater financial 
hardship to the royal mariners than demotion. Amounting 
to less than six percent of the penalties imposed by 
courts martial in the Lesser Antilles (see Table 2), fines 
were a subsidiary punishment. In each of the seventeen 
instances, they were levied along with a flogging, a 
demotion, a reprimand, or a jail term for such crimes as 
contempt or desertion. Nevertheless they could be 
staggering. Master George Passmore of H.M.S. Woolwich who 
was convicted of disobedience of orders and contemptuous 
behavior to his captain by a tribunal on 10 March 1794, 
was broken and "mulcted of all pay due to him from the
^3ADM 51/1122. A corporal of a third rate ship of 
the line was paid £1 10s a month. An able seaman received 
£1 4s during the same period. Regulations and 
Instructions. 1st ed., pp. 146-149.
74ADM 51/1259. A boatswain's mate on a sloop 
earned £1 6s per mensem. An able seaman's monthly wage 
was £1 4s. Regulations and Instructions. 1st ed., pp. 
146-149.
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75said ship." Similarly/ three mariners who had run
from the Intrepid in early 1808 forfeited all the wages
they had earned aboard the vessel in addition to receiving
76large numbers of lashes.
As equally uncommon as amercement was court-ordered
imprisonment. Indeed, only nine of the officers and men
tried in the Leewards between 1784 and 1812 received this
punishment (see Table 2). Accompanied by other penalties
in all but one instance, sentences of incarceration were
rendered for offenses deemed particularly heinous. Having
been found guilty of an unnatural crime by a tribunal held
at the Saintes on 9 July 1810, the ship's corporal of the
Castor. for example, was condemned to three hundred
lashes, the forfeiture of all wages and emoluments, and
77the maximum period of detention. All prisoners
convicted on foreign stations were returned to England and
75ADM 1/5331.
76ADM 1/5386. Trial of Alexander Murdock, John 
Berry and John Warren. 4 April 1808. As noted in Chapter 
One, the Regulations and Instructions enjoined commanders 
to assess fines for misdemeanors like swearing. 
Unfortunately, no record of these summary impositions has 
survived. Hence it is impossible to compute the frequency 
with which they were exacted.
77ADM 1/5407. Trial of Soloman Nathan. Nathan was 
the only man on the Leeward Islands station to be sent to 
prison for two years. The remaining eight were given 
terms ranging from three to eighteen months. Another six 
mariners, who have not been included in the survey, were 
incarcerated for prevaricating during their testimony at 
various trials.
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interned in the Marshalsea Prison, a sparsely populated,
ancient jail £or debtors and pirates located in 
78Southwark. There they remained in the custody of the
Marshal of England until their term, which could not
exceed two years, was completed or commuted to time 
79served.
A much shorter form of incarceration than
court-ordered imprisonment was summary confinement.
Rarely imposed as a complete punishment (see Table 2),
shipboard confinement was reserved for warrant and
80commissioned officers. In all but one of the fourteen
78sir Walter Besant, London in the Eighteenth 
Century (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1902), p. 605.
79There is no evidence pertaining to the nine men 
in the sample which suggests that any of them were granted 
remissions. Indeed, Charles Concanen's plea for a 
reduction of his sentence on 14 November 1810 was flatly 
denied by their Lordships (ADM 1/4427).
80ordinarily members of the lower deck were placed 
in close confinement preparatory to a summary flogging or 
other such punishment. According to this practice, they 
were put in irons in a public place in the ship. For 
example, John Butson was shackled "by the after hatchway" 
of the Whitbv prior to being scourged for theft in April 
1784 (ADM 1/5324. Trial of William Simpson, 14 June 
1785). The length of time a prisoner was fettered was 
entirely dependent upon his commander's discretion. As a 
result, some men wallowed in bondage for weeks; while 
others were manacled for just a few days. Whereas several 
deserters from the Forester remained in captivity for a 
fortnight before experiencing the lash on 16 February 1811 
(ADM 51/2371), two members of the Opossum's crew who were 
guilty of the same offense spent only four days in chains 
prior to receiving their punishments little more than one 
month later (ADM 51/2616). Unfortunately, these 
confinements were seldom recorded in the logs. Hence it 
is impossible to quantify them.
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cases in the sample, it was inflicted for indiscretions
like drunkenness, disobedience, neglect or contempt. The
boatswain of the Forester, for instance, was put under
arrest on 18 June 1811, "for letting go the anchor without 
81orders." Usually the delinquent was required to
remain in one specific place in the vessel. For example, 
Lieutenant Edwards of the Alligator, who was taken into 
custody for intoxication and disrespect on 2 July 1806,
was detained first in the loft and later in his
82 * cabin. How long an officer was kept under restraint
varied with the circumstances of his case, but as a rule
it seems that incarceration did not last more than a day 
83or two. Normally the culprit was released as soon as 
he had apologized for his imprudence and given his
In a similar vein, culprits of all ranks were 
confined to await trial by court martial. Here again, the 
length of confinement varied with the circumstances of 
each case. As noted in Chapter Two, the difficulty of 
assembling the minimum requisite number of judges on 
foreign stations caused some men to remain under arrest 
for months. Others were spared lengthy delays and brought 
to the bar within days of committing their alleged 
infractions. However, a random sample of twenty trials 
yields no clear cut pattern of incarceration. Whereas 
eleven of the defendants spent less than thirty days in 
captivity, nine were in custody for more than a month. 
The periods of detention for these men ranged from three 
days to seven months.
SlADM 51/2371.
82ADM 51/1571.
83In four of the six cases in which the period of 
detention is ascertainable, the prisoner was released 
within forty-eight hours.
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assurance that his subsequent deportment would be more
decorous. Thus Arthur Briarey, the purser of the Mermaid,
spent less than forty-eight hours in captivity for neglect 
and disobedience before being freed by his captain "on 
promise of being more circumspect in [the] future" on 26 
April 1795.84
A even milder sort of punishment than confinement was
Q C
censure by a tribunal. Depending on the degree of
disapprobation which his behavior warranted, a culprit was 
either severely reprimanded, reprimanded or simply
admonished to be more circumspect in his succeeding 
affairs. This gentle measure of correction was seldom
adjudged (see Table 2), and then only to miscreants who 
walked the quarter-deck. In eighteen of the twenty-nine
cases on the Leeward Islands station, it was applied to
actions that were ill-considered but not necessarily 
illegal. For example, the court assembled at Carlisle Bay 
on 22 February 1808 to try Lieutenant Thomas Muir of 
H.M.S. Curieux "for not doing his utmost after his
commander's death to take or destroy a French privateer" 
merely reproached him for not having hove to to repair the 
damages sustained by the Curieux during the engagement
84ADM 51/4474.
85Tw o members of the quarter-deck from the ships in 
the sample also were reprimanded summarily by their 
commanding officers.
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when it became obvious that the ship was in no condition
O g
to overtake the enemy. In the remaining eleven
instances, it was administered because mitigating
circumstances seemed to suggest that greater stringency
87was unnecessary. Thus, though £ound guilty on 8 June
1797, of contempt to Lieutenant Crosbie, Francis Wemyss
was adjudged "to be only reprimanded" because "a
reconciliation had taken place between Lieutenant George
Vandeput Crosbie and the prisoner subsequent to the time
88the offense was committed."
Finally, there were a host of minor, non-corporal
punishments which were inflicted upon seamen and petty
officers for venial offenses. Although these penalties
normally were not recorded in the logs, their number was
limited only by the breadth of the imaginations of the
members of the quarter-deck. As a rule they either denied
the culprit one of the few simple pleasures of maritime
life or caused him to suffer great humiliation in front of
his peers. Of the former, the most popular seems to have
89been watering a man's grog or stopping it completely. 
Captain G. B. Westcott of H.M.S. Majestic, for instance,
86ADM 1/5385.
87In six of these cases, additional minor penalties 
were imposed. William Tullidge, for instance, also was 
"mulated six months pay [and]... placed at the bottom of 
the list of surgeons (ADM 1/5373, 14 April 1806)."
88ADM 1/5339.
89"Robert Wilson's Journal," pp. 154, 173.
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deprived five seaman of their rum rations for crimes
ranging from neglect of duty to riotous behavipr in late
90October and early November 1794. Of the latter, a
practice frequently resorted to was burdening the
91delinquent with demeaning additional tasks. Lord
Collingwood, for example, was master of this usage.
According to the editor of his correspondence, he employed
one technique which his crews especially feared:
It was the ordering any offender to be excluded 
from his mess, and be employed in every sort of 
extra duty; so that he was every moment liable 
to be called upon deck for the meanest service, 
amid the laughter and jeers of the men and 
boys. Such an effect had this upon the sailors, 
that they have often declared that they would 
much prefer having three dozen lashes: and, to
avoid the recurrence of this punishment, the 
worst characters never failed to become 
attentive and orderly.92
These, then, were the major corporal and non-corporal 
punishments administered in the Royal Navy during the age 
of sail. Consistent with the reigning penal theory of the 
eighteenth century, their object was to make horrible 
examples of their victims in order to terrify potential
90ADM 51/1122.
91"Robert Wilson's Journal," p. 181.
92G. L. Newnham-Collingwood, A Selection from the 
Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord 
Collinawood; Interspersed with Memoirs of his Life, vol. 1 
(London: James Ridgway, 1828), p. 72.
137
criminals into obeying the law. Hence they were either 
extremely brutal or terribly humiliating. As such, they 
provided the men who governed His Majesty's ships with 
powerful weapons for maintaining order afloat. And how 
the commanders of the king's vessels used some of these 
weapons summarily to preserve that order is the subject of 
the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NAUTICAL GENTRY
i
%
"Bligh stamped up and down the quarter-deck, his face 
distorted with passion, shaking his fists and shouting at 
us as though we were at the other end of the ship.”1 In 
this brief passage from the timeless sea story by Charles 
Nordoff and James Norman Hall, the haunting portrait of a 
sadistic commander of the Bounty erupts with all its 
demonic fury. Indeed, thanks in large part to the classic 
screen adaptation of their novel about the infamous mutiny, 
featuring such cinematic giants as Charles Laughton and 
Clark Gable, the legendary captain's name has become 
synonymous with the relentless enforcement of a draconian 
code of conduct. But was the representation of Bligh in 
the motion picture of 1936 characteristic of British naval 
officers in the eighteenth century? Was he the brutal rule 
for his profession rather than the tormented exception?
1Charles Nordoff and James Norman Hall, Mutiny on the 
Bounty (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1932), p. 118.
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Modern scholarship —  if somewhat tentatively —  has 
begun to rehabilitate the image of His Majesty's captains 
during the age of sail. Reacting to the assertions of 
rampant brutality made by romantic historians like John 
Masefield, more recent students such as Michael Lewis, G. 
J. Marcus and Dudley Pope have suggested that inhumane 
treatment aboard British men-of-war was far less common 
that was supposed previously. Yet their remarkable
contributions to the social history of the Royal Navy still
1
imply that many of the commanders of the Crown's vessels 
practiced a certain unbending absolutism similar to that of 
the lord of Nordoff and Hall's Bounty. While arguing that 
the majority of officers entered the service to further the 
causes of King and country and their own social 
advancement, Lewis, for example, claims that others were 
induced to enlist by the "despotic power" at the disposal
3
of the members of the quarter-deck. Pope goes even 
further. In his opinion, the solitude and autonomy of 
nautical governance made the men who exercised it 
particularly vulnerable to monomaniacal behavior. "The 
loneliness of command was something that a good leader 
accepted;" he writes, "but with an inadequate man it led to
2Even Bligh's reputation has been improved slightly. 
In one recent study he has been portrayed as "a man of 
exceptionally strong will and of uncertain temperament." 
Richard Hough, Captain Bliah and Mr. Christian:- The Men 
and the Mutiny (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1973),
p. 3.
2Lewis, A Social History of the Navv. p. 291.
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drinking or brooding and introversion; a healthy attitude
towards the church could become a religious mania; a normal
strictness could warp itsel£ into sadism. Obsessions seemed
4
to be lying around waiting to be claimed ...”
Undoubtedly there were obsessional characters to be 
found among the officers of the eighteenth-century British 
Navy. The wide-ranging powers bestowed upon the commanders 
of the king's ships by both editions of the Regulations and 
Instructions created a tremendous potential for the abuse 
of authority, to say nothing of the manifestation of 
personal eccentricities. However, religious fanatics and 
brooding drunkards were probably no more prevalent than 
sadists and tartars. Although captains had great scope to 
establish whatever systems of order they thought fit for 
their vessels, there were strong social and legal pressures 
influencing them to conform to the age's conventional 
methods of maritime management. And these methods were 
grounded firmly in the ideal of "an officer and a
gentleman."
In the Royal Navy, the term "an officer and a
gentleman" had virtually the same connotation that the 
notion of masculine gentility had for the members of the 
rural ruling classes on shore. Like the upper echelons of 
landed society, captains were expected to distinguish
themselves from the masses they governed by their education
4Pope, Life, p. 63.
I141
and civility. In doing so, they were to set dignified 
examples which the lower orders of the maritime community 
would respect and emulate. Moreover, they were to manifest 
a genuine sense of noblesse oblige and so display a 
fatherly concern for the health and well-being of their 
charges. Finally, they were to administer their 
responsibilities to their floating dominions honestly and 
fairly for the public good, particularly rendering 
impartial justice which was firm yet merciful. In short, 
naval commanders had to provide their crews with the same 
type of leadership expected of squires in the British 
countryside.^
Naturally, individual captains, like the members of the 
rural gentry, approximated the ideal with greater or lesser 
success depending on their personal inclinations and 
temperaments. Although some blatantly ignored it, on the
4
whole most seemed to have recognized its importance. As one 
contemporary observed:
5For discussions of the social obligations of the 
English gentry, see J. C. D. Clark, English Society. 
1688-1832: Ideology. Social Structure and Political
Practice during the Ancien Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), pp. 93-118; Roy Porter, English 
Society in the Eighteenth Century (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1982), pp. 78-79; Derek Jarrett, England in the Age 
of Hogarth (St. Albans: Paladin, 1976), pp. 79-80; Harold
Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society. 1780-1890
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 183-195;
G. E. Mingay, The Gentry: The Rise and Fall of a Ruling
Class (London: Longmans, 1976); Norma Landau, The Justices
of the Peace. 1679-1760 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984), pp. 333-362.
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There is ... an ingredient in the composition o£ 
a good officer, without which all others are 
comparatively useless. He must be a gentleman, 
if he has low, mean, or vulgar ideas or habits, 
he will be obeyed, but will never command 
respect.6
And it would appear from the surviving evidence that the 
majority of commanders at least paid lip service to the 
ideal if they actually did not strive earnestly to achieve 
it.
Nor should this be particularly surprising. A 
substantial number of the members of the quarter-deck were 
drawn from the landed classes. According to Professor 
Lewis's estimates, almost forty percent of His Majesty's
7
officers were the sons of aristocrats or squires. 
Moreover, naval commanders enjoyed more or less the same 
administrative independence that the gentry exercised in 
the localities as justices of the peace. Whereas the lords 
of the countryside, thanks to their economic position and 
distance from London, were free from the meddling of the 
metropolis, the men entrusted with the management of the 
king's ships, due to the closed nature of the individual 
communities they ruled, generally enjoyed a comparable 
license. It stands to reason, then, that the captains of 
the Royal Navy, occupying a similar place and fulfilling 
many of the functions in maritime society that the
6Sinclair, Reminiscences, p. 14.
7Lewis, Social History, p. 31.
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squirearchy did on shore, would adopt many of the methods 
of rural government.
«
» •
11
The laws regulating the authority of the men commanding 
the king's ships gave them considerable latitude in the 
management of their vessels. As a result it was incumbent 
upon all captains to devise their own "system," as it was 
known in the usage of the day, for the governance of the 
seamen under their jurisdiction. It goes without saying 
that each system reflected the preferences and professional 
experiences of the individual who promulgated it. Some 
were quite rigorous, others relatively relaxed. While 
Captain Charles Ogle of H.M.S. Unite, for example, drilled 
his charges until they were "often exhausted," his 
successor, Captain Patrick Campbell, reduced the number of 
exercises to two a week and "did away with the formality of
Q
touching ... hats at quarters." But the common object 
of all systems was to avoid misunderstanding and error by 
providing the crews laboring under them with a clear, 
consistent code of conduct which would enable every member 
of the ship's company to know exactly what was expected of 
him. As Captain William Price Cumby instructed his 
immediate subordinates on the Hyperion: "The system of
8"Robert Wilson's Journal," pp. 144-145.
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t
discipline established in the ship must be always 
scrupulously attended to, and the mode of carrying on the 
duty adopted by the First Lieutenant be followed by all the 
others: as variety of method in the officer necessarily
g
tends to irregularity and confusion amongst the men."
Most contemporary theorists of naval captaincy waxed
%
exuberantly about the harmonious effects of well conceived
systems. In the opinion of some, such schemes were
analagous to finely tuned mechanisms. In 1807, the
anonymous author of a work entitled Observations and
Instructions for Officers of the Roval Navy drew the
analogy in the following terms:
Let him [i.e. the captain] fancy the movements of 
his ship to be those of a great machine whose 
vigour, expertness, utility, and effect, are 
dependent on discipline, and discipline on
himself. Let discipline then be considered as the 
great wheel, which sets in motion numberless small 
ones; the great cause of every success; the vital 
spring of subordination; the commanding 
invigorating principle of every action; the power 
which rewards and protects; whose advantages 
include all that is derived from the laws, 
authority and obedience, created with, and
expiring only with, his command. ... A system 
clear and methodical; the execution of it precise 
and regular.10
^William Pryce Cumby, "Orders and Regulations for the 
Government and Discipline of His Majesty's Ship Hyperion" 
in Five Naval Journals, p. 344.
10A Captain in the Royal Navy, Observations and 
Instructions for the Use of the Commissioned, the Junior 
and other Officers of the Roval Navv. on All the Material 
Points of Professional Duty (London: P. Steel, 1804), p.
36. Apparently some officers took the analogy literally. 
According to Samuel Leech, "The difficulty with naval 
officers is that they do not treat with a sailor as a man.
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Yet, ironically, the very systems which were intended 
to create this mechanical harmony among individual 
communities afloat spawned tremendous disorder within the 
fleet as a whole. Because each captain's methods of 
managing his crew inevitably differed from the next, what 
was tolerated on one vessel could be criminal on another. 
As one critic of the unreformed Admiralty laws expressed 
it: "the internal regulation of every ship in the navy
depends upon the 'captain's pleasure.' (as it is termed), 
and what is in one ship forbidden, is in another 
encouraged; what in one is applauded, in another punished; 
thus a naval life becomes a continued series of different 
educations."^
These "different educations" could cause considerable
problems for the seamen subjected to them. Although
grossly exaggerating his case, Jack Nastyface seems to have
been correct when he asserted that it was not uncommon for
veteran seamen to run afoul of the systems promulgated by
succeeding commanding officers through sheer ignorance of
12their methods rather than through criminal intent. A
They know what is fitting between each other as officers 
but they treat their crews on another principle; they are 
apt to look at them as pieces of living mechanism, born to 
serve, to obey their orders, and administer to their wishes 
without complaint." Leech, Thirty Years from Home, p. 123.
^Mentor, "On Our Naval Discipline, and Impressment," 
The Naval Chronicle. 36 (1816), p. 219.
12Nastyface, Nautical Economy, p. 149.
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survey of the mariners turned over from one ship to another 
reveals that almost forty-seven percent of those who were
punished suffered their initial correction within half a
13year of their entry onboard their new vessels.
Moreover approximately seventy-four percent of the men
flogged within the first six months of the arrival of a
fresh captain had no previous history of disciplinary
14problems on their ships.
In an attempt to remedy the lack of uniformity in the
management of the king's ships and its accompanying
problems, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on 12
July 1785 resolved to direct all commanders in chief "to
transmit hither [i.e. London] a copy of the most approved
regulations for the government, discipline and care of the
officers and men which ... subsisted in the ships of the
squadron under their respective commands for their
15Lordships information." However, nothing seems to have
13In computing this statistic, only men who entered a 
ship on or after the date at which examination of that 
vessel's log books commenced were tallied. Because it is 
impossible to determine whether or not seamen who entered 
before that date were ever punished (no less with what 
frequency), these men have been excluded from the
calculation. Thus, 303 of the 651 turned over men who were 
punished suffered their first correction within six months 
of their arrival on board their new ships.
14In the calculation of this percentage, all 
commanders with less than half a year's service were not 
included. As a result, the number of officers in this
survey is sixteen. Of the 423 men punished by these
captains during the first six months of their commands, 312
had no previous records of criminal activity.
15ADM 3/100.
147
come of the plan. The reason for the failure of this
attempt was probably quite simple. As Admiral Philip
Patton observed several years later:
The fluctuating state of the supreme naval power, 
and the contradictory ideas formed at the 
Admiralty by the different sea-officers who have 
sat at that Board, are the true causes why nothing 
really advantageous to discipline is likely to 
emanate from thence. The different Admirals who 
have suggested improvemehts in their squadrons, 
have sometimes been successful in proposing what 
has obtained approbation from the captain: but it
has always been more owing to this approbation, 
than to authority, that these improvements have 
been adopted.16
A certain amount of detail about the differences
between various systems has been preserved in the few
extant order books from the late eighteenth century. These
books were compendia of the directives given by individual
captains for the governance of their charges. Some provided
the officers and men with general outlines of what was
expected of them in ordinary naval situations. Captain
William Pryce Cumby's collection, for example, methodically
described the basic responsibilities of his immediate
subordinates and the functions they were to perform when
17the vessel was at sea and in harbor. Others established 
no daily regimen for the ship's company but consisted of
16Patton, Strictures on Naval Discipline, p. 14.
1^Cumby, "Orders and Regulations" in Five Naval 
Journals. pp. 330-349.
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instructions dealing with specific activities which were
issued as the need for them arose. Thus, the order book of
Prince William Henry, which was promulgated piece-meal
during the course of a one and a half year cruise by His
Royal Highness as commander of H.M.S. Peoasus. was
comprised primarily of rules treating such disparate topics
as swimming alongside the ship while in port and the
18mannerisms of barge men when rowing the longboat ashore.
Regardless of whether the rules contained in order
books were specific or general it was expected that they
would be obeyed by those for whom they were prescribed. It
was axiomatic in the eighteenth-century Royal Navy that
obedience was the fulcrum of order afloat. "Obedience to
the orders given by the captain is an article so
essential," claimed Admiral Patton, "that it may truly be
considered as the foundation upon which the whole system of
19discipline must be built." And the seriousness with 
which this observation was taken by most of His Majesty's 
commissioned officers is reflected by the relatively high 
incidence of summary punishments for failure to comply with 
instructions. Of the 8,610 crimes entered in the logs of 
the seventy-three men-of-war examined during the
18Prince William Henry. "Order Book, Pegasus and
Andromeda, 1786-1788," NMM WQB/40.
19Patton, Strictures. p. 75.
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preparation of the present study, 913, or a little more
20than one tenth, were defined as disobedience.
However, it was recognized that coercive measures alone 
had but a negligible effect on the majority of royal 
mariners. Such measures, it was believed, could be used 
only to compel bad men to follow orders, and then only 
grudgingly. As Patton put it: "obedience cannot be
obtained by any mode or degree of punishment, without a
previously favourable disposition among those who are to
21obey." To inspire a ship's company to perform its 
duties willfully, even happily, demanded something more 
than brute force. Not only did it call for that
indefinable quality of leadership, but it required His 
Majesty's captains to set virtuous examples for their crews 
to emulate.
Of the former, few generalizations can be made. So 
much depended on the talents of the individual commander.
Men with remarkably different personalities could be
blessed with an equal measure of what has become known to 
posterity as "the Nelson Touch." For instance, Captain 
Henry Inman, who —  in the opinion of Peter Cullen —  was 
"of greater firmness and enterprise than his predecessor,"
20The number of punishments for disobedience of
orders was exceeded only by the figures for drunkenness and 
neglect of duty. See Table of Crimes in Chapter Five.
21Patton, Strictures, p. 26.
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Manly Dixon, was as equally well liked by the crew of the
22Espion as Dixon had been. "There was, then, no
pattern," Dudley Pope has argued. "One captain commanded
his ship with a joke on his lips and a gentle hand on the
reign; another rarely spoke and even more rarely smiled.
23Yet each commanded successfully."
t «
Certainly, a modicum of innate leadership ability
helped to make a captain's task much easier, but by
eighteenth-century lights it alone could not insure a
felicific command. According to the conventional wisdom of
the day a commander also was obliged to provide his men
with an example which would encourage them to follow him
willingly and elevate their personal decorum. Numerous
commentators on the duties of commissioned officers
extolled the happy effects of a good example. "I have
always observed, that precept and example is as much
studied and attended to on board ship as in any part of
society," testified one anonymous author, "and where the
captain is particular in his own conduct, and vigilant over
that of his officers, the people are more orderly and
24punishment is the less necessary." Indeed, so
prevalent were these notions that they were
22"Memoirs of Peter Cullen, Esq.” in Five Naval 
Journals, p. 90.
23Pope, Life, p. 64.
2*A Captain, Observations and Instructions, p. 6.
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institutionalized by both editions of the Regulations and
Instructions. The volume originally promulgated in 1731,
for instance, stated: "the commanders of His Majesty's
ships are strictly required to shew in themselves a good
example of honour and virtue to their officers and men 
•i 25
• • •
The example to be set was styled after, that of the
2 6ideal of a country squire. Hence Captain O'Brien
cautioned young lieutenants about to assume command of
their first vessels: "The gentleman and the officer should
27never be separated." Like the members of the gentry, 
His Majesty's commanders were expected to conform to the 
accepted standards of decency and gentility of the day. 
They were to be honorable men who carried themselves with 
dignity and propriety, distinguishing themselves from the 
lower orders of maritime society by their education and
25Reaulations and Instructions. 1st ed., p. 45.
2^For discussions of this ideal, see Joan Wildeblood 
and Peter Brinson, The Polite World: A Guide to English
Manners and Deportment from the Thirteenth to the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press,
1965), pp. 209-217; Clark, English Society, pp. 93-118; and 
the numerous passages by eighteenth-century writers quoted 
in A. Smythe-Palmer, The Ideal of a Gentleman or A Mirror 
for Gentlefolks: A Portrayal in Literature from the
Earliest Times (London: George Routledge and Sons, n.d.).
2?Captain O'Brien, "Essays on the Duty of a Captain," 
The Naval Chronicle. 5 (1801): p. 217.
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28refinement. The Regulations and Instructions of 1806
specifically enjoined them to be paragons of "morality/
29regularity and good order." Only in this manner could 
they enjoy the respect and allegiance of their crews that 
were considered so essential to the good government of the 
king's ships.
Needless to say# the world of the quarter-deck was far 
from that of the ideal polite society. Even a cursory
28While few members of the quarter-deck received the 
education in the classics offered at Eton, Harrow, 
Charterhouse or Westminster, commissioned officers did 
undergo fairly rigorous training in practical seamanship. 
In theory at least, no one aspiring to become a naval 
officer could apply for a lieutenant's commission until he 
had served a minimum of six years as a midshipman and had 
reached the age of twenty. At the end of this 
apprenticeship each candidate was examined on a variety of 
nautical subjects by a committee of captains appointed by 
either the Navy Board or the commanders in chief of foreign 
stations. The social importance of such an education is 
well illustrated by the following passage from Cullen's 
memoirs: "The common seaman knows his officer to be a
well-instructed man, competent to work in a ship, or 
maneuver a fleet, which he himself is incapable of doing, 
he therefore, as it were from instinct, obeys him at once, 
without hesitation, as a superior being, more intelligent 
than himself. A seaman looks up to his officer, as a son 
to his father, whom he knows to be more wise, more 
experienced, and more skillful than he possibly can be, 
because scientifically taught. A seaman knows himself to 
be but a handicraftsman, and his officer a master who must 
direct him. For a thoroughbred commander of a ship, 
whether commercial or naval, must of necessity be a man of 
science. Mathematics, Astronomy, Navigation, Gunnery, etc. 
are sciences which the officer must know or he learns not. 
This then is the grand basis of Naval Discipline, and 
navies cannot exist without it. To the landsman this 
appears slavery, but it is not; it is ignorance submitting 
to knowledge, and it is true wisdom, and discretion." 
("Memoirs of Peter Cullen," p. 105).
29Reaulations and Instructions 2nd ed., p. 3.
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reading of the reminiscences of life at sea during the
eighteenth century betrays some incredibly debauched 
30characters. Such an officer was Lieutenant Byam who
entered H.M.S. Tromp at Martinique on 4 January 1801.
According to the frigate's gunner# William Richardson, Byam
"was a complete rough knot, and said once that he would not
give a damn for a fellow that did not like grog; he seldom
went to bed sober, and sometimes when he had been on shore
and came off in the evening he staggered so that the
quarter-deck was hardly large enough to hold him, and
sometimes would tumble down on the cabin floor when he
31reached it, and lie there." Similarly, William Dillon 
described James Waddy, who was the master of the Aimable 
when Dillon joined her on 13 August 1796 at Fort Royal Bay, 
as "an officer nearly worn out. He sang a capital song, 
but also liked his glass."32
30By the same token one only nee.d look at the works 
of the older school of British social historians to find 
examples of riotous squires. See Dorothy Marshall, 
"Manners, Meals and Domestic Pastimes," in Johnson's 
England: An Account of the Life and Manners of his Aae.
ed. A. S. Turberville (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933),
vol. 1: pp. 336-361 and A. S. Turberville, English Men and
Manners in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1926), pp. 83-100.
31william Richardson, A Mariner of England: An
Account of the Career of William Richardson from Cabin Bov 
in the Merchant Service to Warrant Officer in the Roval 
Navv Q780 to 18191 as told bv Himself, ed. Col. Spencer 
Childers (London: John Murray, 1908), p. 178.
32Dillon, A Narrative of Mv Professional Adventures, 
vol. 1: p. 251.
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However, there is one remarkable document which 
suggests that the Byams and Waddys were the exceptions 
rather than the rule for British naval officers in the age 
of sail. In his memoirs, James Anthony Gardner offers a
unique glimpse of the men who walked the quarter-decks of
33the king’s ships in the late eighteenth century. A 
veteran of almost thirty years service, Gardner records his 
general impression of the personalities of three hundred of 
the warrant and commissioned officers with whom he was 
acquainted. He characterizes fifty-one percent of these 
mariners as either "gentlemen," "good officers," or "worthy 
fellows." Conversely he describes only eleven percent as 
heavy drinkers or coarse mannered.^4
That Gardner found the overall deportment of so few of 
His Majesty's officers objectionable is not particularly 
astonishing. From the surviving evidence it is clear that 
there were strong communal and institutional pressures 
working upon the members of the quarter-deck to comply with 
the prescribed modes of genteel behavior. Failure to do so
33Recollections of James Anthony Gardner. Commander 
R. N. (1775 - 1814). ed. R. Vesey Hamilton and John Knox 
Laughton (London: Navy Records Society, vol. 31, 1906).
3 4 G a r d n e r  describes the remaining third in terms 
which do not indicate a level of gentility. For example, 
his assessment of James Moore, the gunner of the Hind, 
reads simply: "A very good sailor (p. 202)." Similarly,
his only comment about Midshipman O'Connor of the Barfleur 
is: "I hated him (p. 119)."
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could lead to social ostracism or —  even worse —  the 
censure of a court martial. The fate of an unfortunate 
officer serving on the Leeward Islands station in the later 
1780s illustrates how deep-seated the notions of 
gentlemanly propriety were among members of the 
quarter-deck. In December 1787 several mariners who were 
impressed during an Armament entrusted part of the wage 
they had earned on board a merchant vessel to Lieutenant 
James Collins of H.M.S. Jupiter. After the threat of war 
had subsided early in the next year, the men were 
discharged from the navy and returned to collect the money 
they had left with Collins. However, to their dismay they 
discovered that the lieutenant had squandered their 
resources at a gambling den on Barbados and was unable to 
repay them with hard currency. Instead he issued them 
bills of exchange which they had much difficulty cashing at 
face value. When the "Wardroom Gentlemen" of the Jupiter 
became aware of what Collins had done, they were outraged.
i
Expressing their disapprobation, they banished him from 
their mess in February 1788 and refused to show him any 
further "countenance." For months Collins languished as an 
outcast. Finally, in August, Commodore Parker, the 
commander in chief of the squadron, took pity on the 
hapless lieutenant and sent him home to be reassigned to 
another station. In explaining the reasoning behind his 
action, Parker informed the Admiralty that in his opinion
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"it ought not follow for such an error a young man should
35be held out as infamous all his life after."
But it was not only an officer’s peers who expected him 
to adhere to the standards of gentility. The seaman did as 
well. This is evinced quite clearly in an incident related 
by Peter Cullen in his memoirs. During the insurrection at 
the Nore in the Spring of 1797, the mutineers aboard his
ship showed the captain and several of the other officers
the greatest courtesy. At one point they even apologized
1
for the inconvenience they had caused. However, two of the
members of the quarter-deck they would not suffer to remain
in their presence. According to Cullen:
The reasons that these men gave for their
hostility to those officers were curious enough.
The First Lieutenant, they said, was a blackguard 
and nq  gentleman, and by no means fit for being an 
officer. That the Master was like him; both of 
them a disgrace to His Majesty's service. And we 
all had proofs enough of the correctness of their 
observations in that respect.36
As painful or embarrassing as these pressures could be, 
an even greater inducement for officers to behave in a
36ADM 1/315. Unfortunately for Collins, the 
Admiralty did not share the Commodore's sentiments. In the 
margin of Parker's letter of 30 September 1788 to the Lords 
Commissioners concerning the affair is written: "Their
Lordships do not think there was sufficient reason to 
permit Lieutenant Collins to quit the Jupiter." Therefore, 
upon his return to England he was ordered back to the 
Leewards to serve in his former capacity on the Jupiter. 
See Parker's letter of 14 July 1789 acknowledging Collins's 
return (ADM 1/315).
36"Memoirs of Peter Cullen," p. 84.
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decorous manner was the potential danger of condemnation by
a court martial run by men who did not carry themselves
respectably. The possibility of having to answer to a
naval tribunal for one's personal deportment was far from
remote. Of the 110 warrant and commissioned officers tried
on the Leeward Islands Station between 1784 and 1812,
almost three quarters were charged with ungentlemanly
acts. Moreover the gravity with which these offenses were
viewed is demonstrated by the sentences meted out to those
found,guilty of them. Fifty-four percent of the members of
the quarter-deck convicted of unofficer-like conduct in the
Lesser Antilles during the period under discussion either
were dismissed from the Royal Navy or broke of their rank
37and forced to serve before the.mast.
Such was the fate of Lieutenant Michael Mackey who was 
stripped of his commission by a tribunal in Fort Royal Bay, 
Martinique on 29 July 1799 for "drunkenness and 
ungentlemanly behavior." A few days earlier Mackey had sat 
down to supper in the wardroom of the Invincible "without 
coat or waistcoat or handkerchief round his neck.” Seeing 
him in this state of dishabille, several of his messmates 
rebuked him for his "improper" appearance. Mackey defended
370f the 110 officers tried, eighty-one were accused 
of ungentlemanly acts. Of the sixty-seven convicted, 
thirty-six received the maximum sentence.
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himsel£ by claiming that "he had seen gentlemen sit at the
table with only their dressing gowns on.” However, his
reply failed to satisfy his dining companions. After one
of them removed himself from the table in protest, Mackey
arose to return to his quarters. As he was departing, he
"struck his backside twice." A Lieutenant Morris responded
to the gesture by saying that "he would kick it." At this
point, Mackey left the room and entered his cabin. Five
minutes later, he threw open his door brandishing a sword.
When Morris approached Mackey, Mackey —  excited by liquor
—  swung at him twice with the cutlass, the second time
piercing his cheek. Shortly thereafter, Mackey was
arrested and confined to await his trial. Within less than
38a week, his professional career was in ruins.
That the code of gentility was enforced with 
considerable stringency is not surprising. In addition to 
providing the lower orders of the naval population with a 
virtuous example to emulate, it was the principal means, 
other than rank itself, by which the members of the 
quarter-deck distinguished themselves from the maritime 
masses they governed. Through their manners and dress, 
naval officers, like the landed gentry, set themselves 
apart from the rest of society and embellished their
38ADM 1/5350.
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39status. By virtue of this distance, they could
maintain that detached aloofness so characteristic of
eighteenth-century rural squires who sequestered themselves
from the commonality behind the high walls and fences
40surrounding their estates.
Thus, like the landed classes, the members of the 
quarter-deck attempted to surround themselves with the aura 
of distance. To widen the gulf between officers and men 
created by the code of gentility still further, all
intercourse between the two groups normally was conducted 
with rigid formality. As Charles Pemberton delightfully 
put it:
An English officer will respect his station though
he be locked up in a cupboard, six feet by four,
for a month with a private: he is cautious
against the levelling of distinctions at all times 
and in all places. He would be irremediably 
contaminated if he kneeled on the same hassock, at 
prayer, in a church, with a man in the ranks. 
Launch him in a jolly boat with a pair of
mizentopmen, on the wide waste of the Atlantic,
discipline, decorum, and distance will be 
uppermost in his thoughts, the rules and guides of 
his steering an# sail-trimming, and biscuit-
cracking. 41
39Standard uniforms for commissioned officers and 
midshipmen were introduced in 1748. However, the 
regulations concerning them do not appear to have been 
enforced strictly until the later part of the eighteenth 
century. See Marcus, Heart of Oak, pp. 73-75.
40See E. P. Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebian 
Culture," Journal of Social History. 8 (Summer, 1974): p.
389.
41Pemberton, The Autobiography of Pel. Veriuice. pp. 
151-152.
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Indeed the boundaries between the nautical castes were
held to be so inviable that it was considered an o££ense
within the jurisdiction o£ a court martial to transgress
them. Surgeon Richard Graham o£ H.M.S. Heroine. for
example, was tried on 1 July 1793 at Carlisle Bay, Barbados
for, among other things, "familiarizing with the people and 
42servants." Similarly, Lieutenant Roger Woolcombe was
reprimanded by a tribunal at Portsmouth on 7 December 1805
"for having acted unbecoming the character of an officer 
and a gentleman in messing at the top of the [Diamond] Rock 
with part of the ship's company" of the sloop Diamond 
Rock.43
Because of the cramped conditions on board the king's 
ships resulting from the fact that relatively large numbers 
of human beings lived in very small spaces, numerous 
ceremonies were employed to remind the inhabitants of naval 
vessels of the wide social chasm that existed between 
officers and men. Some established the etiquette to be 
observed on various occasions. During the captain's 
promenades on the quarter-deck, for instance, it was ritual 
for the officers in attendance to be careful to follow 
their commander's lead, walking at his pace and turning 
when he turned. Others were intended to be physical
42ADM 1/5330.
43ADM 1/5371.
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manifestations of the deference which seamen owed to their 
superiors. Thus when a mariner wished to address one of 
his officers he was to touch his hat or remove it 
completely as a sign of respect. "These ceremonials, which 
in one point of view, appear frivolous," wrote the Rev. 
Edward Mangin, "are in another, of the utmost importance to 
the well-being of naval society; ... where even a momentary 
dereliction of forms might prove fatal to the general 
interest.”44
However, distance did not imply an abdication of social
responsibility by the ruling elite. Like the rural gentry,
naval officers exhibited a marked paternal concern for the
lower orders of their respective communities. Indeed, for
them to have done anything less would have been seen by
most members of the fleet in the age of sail as a breach of
their obligations to society. In the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, few essayists addressing the
duties of His Majesty's captains failed to draw the analogy
of the parental relationship that existed between
commanders and their crews. "The captain," asserted one
observer, "may properly be called the father of his ship's 
45company." In a similar vein, Admiral Patton argued:
44Edward Mangin, "Some Account of the Writer's
Situation as Chaplain in the British Navy," in Five Naval 
Journals, p. 16.
450'Brien, "Essay," p. 217.
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Whatever ... shall occur which may demonstrate to 
the seamen, that it is the study of the captain to 
promote the general happiness, in those duties a 
skillful officer will always be assiduously 
employed. By such attention it will soon appear 
that he looks upon the whole company as his 
friends or his children . ,.46
Paternalism manifested itself at sea in different ways
than it did on shore. Whereas the charitable acts of the
landed gentry usually took the form of alms for the poor,
reduced rents, free housing for aged tenants and the like,
47those of captains did not. Since food, clothing and 
shelter were provided by the service, there was little need 
for philanthropic contributions of this kind. In the navy, 
paternal concern was reflected primarily by the interest of 
commmanders in the health and well-being of their crews. 
Many officers went to considerable lengths to insure that 
the mariners on their vessels lived as pleasantly as 
possible. The documents from the Leeward Islands station 
during the period under discussion contain numerous 
references to attempts to provide the seamen with wholesome 
provisions, protection from the elements and other such 
comforts. Representative is the following entry in the 
master's log of the Excellent, dated Christmas Day, 1802: 
"Received 1028 lbs. of fresh beef."4®
46Patton, Strictures. p. 49.
47See Mingay, The Gentry, pp. 143-146.
48ADM 52/2992.
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In addition to supplying these amenities, many captains
demonstrated a genuine concern for the morale of their
men. Almost all commanders tolerated the traditional
4 9maritime celebration known as "Crossing the Line." 
Some, like James Carthew of H.M.S. Glorie and the Duke of
^Although there were several variations, this 
festive occasion normally was celebrated as it was 
described by Henry Walsh: "according to ancient custom
among the sailors the[y] shave all those that never was 
across the line [i.e. the Tropic of Cancer] before. The 
manner that the[y] perform this ceremony is as follows: 
The[y] dress one of the sailors in the habbit [sic] of 
Neptune, god of the weaves [sic] and provides a coach and 
six horses to draw him. He has a trident in his hand and a 
crown on his head with a great number of sea nymphs which 
is all painted with various colours and masks with music of 
different kinds all playing. As he rides along he goes 
into the head and with a trumput hails the ship and the 
captain answers. They have a long discourse but Neptune 
comes on board and rides along to the quarter deck and 
acquaints the captain that he is [sic] come on board to 
shave all his children at their arrival in that country. 
Neptune and the captain continues in conversation for a 
considerable length of time and then Neptune presents some 
of his food to the captain which is a fish on the point of 
his trident, which present the captain receives with many 
thanks to Neptune. After having a full account of the 
number of officers and men that is to be shaved, he 
proceeds to the place or shop where all his barbers is 
[sic] waiting to execute his commands. The[y] have a large 
sail of very thick canvas which will hold water and the[y] 
have it filled so that it will hold seven or eight tons of 
water and then fill it with the same. And then the barbers 
their chairs placed close to it and being well provided 
with ladder for shaving, which is composed of tar and dirty 
grace [sic] and filth of every kind that the[y] can find, 
the barbers being prepared at the same time with an iron
hoop for a razor, which is notched in the edge to make it
more disagreeable and rough. This being prepared, with 
every necessary to complete their designs, the[y] then by 
Neptune's order begin the operation. The constable with 
his gang bring the first and places him on the chair, and 
the barber begins to ladder [sic] him discoursing him at
the same time and asking him many questions, intending if
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Clarence, granted their companies regular leave when in 
50port. Others, if they did not allow the seamen to
venture from the ship in harbor, frequently permitted
visitors from shore. Jeffrey Raigersfeld, who served as a
midshipman under Cuthbert Collingwood on board the Mediator
in the West Indies between 1783 and 1786, for example,
relates in his autobiography that blacks from the several
islands continually were given license to enter the vessel
to barter their wares and entertain the crew with
51indigenous performances. Still others promoted various 
forms of amusements. According to James Wallis, Lord 
Nelson, when captain of the Boreas in the Lesser Antilles, 
"encouraged music, dancing, and cudgeling etc. and the 
officers and young gentlemen acted plays which kept up 
their spirits and kept their mind [sic] employed, which ...
he would answer to run the dirty brush into his mouth, but 
when the[y] have shaved him the[y] instantly tumbles him 
into the water and there roll him about until he is half 
drowned, and so on until he is shaved. Of those who never 
crossed the line before there is none excepted, even the 
officers themselves must experience the same without favour 
or exception or bestow valuable presents of liquor to 
ransome [sic] their liberty. This operation being over, 
the[y] generally gets a present of liquor from the captain 
and officers which makes them spend the day in pleasure." 
"An Irish Countryman in the British Navy, 1809-1815: The
Memoirs of Henry Walsh," ed. T. W. Moody, The Irish Sword 4 
(Winter, 1960): pp. 234-235.
50ADM 51/1875, 1996 and 2391; "Order Book, Pegasus,"
N.M.M. WQB/40.
51Baron de Raigersfeld, The Life of a Sea Officer, p. 
14-35.
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[was] of the utmost utility in preserving health in these 
52climates." Finally, a few even indulged the men in 
their pleasures. Thus, soon after assuming command of the 
Aimable, Captain William Granville Lobb authorized, "one 
mess to have, daily, an extra portion of spirits, to enjoy 
themselves without being called upon to attend to any duty,
c q
when no particular exertion was required."
The tendency on the part of certain captains to grant
their crews such indulgences suggests another trait of some
of the members of the quarter-deck. Like a number of rural
squires, these officers had a strong desire to be loved by
54the classes beneath them in the social hierarchy. In a 
few cases this desire could be so great that it inclined 
the commander to overlook clear contraventions of the 
Articles of War. For example, in November 1799 Sir William 
Dillon, then First Lieutenant of the Crescent. found his 
vessel populated with mariners who were "lazy and fond of 
drink." However, his representations to his captain of the
52«captain Wallis's Memoir" in Geoffrey Rawson, ed., 
Nelson's Letters from the Leeward Islands and Other 
Original Documents in the Public Records Office and the 
British Museum, with notes by Professor Michael Lewis and 
Engravings by Geoffrey Wales (London: The Golden Cockerel
Press, 1953), p. 54.
53Dillon, A Narrative, vol. 1, p. 291.
54G . E. Mingay, English Landed Society in the 
Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1963), p. 284.
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misconduct of these men fell on deaf ears. As Dillon
described it: "When I made a complaint to him, he would
frequently not listen to it# but replied, 'You must become
55popular with the ship's company.'"
Other commanders shunned this type of popularity,
attempting instead to elevate the morals of their men
through religious instruction. One such officer was Lord
Barham. In an undated memorandum, he asserted: "As soon
as I became a captain I began reading prayers myself to the
ship's company of a Sunday [sic] and also a sermon."56
While most members of the quarter-deck probably did not
share Barham's evangelical fervor, it does appear that a
considerable number of them attempted in some degree to
minister to the spiritual needs of their seamen. Some form
of divine service was performed regularly on almost forty
57percent of the ships included in the present survey. 
Moreover, eighteen percent of these vessels were supplied 
with Scriptures donated by the Naval and Military Bible 
Society.55
55Dillon, vol. 1, p. 370.
^ Letters and Papers of Charles. Lord Barham. Admiral 
of the Red Squadron. 1758 - 1813. ed. John Knox Laughton, 
(London: Navy Records Society, Vol. 38, 1910), p. 163.
57Twenty-nine of the seventy-three ships.
58Thirteen of the seventy-three vessels. The Naval 
and Military Bible Society was founded in 1780 "for the 
sole purpose of distributing Bibles among the sailors and
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While acts of naval paternalism could assume many
different faces, the fatherly concern a captain exhibited
toward his men theoretically had one over-riding
objective: to render the inhabitants of the lower deck
their just deserts. Assessing the obligations of both
parties in the paternal relationship, Patton concluded:
"The child owes the parent obedience, gratitude,
affectionate attention and respect. The parent, in a word,
59owes the child justice." This conviction was echoed by 
several other contemporaries who committed their thoughts 
to paper. In 1809, an anonymous correspondent to the Naval 
Chronicle, for instance, expressed the connection in the 
following terms: "A ship's company should look up for
paternal care and strict justice to their commander."6®
In the naval lexicon, "strict justice" meant equity as 
much as it did penal retribution. Hence, the Regulations 
and Instructions of 1806 stated explicitly: "The captain
is to see that on all occasions strict justice is done to 
all the officers and men under his command; that they have
soldiers of the British Navy and Army." It supplied 
Scriptures free of charge to all ships whose commanding 
officers or chaplains solicited them (An Account of the 
Naval and Military Bible Society, from its Institution in 
1780 to Ladv-Dav 1804 (London, 1804), pp. 3, 11).
59Patton, pp. 21-22.
SOa .f .Y., "Present Management and Discipline of the 
Navy, Letter XI," The Navy Chronicle. 21 (1809): p. 112.
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their proper allowances of provisions; and that no improper 
charge is made against their wages."61 And, from the
evidence pertaining to the fleet in the Lesser Antilles 
during the period under examination at least, it seems that 
His Majesty's commanders attempted to give the men their 
due by rigidly observing these entitlements and 
occasionally even offering rewards for meritorious 
service. Thus, after discovering he had purchased
undrinkable rum in March 1785, Captain Wilfred Collingwood
I
suspended his crew's grog rations for forty-eight hours;
but when the tainted liquor had been replaced he "ordered
their allowance to be increased one third till they had the
62two days allowance that was stopped." Similarly,
Captain Jemmett Mainwaring, immediately upon anchoring at 
English Harbour, Antigua in December 1796, praised the
company of the Aimable for their attentiveness to duty and 
distributed some prize money among the seamen before
granting them "a holiday."63
If justice involved providing for the worthy, it also 
entailed the unpleasant task of chastening the infamous. 
Here too the notion of fairness was to be applied. It was 
a maxim of eighteenth-century naval penal theory that each
61Reaulations and Instructions 2nd ed., p. 163. 
62ADM 51/770.
63Dillon, vol. 1: p. 273.
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of£ense to be judged impartially in its own light and 
treated with the sternness or lenity that it really 
deserved. In other words, the punishment was to fit the 
crime. Therefore, it was not to be unduly severe. Hence 
Captain O'Brien cautioned young commanders: "to punish
with the utmost rigour is brutality, not justice."64
That many captains honestly sought to abide by this 
theory of justice is suggested by the fact that only about 
seven percent of those surveyed invariably administered the 
same type of correction in equal amounts for all instances
fk *5
of a particular violation. Between December 1799 and 
May 1802, Captain John Nash punished thirty-two seamen and 
marines on board the Hornet sloop for neglect of duty with 
sentences that ranged from six to thirty-six lashes.66 
Moreover, in many cases commanders tried to distinguish 
degrees of guilt among mariners involved in petty 
conspiracies. In roughly forty-five percent of the 
instances in which three or more tars were punished for the 
same multiple offenses on the same day, the delinquents did
640'Brien, p. 216.
65In calculating this statistic, the punishment
records of seventy-four commanders who served continuously 
for six months or longer on one of the seventy-three ships 
were examined. Of these officers only five, or 6.68 
percent habitually administered equal amounts of correction 
for all instances of the same crime.
66ADM 51/1322, 1364, 1417.
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67not receive identical penalties. Thus on 1 June 1808
Captain William Maude £logged two of the three men
belonging to H.M.S. Belleisle who had been deemed guilty of
negligence and intoxication with twenty-four lashes/ and
the other with twelve.68
One technique employed on the king's ships to ensure
justice was the practice of delaying the adjudication and *
correction of offenses for some time after their discovery
to allow whatever anger they had aroused within a commander
to subside, therefore enabling him to consider the issue
dispassionately and avoid unwarranted severity. Because no
systematic records were kept of the intervals between the
detection of crimes and their punishment, it is impossible
to assess the frequency with which this technique was
used. Nevertheless, from the few surviving instances
recorded in the log books of the vessels on the Leeward
Islands station between 1784 and 1812 it is evident that
the minimum period was approximately twenty-four hours.
Thus the day after the captain of the Svren caught Charles
Neily and William Thomas swimming from the frigate on 21
July 1799, he brought them to the gangway and gave them two
69dozen lashes each. In some cases though, the interim
67In thirty-four of the seventy-six cases the 
delinquents involved received different penalties.
68ADM 51/1920.
69ADM 52/3480.
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could be much longer. Captain Henry Newcome, for example,
did not flog Private John Champion for desertion until a
fortnight after the unfortunate marine had been captured
70and returned to the Maidstone on 16 November 1787.
The attempts of captains to administer justice fairly
and dispassionately did not go unnoticed by the men of the
lower deck. In fact British tars seem to have appreciated
these efforts greatly. According to Pemberton, Captain
Murray Maxwell, who saw extensive duty in the Leewards
during the Napoleonic Wars before distinguishing himself in
the East Indies, was served zealously by the seamen under
his command "because they found he wished to be, would be,
just; they put forth their strength, skill, and cheerful
alacrity because he was merciful and considerate in his
discipline; he never tasked them with impossibilities; he
71never irritated them by caprice ..." An even more
revealing episode is found in Cullen's narrative. During
the mutiny at the Nore,
the Second Lieutenaht [of the Espionl ... was 
surprised at their [the mutineers'] tender mercy 
to him, above the rest, turned round to one of the 
delegates, and said, 'how do you spare me? Did I 
not get you flogged the other day?' His answer 
was —  'You did Sir, but I deserved it. You are a 
gentleman, and a good officer. You never, punished 
men but when they were in fault and you did it as 
an officer ought to do.'72
70ADM 51/578; ADM 36/10740.
71Pemberton, p. 225.
72Cullen, pp. 84-85.
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Influenced as they were by the leavening principles of
gentility/ paternalism and detached justice/ His Majesty's
captains as a group seem to have exercised the awesome
disciplinary powers at their disposal with moderation and
restraint. Only about nine percent of the seamen and
marines entered in the muster books of the •seventy-three
vessels included in the present survey ever endured the
lash or the knittle. Thus it would appear that the
defenders of corporal punishment were correct when they
claimed that the majority of British mariners had nothing
to fear from the cat of nine tails. If nine percent of the
inhabitants of the lower decks of king's ships were
73flogged, ninety-one percent were not.
Yet was nine percent a high or low figure in relation
to other sailing navies? Unfortunately/ this is a question
which defies easy answer. For the most part, quantitative
analysis of naval criminology in the age of sail remains to
be undertaken. In fact the only comparable statistics to
be found are those presented by James E. Valle in his study
74of American naval discipline in the Antebellum period.
73The raw numbers used in the calculation of this 
percentage were: 5/538 men punished divided by 59/525
total men on board the ships in the survey.
74James E. Valle, Rocks & Shoals: Order and
Discipline in the Old Navv. 1800-1861 (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1980).
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Although Valle's numbers tally punishments rather than men
punished and therefore do not lend themselves to the
computation of accurate percentages/ they still provide
some perspective on the statistic just cited of nine
percent lashed. By calculating ratios of floggings to
total populations of seamen for both the American and
British samples, it is discovered that the British rate is
much lower. Whereas punishments were inflicted in the
United States Navy at a ratio of one to every four seamen
between 1846 and 1847, the proportion on board the
seventy-three ships included in this survey was roughly one 
75to eight. Placed in this context then, the figure of
nine percent computed for the vessels in the Leewards does
not seem to be particularly high. Indeed,it may be and
seems to be considerably lower than the comparable
76
percentage for the American fleet.
75Citing figures from a Congressional report, Valle 
states that there were 5,936 floggings in the American Navy 
in 1846 and 1847. In his second table he lists the 
population of the U.S. fleet at 11,298 in 1846 and 13,025 
in 1847. By adding these two numbers and dividing the 
total by the incidents of flogging a ratio of about 1 to 4 
is derived. Since Valle's statistics do not make allowance 
for recitivites, the British rate is calculated by using 
the total number of punishments (7,421), instead of the 
total number of men punished (5,538). By dividing the 
total number of men who served on the ships of the survey 
(59,525) by the total number of punishments a rate of 1 to 
8.02 is computed.
76In fact, the American ratio is probably somewhat 
higher than it should be. Unlike the British, it is not 
adjusted for the number of seamen carried over from one 
year to the next. As a result it is based on a population 
which is inflated artificially by counting some men twice.
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While statistical analysis suggests that His Majesty's
captains as a group probably administered correction with
greater lenity than their American counterparts, it also
indicates that British commanders collectively followed few
general patterns in doing so. There is no correlation
between the frequency of punishment and the place of its
infliction. About half of the floggings meted out on board
the ships in the survey occurred at sea, with the remainder
taking place in port or within three days of leaving 
77harbor. Similarly there is no relationship between the
seasons of the year and the number of punishments; most
78months witnessed around 600 apiece. Moreover, there 
appears to be no strong measure of association between the 
size of a vessel and the quota of its crew punished. 
Whereas about five percent of the seamen on board the 
Bellona. which was a third rate ship of the line, endured 
the lash, an equal proportion is found on H.M. Sloop
77The category of "within three days of leaving
harbor" was devised in an effort to distinguish crimes 
which were committed in port but punished at sea. The raw 
totals are:
At Sea - 3,581
In Port - 2,954
Within Three Days - 762
Missing - 124
78The monthly frequencies of punishments are:
January - 588 July - 522
February - 638 August - 625
March - 757 September - 562
April - 711 October - 572
May - 641 November - 488
June - 656 December - 660
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7 9Barbados. Finally, there seems to have been no
appreciable correlation between the length of time a
commander had held a commission and the sternness with
80which he managed his crew. Although James Stevenson
had been a commander for only four months when he was
posted to the Charon in September 1797, he flogged about
the same percentage of his men as did John Hutt who had
more than twelve years of experience at or above the same
81rank on the day he set foot on the Queen in March 1793.
79Seventy-four of the 1419 men on board the Bellona 
between 1 October 1794 and 30 September 1797 were punished 
(ADM 51/1128, 1181, 1194, 1223; ADM 36/11592). Thirty of 
the 847 mariners belonging to the Barbados between 7 March 
1804 and 30 September 1805 suffered correction (ADM 
51/1636, 1483; ADM 36/15787).
80t o establish what —  if any —  relationship existed
between a captain's length of service and his propensity to 
punish, a data set of captains with at least six months 
continuous service on board one of the seventy-three ships 
examined was created which included the lengths of time in 
months each of these officers had spent as a lieutenant, a 
commander and a captain prior to the date he assumed 
control of his vessel and the percentage of his crew that 
he punished. The length of service numbers were calculated 
from the commission dates for each of these officers listed 
in The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Roval Navv.
1660-1815. 3 vols. (London, 1954). SPPSx procedure
"Crosstabs" was run on the data to determine the
correlation. Because the "significance" numbers produced 
by the initial run greatly exceeded those suggesting a 
strong measure of association, several successive recodes 
were undertaken and the program run again. However these 
later tests yielded equally high results.
8^Stevenson punished thirteen of 811 men, or about 
one and a half percent of his crew (ADM 51 1184, 2751; ADM 
36/11835; ADM 36/13 419). Hutt corrected twenty-four of
1161 mariners, or two percent of his company (ADM 51/753; 
ADM 36/11364).
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Nevertheless there is one highly interesting pattern 
that does emerge. For ninety percent of the captains in 
the sample who governed a naval vessel continuously for one 
year or longer, punishments tended to be inflicted in 
cyclical clusters of varying temporal lengths which
DO
succeeded each other at irregular intervals. Almost
invariably, the initial cluster reached its peak sometime 
between the second and the seventh month of an officer's 
command. Thereafter followed a period of diminished
correctional activity. This period in turn gave way to a 
new cluster which, like the first, peaked and subsided. And 
so the pattern continued to wax and wain until either the 
cruise ended or the commander was replaced.
The initial clusters probably reflect the periods in
which captains established their systems for the government
of their ships. A random sample of twenty-five of these
groupings reveals that almost sixty percent of the
punishments constituting them were meted out for crimes
such as neglect of duty, disobedience of orders,
uncleanness, drunkenness and the like —  i.e., for crimes
which indicate either an inability or a refusal to comply
83with a particular method of management. For example,
82See Appendix C for a representative selection of 
charts.
82The raw numbers are: 379 divided by 638.
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eighteen of the first twenty-six floggings inflicted by
Robert Murray on board H.M.S. Blanche in 1789 were for
84disobedience and negligence alone. Similarly,
fifty-six percent of the members of the crew of the Camilla 
corrected by John Bowen during the three months 
inaugurating his command of that vessel were guilty of 
inebriation or carelessness.85
Unfortunately, the succeeding groupings cannot be 
accounted for as readily. A random survey of fifty later 
clusters suggests several explanations for their 
occurrence. The most common reason seems to have been that 
once captains had established their systems they tended to 
relax their enforcement only to have to reassert their 
authority again at a later date. In sixty percent of the 
cases studied more than half of the punishments meted out 
were for crimes of neglect, disobedience, uncleanness, 
drunkenness and the like, that is for the same crimes which 
were so prevalent in the initial clusters. For example, 
twdnty of the twenty-five seamen of the Stork flogged by 
George Le Geyt between March and May 1809 were adjudged to
Q g
have committed one or more of these offenses. At the
84ADM 51/95.
8 8 ADM 51/1667. From 1 April to 30 June 1870, 
fourteen of the twenty-five men punished by Bowen had 
committed these offenses.
86ADM 52/4338. This was Le Geyt's third cluster of 
punishments.
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same time, twelve percent of the subsequent periods of
correctional activity appear to have been due primarily to
restlessness among the crews. In each of these instances
at least two-thirds of the tars subjected to the lash were
charged with disrespect, mutiny, sedition or fighting.
Thus, eight of the ten men punished by William Truscott on
H.M.S. Ganges during August and September 1795 were deemed
87guilty of some act of insubordination or riotousness.
Another six percent of the clusters are attributable
largely to the detection of petty conspiracies. Hence,
while Nelson flogged sixteen members of the company of the
Boreas in April and May 1786, eleven of the victims had
been involved jointly in a scheme to smuggle liquor aboard 
88ship. The remaining twenty-two percent of the later
groupings indicate either various combinations of the three
factors just noted or relatively high incidences of crimes
like theft or desertion. Between August and October 1791,
M. C. Squire, for example, punished three mariners of the
Solebav for drunkenness, two for negligence, two for
insolence, two for quarrelling, two for "riotous
89behaviour," one for disobedience and one for mutiny.
87ADM 51/1162. This was Truscott's fourth and final
cluster of correctional activity.
88ADM 51/120.
8^ADM 51/874. This was Squire's third cluster of
punishments.
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Despite the general pattern of clusters in the 
infliction of punishment, individual captains employed a 
variety of different correctional techniques which from the 
nature of the sources are impossible to quantify. Some 
commanders tried to maximize the impact that the example of 
punishment had on their crews by restricting the number of
t 1
occasions on which floggings were administered. According
to an advocate of this practice, it made for "a more solemn
9 0sort of day of trial or jail delivery ..." One
proponent of such a policy who served in the Lesser
Antilles during the period under examination was Thomas
Manby. While commander of the Africaine in 1805, Manby
punished the majority of criminals in groups at intervals
91ranging from six or seven days to a month. Likewise,
- Charles Ekins dealt with most of the offenses committed on
H.M.S. Beaulieu between 1 June 1804 and 24 March 1806
collectively on the average of once or twice a month in the
92periods in which he inflicted punishment.
Other captains attempted to increase the weight of the 
example of punishment by addressing their crews at each 
infliction. In these speeches, they described the
^Openrose, Observations on Corporal Punishment, p. 14. 
Sl-ADM 51/1521.
92ADM 51/1518; 1543.
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criminal's transgressions and explained the reasons which
led them to bring the culprit to the gangway. During his
command of the Unite. Patrick Campbell regularly lectured
the ship's company after floggings and on one occasion took
the time to read a letter of complaint cataloging the
93offender's misconduct. Some commanders even went so
far as to read the Articles of War * prior to every
chastisement. Although only required by law to do so once
a month/ Captain William Henry Byam almost never failed to
recite publicly the thirty-six clauses regulating naval
discipline before administering correction on board the
Opossum between 1 October 1809 and 12 December 1810. Thus
a typical entry in his logbook dated 17 January 1810
notes: "Articles of War was [sic] read for punishment
William Thompson, Quarter Master, received three dozen for
94
neglect of duty."
In effect, still other commanders husbanded 
punishment's example by extending mercy to selected 
criminals. Several analysts of the punitive jurisdiction 
of captains extolled the beneficial results of summary 
pardons. "[T]here are few cases for which corporal 
punishment should be inflicted for a first fault;" argued 
Admiral Sir Charles Vinicombe Penrose, "For there are men
93"Robert Wilson's Journal," pp. 161-162; 167. 
94ADM 51/2616.
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who will strive long to avoid the shame, as well as the
pain, of a public exposition and flogging, who, when that
shame and pain has been once surmounted, care much less for 
95a repetition." One subscriber to this philosophy was
Alexander Kennedy who, as commander of the Forester, on 21
April 1812 "turned the hands up and brought Andrew Pringle,
Malachy Culligan, Alexander Watson and William Fothergill
9 6to the gangway for desertion and pardoned them."
Some captains, though, were not as tolerant as Kennedy
and those like him. These officers exhibited a low
threshold of patience for acts of delinquency which they
considered exceptionally heinous. Rather than suffer the
perpetrators of such acts to remain among their crews, they
removed them from their vessels. Thus on 1 September 1797,
Captain William Fahie of H.M.S. Pedrix "punished William
Lockwood with thirty-three lashes for a breach of the
second Article of War and drummed him out of the
97ship." However, not all commanders took it upon
themselves to dismiss individuals whom they found
particularly aggravating. Because the practice was 
prohibited by the Regulations and Instructions. a few
95Penrose, Observations, p. 11.
96ADM 51/2371.
97ADM 51/1264.
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attempted to legitimize their actions by seeking the
9 8approval of their commanders in chief. On 30 May 1808 
Isaac Wooley had a drunkard named James Warley belonging to 
the Captain discharged to "H.M.S. Camilla per order the
QQ
Hble. Sir. A. Cochrane."
In addition to employing different correctional 
techniques/ 'individual captains could possess remarkably 
dissimilar styles of applying punishment. Some rendered 
what they considered to be justice with a much heavier hand 
than others did. For instance/ George Losack rarely 
inflicted less than twenty-four lashes for most types of 
crime committed on board the Prince George from 1 December 
1806 to 26 September 1807.*®® By contrast Edward King 
routinely punished offenses perpetrated aboard the 
Andromeda between 5 June and 11 November 1801 with no more 
than a dozen strokes of the cat of nine tails and often 
with many fewer.1®1
Similarly, some commanders who adjudged multiple 
infractions worthy of compounded penalties preferred to 
administer these sentences in their entirety at one time;
^ Regulations and Instructions 1st ed., p. 192-193; 
Regulations and Instructions 2nd ed., p. 120.
" A D M  36/896.
100ADM 51/1693.
101ADM 51/1364 pt 1.
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others chose to impose them in smaller doses over a period
of days. Thus on 23 November 1808, Robert Barton had
seaman Richard Morris receive all thirty-six of the lashes
he had awarded Morris for "drunkenness, neglect of duty and
102mutinous expression" on board the York. Conversely,
Charles Sandys ordered David Henderson to suffer his
punishment of three dozen blows for "insolence and
threatening to strike his officer" in two inflictions on
1 0 3
H.M.S. Latona in November 1785.
Finally, individual captains enforced discipline on
their vessels with varying levels of strictness. Some were
much sterner with their crews than many of their brother
officers. Indeed a few of them drastically exceeded the
nine percent mean for all the commanders of the men-of-war
examined for the present study. Edward Galway, for
example, punished eighteen percent of the seamen of the
Plover during his tenure as that sloop's governor between
1 0 4
1 April 1801 and 19 July 1802. On the other hand a
number of captains fell far below the average. In the 
twenty months during 1796 and 1797 that he commanded the
102ADM 51/2989.
103ADM 51/1428.
104a d m  51/1430. Galway flogged forty-two of the 237 
men he commanded.
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Beaver. Richard Brown flogged only one percent of the 
mariners in his charge.10**
iv
Paternal justice did not preclude strictness. Some of
the sternest disciplinarians in the Royal Navy were also
noted for their fatherly concern for their men. Although
instituting a harsh policy known as "the New Discipline" in
the Mediterranean, John Jervis "appealed also to men's
regard by intelligent and constant thought for the wants
and comfort of those under him .,."106 Similarly,
Nelson, who, as noted, was mindful of his crew's morale,
punished over twenty-five percent of the company of the
107Boreas as her commander. However, as William Burney
IOS^d m  52/2750. Brown punished twenty-two of the 247 
mariners. Of the seventy-four captains with six months or 
more continuous service on one of the vessels in the 
sample, thirty-five exceeded the nine percent average, two 
punished exactly nine percent of his crew and thirty-seven 
fell below the mean. The percentages ranged from one to 
thirty-one.
1 0 6 a . T. Mahan, Types of Naval Officers: Drawn from
Conditions of Naval Warfare at the beginning of the
Eighteenth Centurv. and of its Subseguent Development
during the Sail Period. (London: Sampson Low, Marston and
company, 1904), p. 342.
107a d m  51/125, 120. Eighty-six of the 334 mariners
on board the Boreas between 1 May 1784 and 31 July 1787 
suffered correction at Nelson's hand.
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put it: "The great difficulty is ... in drawing the line
1 0 8between strict discipline and tyranny."
Inevitably, there were a few officers who crossed this 
line. Indeed, there were some terribly brutal fiends to be 
found among the men who walked the quarter-decks of the 
king's ships in the eighteenth century. Hugh Pigot's
I
savagery sparked the bloodiest mutiny in the history of the
British navy on 22 September 1797, while Warwick Lake's
cruelty, to which we shall turn shortly, became a cause
celebre in England in 1810. "Yet the Pigots and Lakes were
1 0 9rare ..." as Dudley Pope so rightly has observed. In
fact, between 1784 and 1812 only three officers were
convicted of tyrannical behavior on the Leeward Islands 
station.
Although one or two tyrants may have gone undetected, 
and therefore unpunished, this figure is probably an 
accurate reflection of the incidence of brutality on board 
His Majesty's vessels during the age of sail. In Gardner's 
opinion, only five percent of the officers who he knew were 
overly severe with their men.110 Moreover, British
108^ New Universal Dictionary of the Marine. 1815 
ed., s. v. Disciplinarian.
109Pope, p. 223.
110Recollections of James Anthony Gardner. Gardner 
describes fifteen of the three hundred officers in these 
terms, seven of whom were his shipmates on board H.M.S. 
Salisbury in 1784 and 1785 (see pp. 41-55).
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mariners were not defenseless against acts of oppression. A 
letter of complaint containing bonafide allegations of
cruelty normally led to an investigation by a court of
inquiry and —  if the court's examination uncovered 
sufficient grounds for a trial —  to a naval tribunal. 
Hence, while only three officers were adjudged to be guilty 
of brutishness, eight other members of the quarter-deck 
were tried and acquitted of the same charge in the Lesser 
Antilles during the period under discussion.
But what constituted an act of cruelty in the 
eighteenth-century Royal Navy? Judging from the surviving 
evidence from the Leewards, it seems that brutality was 
defined as either unwarranted severity in punishment or 
unprovoked harsh usage. Thus Lieutenant William Smith was 
dismissed from H.M. Sloop Julia and put at the bottom of
the lieutenant's list on 11 June 1811 for having "caused
two men ... to be started with ropes ends in a severe 
manner, contrary to the orders of his captain."111 
Similarly Captain William Roberts lost command of the 
Statira in 16 July 1810 for having treated Lieutenant 
Michael Raven "with unnecessary severity and frequently 
made use of improper language to several of the officers of
1 1 9
His Majesty's ship Castor."
i;l1ADM 1/5416. 
112Ad m  1/5407.
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One instance o£ brutality that merits close attention
is the case of Captain Warwick Lake. Not only is it an 
interesting story in its own right, but it illustrates the 
Admiralty's diligence in prosecuting sadists. Moreover it 
provides some indication of Regency England's interest in 
naval scandals. Furthermore it suggests that the
Government's opponents in Parliament attempted to use such 
unpleasant episodes to gain political sparing points by 
holding the cabinet responsible for them. Finally it 
indicates in an ancillary manner just how vexatious some 
members of the fleet could be under certain circumstances 
and still avoid the wrath of the lords of the service.
The story begins in 1807. In November of that year 
Captain Warwick Lake found seaman Robert Jeffery to be 
guilty of several acts of petty thievery on board H.M.S. 
Recruit. At first Lake seems to have indulged the young 
mariner. However, his mood soon changed. While cruising 
off a barren rock called the Isle of Sombrero on 13
December, Lake decided to maroon Jeffery, concealing this 
act by listing the man as a deserter in the Recruit' s
muster book. For eight days the hapless sailor remained on 
this island without food or water. Nearing exhaustion, he 
was rescued by an American merchant vessel and taken to 
Boston where he became a prosperous blacksmith.
And there the matter remained for two years. Indeed 
the whole affair would have been lost in the sands of time 
save for Charles Morgan Thomas. A drifter with no visible
I188
means of support, Thomas enlisted in the navy at Barbados
in February 1806 and shortly thereafter was rated the
1 1 3acting purser of the Heureux. During his entire
career in the service, he did nothing but bombard Sir
Alexander Cochrane, the commander in chief in the Leewards
at the time, with letters about the alleged incompetence of
* the captains on the station. In exasperation, Cochrane
attempted to discharge Thomas in early 1809, confiding to
their Lordships that he found the contentious purser "unfit
1 1 4for an officer in the navy." Unhappily for both
parties Thomas's discharge and departure for England were 
delayed for several weeks. Suspecting a conspiracy to 
deprive him of his freedom, Thomas, who had heard rumors of
Jeffery's marooning, wrote to his member of Parliament on
N 1 1 524 March 1809 exposing the scandal.
113ADM 1/5402.
114ADM 1/330.
115^d m  1/5402. Although Thomas's accusations served
as the formal basis for the trial of Lake, he could not be 
located and brought to Portsmouth to testify at the court 
martial. After his discharge from the naval hospital at 
Plymouth on 8 December 1809, he apparently went immediately 
to Bristol. From there he began petitioning the Admiralty 
for his arrears in March 1810 (ADM 1/5402). Sometime 
during the following summer he wrote to their Lordships 
"stating various circumstances which induce[d] him to 
believe that Sir A. Cochrane ... [was] in the pay of the 
French Government and a traitor to his country (ADM 
12/145)." This letter was turned over to Cochrane's 
brother, Basil, who planned to take legal action on his 
behalf against Thomas for libel (ADM 1/4428). However 
there is no record of any such proceeding.
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Upon being informed of this irregular episode, the
Admiralty took the appropriate action. In July 1809, the
Lord Commissioners directed Cochrane Hto make a strict
investigation into the case." When the inquiry, dated
1 November 1809, revealed sufficient grounds for a court
martial, Lake was ordered to stand trial. On 6 February
1810 the sadistic captain was "dismissed from His Majesty's
service" by a tribunal assembled on H.M.S. Gladiator in
Portsmouth harbor.116 Moreover, since Jeffery's fate
still was unknown in Britain, their Lordships instituted a
global search for him, even sending a description of the
former seaman to British ambassadors around the 
117world. On 11 April 1810 they drafted a circular to
all commanders in chief soliciting information about the 
young mariner, and at the same time they began taking
depositions from sailors who had been Jeffery's shipmates
• >1. n •, 118xn the Recruit.
By then, however, it was too late. Scenting a scandal,
the print media had closed in on the Admiralty. Soon after
Lake's trial the papers began sensationalizing the story.
"Where's Jeffery?" became the cry as Britain followed this
H ^ A D M  1/5402.
H ? Ibid.
HSibid.
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Robinson Crusoesgue melodrama. From Edinburgh to
1 1 9Portsmouth, journalists scrutinized the affair. 
Typical was a piece appearing in The National Register on 
29 April 1810 entitled "The Unfortunate Jeffery" which 
began:
A report has been in circulation for several days 
past, that a letter to the mother of the
unfortunate Jeffery has been received from an 
American captain, addressed to her at Fowey,
stating his being taken off the island, after a
lapse of twelve days, and that he had eaten flesh 
off his shoulders. We have taken pains to
ascertain what credit is due to the report, and
find it entirely void of truth.120
So infamous did this atrocity become that seaman
Jeffery's fate was debated twice in the House of Commons,
where the Perceval ministry's opponents had a field day
with the case. On 15 February 1810 Sir Francis Burdett
rose to demand:
Whether the government of the country meant to 
stop here with such a fact in proof before them, 
or, whether they meant to take any further steps 
upon a subject so disgraceful to the service, so 
materially interesting to the life and security of 
every seaman in his Majesty's fleet; a 
circumstance which if so slightly passed over, 
might have the most serious effects in the naval 
service. As no further steps were taken nor 
seemed to be intended by government he felt it his 
duty, in his place as a member of Parliament, to 
call the attention of the House to the subject.
119Among the papers carrying the story were: The
Times. The Hampshire Courier. The Hampshire Telegraph and 
Sussex Chronicle. The Edinburgh Evening Courant and The 
National Register.
120The National Register. 29 April 1810, p. 261.
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’ He hoped, however, that government would not 
allow it to pass over without taking some 
further steps; for if such wanton and tyrannical 
occurrences were once suffered to obtain with 
impunity, there would be an end to all order and 
good government in our fleets.121
It was under such pressure that the Admiralty conducted
its search for the missing martyr. Eventually the British
pro consul in Boston located Jeffery and, with great
difficulty, convinced him to return to England. As he
informed their Lordships on 14 July 1810; "I am the more
anxious to effect this, finding that he, [Jeffery] is living
in this country under the patronage of those whose politics
and principles are inimical to Great Britain and I consider
the honour of my country engaged to accomplish it by the
122first favourable opportunity."
"The first favourable opportunity" occurred in 19
October 1810. Stepping off H.M. Schooner Thistle. Jeffery
found himself to be a national celebrity. Soon sentimental
accounts of his reunion with his mother began cropping up
in the newspapers. One enterprising promoter even
attempted to parlay Jeffery's fame into fortune by asking
him to tour the kingdom in the manner of a circus 
123performer. The erstwhile petty thief who had been
121Hansard Parliamentary Debates. 1st ser., vol. 15 
(1810) col. 425.
122ADM 1/3845.
122The Naval Chronicle. 24 (1810): p. 390.
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punished so ruthlessly for his crimes was now at the center
of the country's attention.
To diffuse this embarrassing situation, the Admiralty
ordered the celebrated seaman to London. There he was
reminded by their Lordships that despite his newly acquired
popularity he was still officially a member of the Royal
Navy and thus subject to reassignment abroad. However, in
light of his terrible ordeal the Lords Commissioners would
be more than willing to remove his name from the desertion
lists and pay him his arrears, provided he disappeared from
the public view. Being no fool, Jeffery accepted the money
124and returned to his native village of Polpero. But
his fame died hard. Several years later The Times reported:
Jefferyes [sic] the seaman - It may not be 
uninteresting to know that this man, who, it has 
not been forgotten, was left by Captain Lake on
the Sombrero Rock, has lately enlisted in the
North Devon Militia and is now serving in that
corps at Gosport.12^
Mercifully incidents like this were rare. The vast 
majority of British naval captains were of a far different 
ilk than Warwick Lake. The surviving manuscripts and 
printed sources, both directly and indirectly, suggest that 
the notions of gentility and social obligation were 
important strains in the collective mentality of the
IS^ Ibid.
125The Times (London), 29 March 1814, p. 3.
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members of the quarter-deck in the age of sail. Not only 
was there a marked element of paternalism in maritime 
leadership, but there was a heavy emphasis on respectable 
deportment. Needless to say, some of His Majesty's 
commanders internalized these values to a greater degree 
than others. But most seem to have tried to abide by their 
conceptions of them. In doing so, the men vested with the 
government of the king's floating dominions truly can be 
considered the nautical gentry.
tCHAPTER FIVE 
A FLOATING SOCIETY
i
"A vessel of war," observed one chronicler of maritime 
life in the age of sail, "contains a little community of 
human beings, isolated, for the time being, from the rest 
of mankind."1 Although frequently separated by broad 
expanses of water from the remainder of the king's 
dominions, this "little community" was by no means free oft
the problems which plagued eighteenth-century British
» * 
society at large. In criminal matters, naval authorities
encountered many of the same felonies and misdemeanors at
sea that judges confronted on shore. Like the magistrates
of England, His Majesty's captains were forced to deal
with a wide variety of illicit activities, ranging from
the grievous offenses of homicide, robbery and sodomy to
the relatively minor infractions of drunkenness, profanity
and disturbing the peace.
^Leech, Thirty Years from Home, p. 28.
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In its basic outline and operation, the system of 
adjudicating social offenses in the fleet paralleled that 
employed in the localities of England. As at English 
criminal law, proceedings could be undertaken at the 
curial or summary level in the navy. Moreover, within 
each system of judicature there were no fixed rules 
establishing the forum of judgement for most types of 
infractions. Under both arrangements, authorities 
exercised the discretion to determine causes brought 
before them singly on their own prerogative or to commit 
them to trial. For example, cases of assault could be 
heard by justices of the peace and commanders of the 
king's ships as well as by assizes and courts martial. 
Finally, the decisions rendered at the corresponding 
levels of the two systems were the product of common 
judicial procedures. Criminal and naval tribunals applied 
identical legal standards in reaching their verdicts. At 
the same time, captains and magistrates dispensed justice 
on a less formal basis according to the spirit —  if not 
always the letter —  of the law.
Despite the similarities in the structures and 
practices of the naval and criminal systems, there were 
noticable differences in the manner in which these two 
branches of English law dealt with societal problems. 
Justice at sea probably relied much more heavily on the 
summary adjudication of the graver varieties of social 
delinquency than did its counterpart on shore, although
196
just how much more heavily is impossible to assess since 
the surviving evidence concerning the judicial activities 
of eighteenth-century magistrates is extremely patchy. 
This conclusion is suggested strongly by the Royal Navy's 
prosecution of property offenses and physical violence. 
Whereas 1123 such crimes were punished unilaterally by the 
commanders of the vessels in the sample alone (see Table 
3)/ only fifty-four infractions of a corresponding nature 
were tried by courts martial on the entire Leeward Islands 
station during the period under discussion.
The preponderance of summary adjudications of civil 
transgressions at naval law was largely a product of 
expedience. Certainly thieves and ruffians were no more 
welcome on board the king's ships than they were in other 
parts of the crown's dominions, but they did not pose the 
threat to the service that mutineers and deserters did. 
And since courts martial were intended to be solemn 
affairs held in reserve for particularly serious 
infractions, very few of these miscreants were brought to
2At present, there is no clear consensus in the
scholarly community about the percentage of criminal
activity adjudicated in the courts on the English mainland 
and that which was dealt with summarily by magistrates. 
J. M. Beattie, for example, contends that virtually all 
indictable cases of theft were handled by assizes or
quarter sessions. Crime and the Courts, p.18. However, 
this view has been criticised strongly by J. A. Sharpe. 
See "Enforcing the Law in the Seventeenth-century English 
Village," in V. A. C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman and Geoffry 
Parker, eds., Crime and the Law: The Social History of
Crime in Western Europe since 1500 (London: Europa
Publications Ltd, 1980), pp.97-119.
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trial. In fact, only twenty-five percent of the mariners 
tried in the Lesser Antilles between 1784 and 1812 stood 
accused primarily of social offenses. Furthermore the 
men so charged generally were indicted for one of two 
reasons. About sixty-four percent were alledged to have 
committed acts like homicide, robbery or buggery which 
were patently abominable. The remaining thirty-six 
percent, the vast majority of whom were officers, were 
denounced for indiscretions such as drunkenness or
t
disturbing the peace which, given the status of the 
offender, were thought to set bad examples for the rest of 
the maritime community.4
A similar pattern of prosecution was manifest in the 
summary punishments inflicted by His Majesty’s captains. 
As the statistics presented in Table 3 indicate, civil 
transgressions accounted for less than half of the
3Ninety of the 362 men tried in the Leewards were 
accused of civil crimes. In calculating this statistic, 
some allowance had to be made for defendants charged with 
both social and military offenses. Thus, the following 
guideline was adopted: If the majority of transgressions
listed in the indictment were of a civil nature, then the 
accused was counted as a social offender. Conversely, if 
the majority of infractions were of a military nature, 
then the person was counted as a military offender. 
Hence, Edward Pooley was placed in the latter category 
because he stood trial on 4 Octover 1787 for "disobedience 
of orders, contempt and drunkenness (ADM 1/5326)."
4Of the ninety mariners tried for these offenses, 
fifty-eight were accused of crimes in the former 
category. Thirty-two members of the fleet, twenty-seven 
of whom were warrant or commissioned officers, were 
charged with crimes in the latter category.
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correctional activity recorded in the logs of the ships in 
the sample. Moreover, the vast majority of the social 
contraventions penalized without benefit of trial were of 
the same basic types as those adjudicated by courts 
martial. Almost twenty-nine percent involved property or 
violence, that is, acts offensive to the sensibilities of 
eighteenth-century society. And slightly more than 
seventy percent were misdemeanors like drunkenness or 
disturbing the peace, that is, indiscretions which impeded 
the service's ability to function effectively. 
Significantly, less than one percent were violations of 
morality such as blasphemy or gambling. Hence, captains 
as well as naval tribunals exhibited a pronounced tendency 
to enforce only the sections of the Articles of War which 
proscribed crimes that were regarded widely as outrages or 
infractions that were injurious to the well-being of the 
fleet.
In the Royal Navy, these misdeeds normally were 
punished corporally. Although physical penalties for such 
crimes were not unknown on shore, His Majesty's captains 
seem to have inflicted them with greater frequency than
5
English magistrates did. Whereas commanders routinely
5See Elizabeth Crittall, ed., The Justicinq Notebook 
of William Hunt. 1744 - 1749 (Devizes: Wiltshire Record
Society, 1982) and Alan F. Cirket, ed., Samuel Whitbread's 
Notebooks. 1810-11. 1813-14 (Bedfordshire: Bedfordshire
Historical Record Society, 1971).
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Table 3
General Types of Crime Punished Summarily
Category of Crime N % of Total
Absence/Desertion 489 05.6
Alcohol 2,356 27.3
Disobedience 913 10.6
Disturbances/Uncleanness 392 04.5
Immorality 37 00.4
Insolence/Contempt 966 11.2
Mutiny/Sedition 220 02.5
Miscellaneous 117 01.3
Neglect of Duty 1,997 23.2
Property 597 06.7
Violence 544 06.3
Total N 8,610
Source: Sample
flogged the perpetrators of social offenses, justices of 
the peace usually chastened people found guilty of 
assault, petty theft and the like with a fine or a short 
term of imprisonment.® But here again the navy's
6See Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace, and 
Parish Officer. 22d ed., ed. John King (London: A
Strahan, 1814).
200
deviation from the practice of crown law was the result of
expedience. On such a labor intensive machine as a
man-of-war, where the work force was paid at irregular
intervals, amercement or incarceration for extended
periods was impractical. Years after substitutes for
corporal punishment had become more widespread in the
service, Captain Francis Liardet still insisted:
If a man were to be extremely mutinous, sending 
him to be confined in prison would not have the 
same effect, as an example to the ship's company, 
that a well considered and justly inflicted 
flogging would have. There are many situations 
in which a ship may be placed, in which 
confinement to prison would only be a release 
from hard labour and privations (more especially 
at sea). Even under these circumstances, 
examples must sometimes be made; but that of 
confinement cannot be considered a good one at 
such a time, as it will take from the number of 
working hands, and do very little good as an 
immediate example to the ship's company.7
ii
The most chronic social problem confronting naval 
authorities in the age of sail was drunkenness. On board 
the vessels in the sample insobriety was the leading 
reason for correctional activity. More punishments were 
inflicted for this vice than for any other infraction (see
7Francis Liardet, Professional Recollections on 
Points of Seamanship. Discipline. &c (Portsea: William
Woodward, Common Hard, 1849), p. 277.
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Table 3). Henry Walsh claims to have seen thirty-seven 
seamen belonging to the Alfred flogged for intoxication on
Q
one day alone at Martinique in January 1810. Indeed
the British tar’s reputation for excessive consumption was
so great that a Dutch privateer once told William Dillon
with complete seriousness that he "was quite certain that
if he fell in with one of our ships of war on a Saturday
night he would capture her/ under the conviction that the
whole crew, being in a perfect state of inebriety# would
□
not be able to defend themselves."
Although the Dutchman's confidence was somewhat 
misguided# there is no question that drunkenness was 
endemic in the Royal Navy. Seamen revelled in 
overindulgence and extolled its virtues. "To be drunk is 
considered by almost every sailor as the acme of sensual 
bliss#" observed Samuel Leech# "while many fancy that 
swearing and drunkenness are necessary accomplishments in 
a genuine man-of-war's man. Hence it almost universally 
prevails. Moreover, as Leech's comments suggest# 
there were strong communal pressures within nautical
8"The Memoirs of Henry Walsh#" p. 235.
^Dillon# A Narrative. vol. 2# p. 25 quoted in 
Lewis. A Social History, p. 399.
10Leech# p. 51.
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society encouraging the individual to consume excessive 
amounts of alcohol. In some quarters a member of the 
fleet was not regarded as a true mariner until he had been 
intoxicated at least once. Thus soon after his rather 
unpleasant introduction to grog and his first encounter 
with the enemy during his maiden voyage on board the
f t
Salsette frigate in 1809, Midshipman Frederick Chamier's 
captain turned to him and said: "There... you are fairly
a sailor now; been drunk, been aloft and been in 
action."11
Several modern students have attributed the affinity 
of royal mariners toward strong waters to the deplorable 
living conditions on His Majesty's vessels in the 
eighteenth century. Three of the principal advocates of 
this view are Christopher Lloyd, Jack L. S. Coulter and 
John Keevil. "Constantly exposed to cold and wet," they 
contend, "often miserable because of a tyrannical bo's'un 
or 'taut* officer, subsisting largely on salt provisions 
which must have been conducive to thirst the poor wretches 
who were unwillingly pressed into their country's service 
may be excused their addiction to drink by later and
^-Frederick Chamier, The Life of a Sailor (London; 
Ward and Lock, 1856), p. 19.
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12happier generations." No doubt there is a grain of 
truth in this argument. Damp, malodorous, overcrowded, 
cold in northern climes and usually vermon-infested in the 
tropics, the king's ships were far from comfortable. And 
some mariners probably did use their cups to escape these 
surroundings.
But the grim picture painted by Lloyd, Coulter and
Keevil of conscription and oppression driving men to drown
their sorrows in liquor is less than satisfactory as a
general explanation of the prevalence of drunkenness i,n
the Royal Navy. Such an interpretation is based more on
literary fancy than historical fact. Very few of the
seamen punished for intoxication had been prest. On the
ships surveyed for the present study approximately
eighty-five percent of the mariners found guilty of this
13vice were entered in the muster books as volunteers.
*2Christopher Lloyd, Jack L. S. Coulter and John
Keevil, Medicine and the Navv. 1200 - 1900 (Edinburgh and
London: E & S Livingstone, 1961), vol. 3, 1714 - 1815. p.
356. See also A. J. Pack, Nelson's Blood: The Storv of
Naval Rum (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp.
56-57 and Lewis, A Social History, pp. 398-402.
13Of the 1059 mariners punished exclusively for 
drunkenness, 903 were volunteers, 102 were prest and 
fifty-four were substitutes, quota men and the like. 
Turned-over men have been excluded from the calculation 
because their original means of entry in the navy cannot 
be determined.
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Moreover, commanders who hardly could be described as 
"taut" or tyrannical seem to have had just as much trouble 
with insobriety among their companies as other officers 
did. Although Captain Patrick Campbell governed H.M.S. 
Unite with relative informality, he repeatedly scolded his 
crew for their love of overindulgence. On one occasion, 
he told them "that he was really tired and annoyed by 
continually flogging of [sic] men, only for that beastly 
habit of drunkenness, so ill becoming an Englishman."14
Far from being a consequence of impressment or 
tyranny, the widespread drunkenness in the fleet was in 
all likelihood an indication of the inability or refusal 
of many of the king's mariners to conform to the 
mechanical regularity expected of them in the performance 
of their duty. The "systems" established by naval 
commanders for the governance of their ships were intended 
to instill an order and uniformity among their crews that 
was analagous to the regimantation inherent in the work 
ethic demanded of the early industrial proletariat. And 
one manfestation of the disregard for the rigours imposed 
by these arrangements common to both seamen and laborers
14"Robert Wilson's Journal," p. 153. See above p.
143.
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15was overindulgence. "The common tinners continue to
be very refractory and insolent: many of them refuse to
work, and have not gone underground for three weeks past,"
lamented a mine operator from Cornwall in 1793, "They have
no just cause for it; for their wages have been rather too
high lately than otherwise; the consequence has been too
much brandy drinking, and other bad practices."1® In a
similar vein, Charles Pemberton, commenting on the
behavior of tars in port, observed: "though the toil is
greater and more constant in refitting, victualling, &c,
in harbour, the usual severity of discipline is relaxed;
the eye of authority cannot be fixed on every individual
of the scattered labours, and the opportunities for
17getting drunk, are as surely seized as they are found."
Whatever the reasons inclining men to drink —  peer 
pressure, poor living conditions, personal indiscipline —  
they could not have done so without access to alcohol.
l^This is not to imply that farm workers and 
artisans did not drink to excess. Indeed, "alcohol 
consumption was high" among all classes and walks of life 
in the eighteenth century (Porter, English Society in the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 235). Rather, it is to suggest 
that the internal discipline demanded of those in the navy 
and industry ran counter to the customary patterns of 
labor. For the irregular rhythms of labor in the 
eighteenth century, see E. P. Thompson, "Time, 
Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and 
Present 38 (December, 1967), pp. 56-97.
16Quoted in John Rule, The Experience of Labour in 
Eighteenth Century Industry (London: Croom Helm, 1981),
p. 54.
17Pemberton, p. 218.
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And alcohol was readily available on board the king's
ships. The most obvious source of strong waters was the
navy itself. Throughout the period under discussion/ each
member of the fleet was entitled to a daily ration of
spirits consisting either of one gallon of beer, a half
pint of rum, a pint of wine# or an equivalent measure of
18brandy or arrack. Because beer had a tendency to
spoil quickly in tropical climates and wine was not a
product indigenous to the Caribbean basin, the allowance
usually was given in the form of rum on the Leeward
Islands station.
According to the naval routine, the allowance was
divided in' half and served on two separate occasions
during the day from a scuttled butt, one portion being
issued in the forenoon, the other in the afternoon or
evening. By the late eighteenth century, the standard
practice was to dilute the rum by mixing it with water.
Normally, the formula followed was three parts water to
one pa’rt spirits, although on some ships the ratio was 
19four to one. Often lime juice and sugar were added to 
the drink as antiscorbutics. This concoction was called 
grog by the seamen —  a term which was derived from the
^ Regulations and Instructions. 1st ed., p. 62; 
Regulations and Instructions. 2nd ed., p. 288.
l^Pack, Nelson's Blood, pp. 44-45.
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20nickname of its inventor. Admiral Edward Vernon.
While the daily ration was the steadiest source of
intoxicants for royal mariners, it was not the only way in
which they could obtain alcoholic beverages. Some tars
pilfered liquor from the ship’s stores. Marine Privates
William Farmer and William Wells, for example, were given
a dozen lashes each on 24 May 1785 aboard the Rattler
sloop for "taking wine out of a cask on the main 
21deck." Others attempted to bring spirits into their
vessels clandestinely. For instance, Landsmen John
Conner, Peter Crews and John Mahars were detected
smuggling strong waters on board the Camilla and punished
22for the offense on 25 June 1808. Still others seized 
the opportunities provided by time spent on land. Thus 
Ship's Corporal Chambers of the Opossum received
twenty-four strokes on 29 May 1813 for "getting drunk when
2®During the War of Jenkin's Ear, Vernon earned the 
sobriquet "Old Grogram" because of the water-repellent 
grogram coat he invariably wore.
21ADM 51/770.
2 2 ADM 51/1906. In these covert operations, a
variety of methods were employed. Some mariners attempted 
to smuggle liquor on board when their superiors were 
distracted. According to Leech, a number of the 
Macedonian's men "who belonged to the boat's crew provided 
themselves with bladders; if left ashore by their officers 
a few moments they would slip into the first grocery, fill 
their bladders and return with the spoil. Once by the 
ship's side the favourable moment was seized to pass the 
interdicted bladders into the portholes, to some watchful 
shipmate, by whom it was carefully secreted to be drunk at
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23sent on duty ashore." Finally, a few acquired
inebriants through commercial transaction. One such 
enterprising seaman was Michael Ryan, a Boy Second Class 
belonging to the Forester, who was given twelve blows at 
the gangway on 25 June 1812 for "selling his cloathes 
[sic] for grog."24
i t
Needless to say the seamen's proclivity toward
insobriety was fraught with danger both for themselves and
the service. According to Lloyd, Coulter and Keevil,
alcohol-induced falls were the leading cause of head
25injuries suffered by mariners. Occasionally, they
the first opportunity (Leech, p. 52)." Other tars 
concealed their illicit beverages in objects which could 
be brought into their vessels easily and without
suspicion. Peter Kemp claims that during the War of 
American Independence it was common for the members of the 
lower deck in the West Indies to indulge in the practice 
of having coconuts drained of their milk, filled with rum 
and carried on board their ships by local slave women 
(Peter Kemp, The British Sailor: A Social History of the
Lower Deck (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1970), p. 145).
Finally, some sailors favored the simpler technique of 
hiding the contraband in their clothes before re-entering 
their ship. Dillon relates the following incident 
involving the coxwain of the Aimable's launch, whom the 
officers thought to be the frigate's leading trafficer in 
rum: "One day, when he returned from the shore with a
large pea-jacket hanging over his arm, he was desired to 
open it out that it might be searched for liquor. 'Oh, 
very well,' he said. 'Here it is. You will not find 
anything in it now (Dillon, vol. 1, p. 241).'"
23ADM 51/2616.
24ADM 51/2371.
25Lloyd, Coulter and Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, 
vol. 3, pp. 355-356.
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resulted in death. For example, on a Sunday evening in
1801 at Martinique, Samuel Hayley, a marine private
serving on H.M.S. Tromn. fell overboard in a drunken
26stupor and was devoured by a shark. Moreover,
intoxication was frequently a contributing factor in other
crimes. About thirty-five percent of the men punished for
inebriation on the ships surveyed for the present study
simultaneously were deemed guilty of one or more
27additional offenses. Boatswain's Mate David Roach of
the Trustv. for instance, received three dozen lashes on 1
28August 1791 for "drunkenness, contempt and fighting." 
Furthermore, biblious indescretions by mariners could 
imperil the lives of the remainder of the crew and the 
safety of the vessel. Thus Oliver Lloyd, the ship's 
corporal of H.M.S. Majestic, was demoted and given twelve 
strokes on 3 May 1795 "for drunkenness and running into 
the magazine with a lighted candle."29
However, the problem of drunkenness was not confined 
exclusively to the lower deck. The lure of alcohol 
trancended rank and status. Warrant and commissioned 
officers also could be addicted to strong waters. The
28Richardson, A Mariner of England, p. 184.
27Seven hundred and ninety-eight of the 2,356 men 
punished for drunkenness were charged with aditional 
crimes.
28ADM 51/985
28ADM 51/1122
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carpenter of the Nautilus sloop, Thomas Cunningham, was
such a chronic alcoholic that he was found intoxicated in
his cabin several hours after being warned by his captain
on 22 January 1794 that if he was discovered in such a
state again he would be brought before a court
30martial. Fortunately for the service, men like
Cunningham were rare. According to James Anthony
Gardner's assessment, only about six percent of the
31officers that he knew were heavy drinkers.
If the number of members of the quarter-deck prone to
overindulgence was small, the hazards created by these men
were not. In naval society, where leadership by example
was emphasized strongly, the influence of a drunken
officer on the mariners under his command was held to be
particularly corruptive. As Admiral Patton put it:
"Emulation is miserably perverted, when it is made to
serve the wretched purpose of increasing drunkenness; and
an officer who reflects a moment, must lament when the
least encouragement is given to inebriety by those to whom
32rank and experience ought to have served as a guide."
At the same time, judgement clouded by alcohol could lead 
to accidents jeopardizing the safety of the crew of a
30ADM 1/5330. 27 January 1794.
31Gardner described nineteen of three-hundred
officers in this manner.
32Patton, Strictures, p. 96.
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man-of-war. While in charge of a captured French
privateer in Woodbridge Bay, Dominica on the evening of 24
February 1800/ Lieutenant Thomas Flemming was so drunk
that he failed to heed a signal from H.M.S. Daphne to
order the prize's helm put to port and the two vessels
33collided as a result.
Given the tremendous dangers inherent in the
drunkenness of both officers and men, several modern
historians have taken the Admiralty to task for its policy
regarding alcohol. The harshest of these critics was the
late Professor Lewis. In his opinion, the dispensation of
the daily allowance amounted to nothing short of an
attempt to anesthetize the inhabitants of the king's ships
to the hardships of their surroundings. In A Social
•*
History of the Navv. Lewis argued:
It is indeed almost impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that the bad conditions and the potent 
spirits were direct links in one chain of cause 
and effect: that Authority was actually
sanctioning over-drinking as a means of doping 
the men into enduring the conditions. It is a, 
shocking thought. Such a remedy for such 
conditions argues an amorality in high places 
which is hard to credit. Nor, indeed is it 
necessary to believe that the remedy was being 
consciously applied: it was rather the result of
an ageless policy of drift, and refusal to look 
facts in the face.34
33ADM 1/5354. Flemming was tried by a court martial
at Fort Royal Bay on 25 November 1800.
34Lewis, pp. 398-399. See also Neale, The Cutlass
and the Lash, pp. 119-122 and Laffin, Jack Tar, p. 93.
212
Yet these comments suggest that it was Lewis, not the 
Admiralty, who refused "to look facts in the face." The 
rum. ration was not "the result of an ageless policy of 
drift." On the contrary, it was a time-honored nautical 
custom. In tolerating a certain amount of drinking on 
board His Majesty's ships, the naval ruling classes —  
like many of their civilian counterparts —  deferred to 
what was perceived as a traditional right of the
*3 e
commonality. Expressing this deference, Sir Gilbert 
Blane remarked in 1789:
It has been custom, as far back as we know 
to allow seamen the use of some sort of fermented 
liquor. We need hardly inquire if this is 
salutary or not; for it would be impossible at 
any rate to withhold it, since it is an article 
of luxury, and gratification which the men would 
claim as their right.3®
In a similar vein, Admiral Lord Keith concluded a letter
written on 1 September 1812 decrying the hazards of
drunkenness afloat with a note of caution. "It is at all
times a delicate point to interfere with what is called an
allowance or right," he observed, "and the present may not
be the moment for reforming even so great an evil; but in
the event of peace I am satisfied that not a more
35See E. P. Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebian 
Culture," pp. 394-395.
3®Gilbert Blane, "Observations on the Disease of 
Seamen," in The Health of Seamen: Selections from the
Works of Dr. James Lind. Sir Gilbert Blane and Dr. Thomas 
Trotter, ed. Christopher Lloyd (London: Navy Records
Society, vol 107, 1965) p. 163.
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essential service could be rendered the nation than to
37reduce the quantity of spirits now used in the navy..."
At the same time the Admiralty's reluctance to meddle 
with the traditional rights of the seamen should not be 
taken to imply that the Lords Commissioners condoned 
overindulgence. To deter drunkenness in the fleet/ their 
Lordships adopted a two-fold policy of prevention and 
retribution. After 1756/ the Regulations and Instructions 
enjoined commanders never "to suffer the seamen to drink 
in drams [i.e. undiluted] the allowance made to them of
< Q Q
any kind of spiritous liquor in lieu of beer."
Moreover both editions of the manual directed every
captain to combat smuggling by giving "strict charge to
all his officers/ to be very careful in their respective
watches to prevent spiritous liquors of any kind being
39conveyed on board the ship” under his command.
Furthermore/ the Articles of War empowered the governors
of the king's floating dominions to punish those members
40of the service found guilty of intoxication.
Drunkenness/ of course, was a relative term and as 
such it was subject to the interpretation of individual
^Quoted in Lewis, p. 400.
38»Additional Regulations and Instructions" 
Regulations and Instructions. 1st ed., p. 205.
39lbid: Regulations and Instructions. 2nd. ed., p.
302.
4022 Geo II c. 33.
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captains. But the general rule of thumb seems to have 
been that a mariner was not considered intoxicated unless 
he was so incapacitated by drink that he was unable to 
execute the nautical functions comprising his job. Thus# 
when called to testify for the prosecution at Daniel
Harris' trial for inebriation on 31 December 1802,
* *
Lieutenant Henderson Basin was asked by the tribunal: "If
the prisoner had been ordered to perform any duty at that
time [five days earlier] was he in a fit state to do 
41it?" Correspondingly, the master of H.M.S. Mermaid 
recorded in his journal on 8 March 1796: "At 8 p.m. found
James Smith and David Stintin drunk and incapable of duty 
by rum issued by Mr. Briarey contrary to the captain's 
orders."42
As was the practice at crown law, the vast majority of 
men accused of being in this condition were dealt with 
summarily. Whereas more than two thousand seamen were 
chastised for intoxication on board the vessels in the 
sample conducted (see Table 3), only forty-three mariners 
were tried by courts martial for the same offense on the 
entire Leeward Islands station during the period under 
discussion. However, the penalties inflicted by His 
Majesty's captains differed sharply from those imposed by
41ADM 1/5362.
42ADM 52/3216.
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Justices of the Peace. On shore summary convictions for 
inebriation usually resulted in a fine or several hours in
Jk A
the stocks. At sea, they almost invariably led to a
scourging at the gangway. Over ninety-nine percent of the
punishments meted out exclusively for drunkenness on the
ships surveyed were recorded in the logs as 
44floggings. These punishments, though, were not
excessively harsh by naval standards. While approximately
sixty percent of all whippings in the Lesser Antilles were
of a dozen lashes, or less, fifty-eight percent of those
administered solely for insobriety were levied in like 
45proportions.
All but two of the men punished summarily for
drunkenness were seamen or petty officers. By contrast,
only four of the forty-three men brought before naval
tribunals for insobriety were below the rank of a warrant 
4 6officer. Yet if courts martial normally were reserved 
for members of the quarter-deck, they were not convened
43]3urn, The Justice of the Peace, vol. 1, p. 59.
440ne thousand, three hundred and twenty-eight of
1,333 were recorded as floggings.
4^Four thousand and fifty-six of 6,776 floggings
were of a dozen lashes or less. Seven hundred and
sixty-six of the 1,328 scourgings for drunkenness were at 
or below twelve strokes. The fewest number of stripes 
inflicted in a single punishment was three; the greatest 
was seventy-two.
46Each of the seamen indicted for drunkenness was
also charged with additional crimes.
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to try the cases of officers merely accused of consuming
one glass too many on a single occasion. Sixty-nine
percent of the men indicted for inebriation were alleged
to have compounded their indiscretions by committing one
or more additional crimes. The remaining thirty-one
percent were accused of habitual overindulgence.4^ The
gravity with which drunkenness among the nautical elite
was viewed by judicial bodies at sea was reflected in the
stiff sentences generally adjudged those found guilty of
the offense. Of the thirteen warrant and commissioned
officers convicted solely of the charge of intoxication/
three were dismissed from the service/ one was cashiered
48and imprisoned, and five were turned before the mast.
iii
Although drunkenness, especially among officers, was 
considered a serious infraction by naval authorities, it 
was not regarded with the gravity that property crime 
was. Few things were more revered in eighteenth-century 
England than the sanctity of material possessions, a 
reverence clearly in evidence in the system of criminal
47Thirty of the forty-three men were indicted for 
multiple offenses. Thirteen members of the fleet were 
charged exclusively with drunkenness.
48Three of the other four were dismissed from their 
ships and one was reprimanded.
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justice afloat. Its most obvious manifestation was found
in several types of corporal punishment customarily
reserved for property offenders. If adjudged to receive a
scourging at the gangway, a larcenist was liable to be
flogged with an instrument called the "Thieve's Cat."
According to William Burney, the Thieve's Cat was "a cat
o' nine tails, having larger and harder knots upon it than
those generally employed, and...[was] only used for the
49punishment of theft." Similarly, the penalty of
running the gauntlet normally was saved for acts of 
stealing.50
Consistent with the practice at crown law, property 
offenses in the navy were adjudicated both summarily and 
by courts martial. As on land, there were no iron-clad 
rules determining the jurisdiction of such cases at sea. 
In each system of justice, captains or magistrates 
exercised considerable discretionary power to decide 
whether causes were to be heard with or without benefit of 
trial. Given the paucity of the surviving evidence, it is 
impossible to assess the relative frequency with which 
commissioners of the peace selected either method. 
However, the records pertaining to justice afloat clearly
^Falconer, A New Universal Dictionary. 1815 ed., 
s.v. Cat-o'nine-tails.
50A s noted in Chapter Three, forty of the forty-four 
instances in which it was inflicted on the ships in the 
sample were the consequence of transgressions against 
material goods.
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indicate that His Majesty's commanders preferred to judge 
the vast majority of property cases singly on their own 
authority. On board the vessels surveyed/ over five 
hundred mariners were punished summarily for crimes 
against property (see Table 3). Conversely there were but 
thirty-one officers and men tried by naval tribunals for 
similar infractions on the entire station between 1784 and 
1812.
Unfortunately/ few observations can be made about the
property offenses punished summarily. Most of these
crimes were noted in the ship's logs in very general
terms. Representative of the standard form used to record
such infractions is the following entry in the captain's
journal of the Queen dated 19 August 1793: "Punished
51William Horridge with 24 lashes for theft." Moreover
the term "theft" cannot be taken to imply a specific type
of larceny. From the small number of cases in which the
item pilfered is mentioned, it is evident that the word
was used as often to refer to the embezzlement of naval
stores as it was to betoken the theft of personal 
52possessions. As a result, in all but a handful of the
51ADM 51/753
52While Christopher Leman and Joseph Thompson were 
flogged on board the Glorie on 15 December 1809 for 
"attempting to steal the ship's liquor (ADM 51/1996)," 
Edward Saunders suffered the same correction on H.M.S. 
Perdrix on 5 April 1799 for "embezzlement of liquor (ADM 
51/1275)."
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cases in the sample, it is impossible to discover what
articles were stolen, their economic value or from whom
they were Itaken.
Despite their sketchiness about the crimes, the logs
do suggest something of the way in which property offenses
were dealt with summarily in the navy. All of the thieves
punished without benefit of trial on the vessels surveyed
were petty officers or enlisted men. Moreover, every one
53of them was penalized corporally. Furthermore, the
punishments they received tended to be harsher than those
given to men guilty of other infractions. Whereas sixty
percent of the mariners punished physically on the
seventy-three men-of-war in the survey were flogged with
twelve strokes or less, fifty-five percent of those
chastised for theft either endured more than a dozen
54lashes or were forced to run the gauntlet. Still, 
without reference to the objects stolen, it is not 
possible to determine if this increased severity normally 
was held in reserve for a specific type of larceny or
53Although fine or imprisonment were the customary 
penalties imposed on shore, Justices of the Peace 
occasionally ordered both male and female thieves to be 
whipped. See Crittal, ed., The Justicing Notebook of 
William Hunt.
540ne hundred and eighty-eight punishments 
exclusively for theft were of twelve lashes or less. One 
hundred and ninety were of more than a dozen strokes. 
Forty men ran the gauntlet. The number of blows inflicted 
ranged from four to eighty-six.
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if it was applied in equal measure to the embezzlement of 
naval stores and the pilfering of personal possessions.
Happily, the transcripts of courts martial for 
property offenses are more precise than the records 
contained in the logs. Not only do they provide a clear 
picture of the items illegally obtained and the methods 
used to procure them, but they indicate the rationale 
behind the courts' decisions. Therefore, distinctions can 
be drawn between crimes committed against individual 
possessions and those perpetrated against the king's 
property. At the same time, it is possible to get some 
idea of the criteria employed both in bringing cases to 
trial and in rendering verdicts.
Of the thirty-one mariners tried by courts martial for
property offenses, nineteen, or sixty-one percent, were
accused of stealing personal possessions. But these men,
none of whom was above the rank of a petty officer, were
not accused of simple pilfering. All of them were alleged
to have committed their crimes in a manner which cast the
infractions in a particularly heinous light. For example,
Samuel Lloyd was brought to the bar for having taken the
watch of a Frenchman at Grosse Morne who had invited him
55into his house for dinner. An even greater outrage 
was perpetrated by several tars belonging to H.M.S.
55ADM 1/5331, Trial of Samuel Lloyd, 12 March 1794.
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Vengeance who were tried jointly in Fort Royal Bay on 11
jr f.
and 12 March 1794. A few nights earlier, these
seamen, acting in the fashion of a marauding gang, had
forced their way into a hut on Martinique and threatened
to kill its owner before tying him up and making off with
some handkerchieves and money. In short they had
committed an exceedingly chilling type of theft in the
57eyes of Georgian Englishmen.
In dealing with such infractions, naval tribunals were 
empowered to inflict stiff penalties upon those they found 
guilty. Like the criminal courts, judicial bodies at sea 
could sentence a thief to death, or to be publicly whipped 
or imprisoned. However, courts martial exercised the same 
restraint shown by their civilian counterparts on shore in 
adjudicating thefts of private property. Of the nineteen 
seamen indicted for this form of larceny, six were fully
C Q
acquitted. Moreover none of the thirteen mariners
56ADM 1/5331. Trial of John Bell, John Rodney, 
Stephen Murphy, John Long and David Connolly.
57A s Professor J.M. Beattie has observed: "For most
of the eighteenth century...the offense that caused the 
greatest anxiety was robbery, which always involved the 
direct confrontation of victim and offender and which all 
too often in fact led to serious physical violence 
(Beattie, p. 148)."
58A similar rate of acquittal was found on shore. 
According to Professor Beattie's calculations 37.2 percent 
of those tried for robbery at Surrey Assizes were found 
completely innocent. The percentage for burglary was 
36.9. Crime and the Courts, p. 428.
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convicted was given the maximum punishment. Twelve of the
malfactors were condemned instead to pass through the
fleet receiving a number of lashes ranging from
thirty-six to three hundred and one was returned to
England to be incarcerated in the Marshalsea prison for a
year. In these cases the legal device normally used to
spare the villain's life was to render a partial verdict,
whereby the defendant was deemed culpable of a lesser
59offense and punished accordingly.
Two cases illustrate the general tenor of the navy's 
prosecution of those accused of stealing personal 
possessions. The first was tried in Fort Royal Bay on 15 
July 1797. On that day, Edmund Nowland, the master at 
arms of H.M.S. Vengeance, stood before a naval tribunal 
indicted for "having robbed the chest and birth of the 
deceased William Bruce late cok [sic] of the said ship of 
a certain number of Guineas, Joes [i.e. coins] and other 
articles..." During the course of the trial, .several 
witnessess testified that they had seen Nowland help 
himself to Bruce's effects. A few claimed that when the 
defendant's locker was searched, some of the items found 
there had belonged to the departed cook. However, only 
one attestant was willing to swear that he had seen 
Nowland actually take money from Bruce's chest. As a 
result, the court ruled that the charge was "proved except
59The same device was common on shore. Ibid.
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with respect to the money" and sentenced the master at 
arms to be broken o£ his rank and given 150 lashes through 
the fleet.60
The second case was heard before a tribunal assembled 
on board H.M.S. Dannemark on 7 and 8 March 1810 off the 
island of Guadaloupe. George Phillips, the former clerk 
of the Achates, was on trial for having rifled £45 from a 
midshipman's desk twelve months earlier while the sloop 
was anchored at Spithead. Fortunately for Phillips, the 
prosecution's allegations rested almost entirely on the 
evidence presented by one George Neville whose testimony 
was far from unimpeachable. Neville claimed that he had 
conspired to commit the burglary with Phillips but being 
overcome with remorse had decided later to confess his 
part in the crime. Yet Neville had not made his 
confession until he was in irons for deserting at 
Barbados, a circumstance which led the court to question 
his motives. Moreover, he himself had been the leading 
suspect at the time the theft had been perpetrated, a nail 
having been discovered in his coat that was approximately 
the size of the instrument used to prise open the lock on 
the desk. Furthermore, he was forced to admit under 
cross-examination that he had not seen the clerk take the 
money. In short, his account was tenuous at best.
60ADM 1/5340
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Needless to say, Phillips was acquitted.61
Courts martial for embezzlement of the king's stores
differed significantly in at least two respects from the
curial proceedings involving offenses against personal
property. In the first place, the great majority of
defendants at such tribunals were warrant or commissioned
officers rather than petty officers or seamen. Of the
eleven mariners tried for stealing naval property in the
Lesser Antilles between 1784 and 1812, all but one were
members of the quarter-deck. Secondly, although the
penalties meted out to the men found guilty of defrauding
the government were not inconsistent with those imposed
upon people convicted of the same crime at assizes or
quarter sessions, they tended to be relatively more severe
than the punishments inflicted by judicial bodies for
62robbery or burglary. Four of the six men condemned in 
the Leewards during the period under discussion were given 
stiff sentences. All were officers: two were stripped of
their ranks permanently and forced to serve before the 
mast, one was dismissed from the navy and rendered
incapable of ever receiving another warrant, and one was
61ADM 1/5403
620n shore the usual punishments were banishment, 
fine or imprisonment. William Blackstone, Commentaries. 
vol. 4, p. 121.
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63cashiered and imprisoned in the Marshalsea for a year.
Yet the harshness of these punishments should not be
taken as an indication that courts martial proceeded
wantonly in cases of embezzlement of the king’s 
64stores. Indeed, quite the opposite was true. Almost
half of the mariners indicted on this charge on the
Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 1812 were 
6 *5
acquitted. Moreover, naval tribunals applied the same 
legal standards in reaching their verdicts that were used 
in similar cases on shore. As at criminal trials, the 
defendant's guilt or innocence was determined by two 
central criteria: his intentions and the ownership of the
articles taken.66 If the accused was deemed to have 
misappropriated naval property willfully for his own gain,
®3The two other men convicted were Seaman William 
Renburd and Lieutenant William Simpson. Renburd was found 
guilty of pilfering liquor on 12 August 1802 and given
three hundred lashes through the fleet (ADM 1/5362). 
Simpson was "reprimanded and mulcted of six months 
personal pay" on 14 June 1785 for embezzling a small 
quantity of paint (ADM 1/5324; ADM 3/101).
^Throughout the eighteenth century, the Admiralty 
placed great emphasis on economy. All commanders in chief 
going to the Leewards, for instance, were instructed "to 
take all possible care that his Majesty's stores, as well 
ordnance as others, be expended with the utmost frugality, 
and to give the strictest orders to the captains and other 
officers concerned that every degree of attention be had 
to the due care and expenditure of them (ADM 2/117)."
65of the eleven tried, five were found completely 
innocent.
66see Burn, The Justice of the Peace, vol. 3, pp. 
226-232.
226
he was convicted. If he was judged not to have acted
maliciously or if the items in question could not be shown
67to belong to the service, he was exonerated.
Two cases will suffice as examples. The first came to 
trial on 4 May 1810 in Carlisle Bay, Barbados. The 
defendant, Purser Charles Concanen of the Star, was 
accused of "fraudulent practices in the execution of his 
duty." From the evidence presented by the prosecution, it 
was clear that the purser had altered several bills for 
the purchase of fresh beef so that the weight of the food 
listed on the certificates was almost twice the amount 
actually received on board the sloop. He then took the 
receipts to the agent of a local contractor at St. Thomas
who paid him in cash "the exact contract price” for the
portion of the meat which had not been supplied and sent 
the vouchers on to the Victualling Board. In his defense, 
Concanen did not deny that he had developed this scheme. 
Instead, he claimed that he had resorted to it from "no
intention of defrauding Government, but from a false idea 
that the deficiency of fresh beef might be made up by my 
credit on other accounts." However, Concanen's
explanation had a hollow ring to it in light of the fact
67To prevent peculation, items likely to be stolen 
were given distinctive markings. For example, all sail 
canvas dispensed by the Navy Board had woven into it 
specially colored "King's Yarn."
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that he, like all pursers, was essentially an entrepreneur
who —  though regulated and supported by the Admiralty —
was given a monopoly to make his profit or sustain his
68loss at his own risk. Hence, he was convicted,
69cashiered and sent to the Marshalsea Prison.
The second trial took place on 29 February 1808 on 
board H.M.S. York in Carlisle Bay. The tribunal was 
assembled to hear the case of Thomas Ward, the acting 
carpenter of the Port D'Espaane. who was accused of 
embezzling the ship’s copper and "having converted other 
articles being also part of the king's stores, committed 
to his charge, to his own private use." Happily for Ward, 
the prosecution presented a very weak case against him. 
All but one of the witnesses called to substantiate the 
allegations admitted during their examinations that they 
had not known the carpenter to misappropriate any of the 
items in question or attempt to remove any of the crown's 
property from the sloop. Moreover, Ward was able to 
produce documents showing that he had not been supplied 
with copper. Given the paucity of the evidence against 
him, the court acquitted the carpenter, noting in regard 
to the copper that the prosecutor had failed "to prove 
that it belonged to His Majesty."70
68For eighteenth-century pursers, see Lewis, A 
Social History, pp. 246-248.
68ADM 1/5405
70ADM 1/5385
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Like property offenses, violent crimes were handled in
the navy in much the same fashion that they were on
shore. Naval justice dealt with two basic types of
violence. The most serious was homicide which was the
only maritime social problem invariably adjudicated by
tribunal. According to David Hannay, the treatment given
such cases by the crown’s judicial bodies at sea was less
than creditable. In his opinion, nautical jurisprudence
betrayed a general ignorance of the rudimentary legal
distinction between murder and manslaughter. "Naval
courts martial of the eighteenth century appear, as far as
I can discover," he wrote, "rarely to have understood that
killing which falls short of murder may yet be
manslaughter, and deserving of punishment. They at least
acted as if they had no choice between condemning for
71murder and acquitting."
No doubt there were a few garbled cases in which the 
statutory classifications of homicide were missed by 
individual tribunals. Indeed there is one to be found 
among the records from the Lesser Antilles. On 28 
February 1799, seaman John Farrant of H.M.S. Santa 
Margarita was tried in Fort Royal Bay "for having on the
71Hannay, Naval Courts Martial, p. 146.
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night of the 6th October last given a blow to Daniel 
Morrison, seaman also belonging to that ship, in a scuffle 
which occasioned his death." The fight apparently had 
started when Morrison refused to share some grog with 
Farrant. After the two had exchanged several blows, 
Morrison "laid down on the chest [in his berth] upon his 
belly and said 'Lord have mercy upon us' and there was a 
deal of water came out of his mouth and within a few 
moments he died." At the trial, the medical examiner, who 
had performed a cursory autopsy on the body of the 
deceased, testified that he had discovered "no external 
marks of violence" on the corpse. It was primarily upon 
this evidence that the court rendered a verdict favorable 
to Farrant. In doing so, however-, they acquitted him not 
of manslaughter (which was technically the crime of which 
he was accused), but "of all murder or intention of 
murder."72
Yet Farrant's case was the exception not the rule.
From the ten other homicide trials on the Leeward Islands
station between 1784 and 1812 for which transcripts are
extant, it is clear that courts martial adopted the same
legal distinctions employed on shore in the adjudication
73of such crimes. As at criminal proceedings, a
72ADM 1/5348
73The transcript to the trial of William Albanie, 
who was acquitted of killing John Spooner on 14 April 
1806, is not included in the bound volumes of minutes to 
courts martial (ADM 1/5373).
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killer's degree of culpability was determined by the
intentions which lay behind his deed. Like assize juries,
naval tribunals delineated three basic classifications of
killing: murder, manslaughter and justifiable
74homicide. If the death resulted from malicious
intent, it was considered murder. If it was wrought by
what Blackstone called "the sudden heat of the passions,"
75it was deemed manslaughter. And, if it occurred in
the line of duty or in self-defense, it was held to be
7 6justifiable homicide.
Of the ten other men tried for killing a fellow human 
being on the Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 
1812, one was found guilty of slaying a man in a duel, two
74Closely akin to the category of justifiable 
homicide was excusable homicide, whereby the killer bore 
some culpability for the victim's demise but not enough to 
warrant a penalty for the killing itself. Although this 
distinction was applied on shore in a variety of cases 
arising from accidents, for the present purposes the most 
important was in instances in which the death was a 
consequence of a legal punishment. At criminal law, if, 
for example, a father used excessive force in correcting 
his child and the child died as a result, then he was 
liable to be convicted of murder or manslaughter (Beattie, 
p. 86). At naval law a somewhat different standard was 
employed, due in large part to the injunction against 
cruelty contained in the Thirty-third Article of War. If 
a captain used immoderate force in fatally punishing a 
seaman, he normally was acquitted of murder or 
manslaughter and convicted of cruelty instead. For the 
only case of this nature in the Leewards, see above 
Chapter Three, p. 122.
75Blackstone, vol. 4, p. 190.
76ibid.. pp. 182-188.
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were convicted of manslaughter and seven were acquitted by
77reason of justifiable or excusable homicide. The
ability of naval tribunals to distinguish between murder 
and manslaughter was plainly in evidence at the trial of 
Acting Lieutenant William Cumpston of H.M. Sloop Drake. 
On 3 October 1804, Cumpston stood before a court martial 
assembled in English Harbour accused of mortally wounding 
John McLaughlin. Several months earlier, the lieutenant 
had gone on board the guiniaman Thames at Paramaribo, 
Surinam to dine with her captain. As he departed the 
Drake he instructed the master’s mate that he would signal 
for the launch when he was ready to return. Just after 
the grog had been served at four o ’clock that fateful 
afternoon, Cumpston hoisted the merchant ship's ensign and 
discharged a musket in the direction of the sloop. 
Although recognizing the lieutenant's signal, the master's 
mate elected to put off sending the boat until the 
bargemen had had time to finish their ration. Impatient 
with the delay, Cumpston fired a second shot towards the 
Drake, which struck the ship's corporal, John McLaughlin, 
in the head and killed him. At his trial, Cumpston did 
not deny slaying McLaughlin. Significantly, he
77The person convicted o£ dueling, Lieutenant Thomas 
Connell of the Chichester, was sentenced to death by a 
tribunal assembled at sea near Martinique on 9 April 
1807. However, because it appeared to the court that his 
opponent had instigated this unpleasant episode, he was 
deemed a fit object of mercy and subsequently pardonned 
(ADM 1/5380).
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concentrated his efforts instead on proving that he bore
the deceased no ill will. His only question to each of
the prosecution's witnesses was: "Do you think that I had
any spite or malice against John McLaughlin that I could
have picked that man out in particular[?]" Fortunately
for the lieutenant all attestants answered this query
negatively. As a result he was convicted of the lesser
78charge of manslaughter and dismissed from the service.
Like manslaughter rulings, verdicts of justifiable 
homicide were reached in accordance with the standards 
established by the criminal law. The decision rendered at 
the trial of Lieutenant James Edward Smith on 15 March 
1804 on board the Centaur off Martinique may be cited as a 
case in point. One night during the previous summer, 
while commanding the Express off the island of Trinidad, 
Smith had gone on shore with the launch to collect the 
members of the brig's crew who were returning from leave. 
As William Scott and. Stephen Price, two seamen belonging 
to the Express, made their way down to the boat from a 
punch house called Mr. Duffy's, they were followed by one 
of the tavern's other patrons. When they arrived at the 
rendezvous, Lieutenant Smith ordered Scott and Price to 
impress the man. However, Smith promised to release his 
new recruit if the man would show him where more mariners 
could be found. Agreeing to do so, the fellow led Smith,
78ADM 1/5367. For the other case, see below Chapter 
Six, p. 268.
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Scott and Price to "a house kept by Mother Kitt." Scott
related to the court the events that followed:
As soon as we reached the house Stephen Price and
the man alluded to, staid at the door of the yard 
or outside/ and Lieutenant Smith called me, and 
ordered me to go with him. I followed Lieutenant 
Smith into the yard at the back of the house. As 
soon as he got in. Lieutenant Smith stayed at one 
door and told me to run into a room to fetch out 
the candle. I went in directly and took hold of 
the candle,then two women who were in the room 
got up, and took hold of my collar one on each 
side. I dragged them to the door, and Lieutenant 
Smith put his dirk into the doorstop in order to 
separate the women from me and desired them to 
let me go; which they did and I got into the 
yard, with the candle in my hand. There was a
man whom I knew to be the man of the house, who
knocked me down with the candle in my hand. 
Lieutenant Smith came up to me, and asked if the 
man had knocked me down, and directly the man 
called out 'fetch me a light that I may find my 
sword. ' A man was looking out of a window of the 
same house above stairs and called Lieutenant 
Smith 'Blackguard, Rascal and scoundrel.' When 
Lieutenant Smith replied 'certainly you would not 
come down and tell me so.' 'Sir' said the man 'I 
will.' and he shut the window directly. He came 
down with another man - a tall man, and by his 
speech, he appeared to be a Scotchman, he had a 
plaid jacket on. Then the man who had replied to 
Lieutenant Smith, laid hold of the Lieutenant by 
the collar, by each collar of his coat. 
Lieutenant Smith said, 'certainly you cannot be 
in your senses to hold me in this manner.' The 
man replied 'I am' and struck Lieutenant Smith 
with his fist on his breast. 'Certainly,' said 
the Lieutenant , 'you cannot be in your senses.'
'I am' replied the man and repeated his blows by 
striking on the side of Lieutenant Smith's head, 
after which Lieutenant Smith wounded him with his 
dirk. The man had hold of the Lieutenant at the 
time but instantly fell in consequence of the 
wound. As soon as he fell Lieutenant Smith went 
out of the yard, and one Mr. Hogg looked out of 
his window and begun to abuse Lieutenant Smith, 
who walked away without making any reply.
Smith's assailant, John Redford, died soon after the
scuffle. At his court martial, the lieutenant defended
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himself by claiming that he had killed Redford during an 
attempt to ward off an unprovoked attack while on His 
Majesty's impress service. And from the evidence 
presented by the witnesses it was clear that this was 
indeed what had taken place. Thus, the tribunal "was of 
opinion that Lieutenant James Edward Smith did cause the 
death of John Redford by inflicting a wound to the brain * 
of the deceased but that the same happened in his own 
defence, the court therefore acquitted Lieutenant James 
Edward Smith.',7^
The second type of violence dealt with by naval 
authorities manifested itself in the form of fights among 
the men or assaults on officers. As was the case in the 
adjudication of so many other varieties of crime at sea, 
the method of prosecuting incidents of battery was left to 
the discretion of the commanders of His Majesty's ships. 
Nevertheless, most physical conflicts that did not result 
in death were arbitrated summarily. While there were over 
five hundred mariners flogged at the gangways of the 
vessels surveyed for violent confrontations, there were 
but twelve members of the fleet brought before naval 
tribunals on similar charges in the Leewards during the 
period under discussion.
Only sailors who had committed especially serious acts 
of non-fatal violence were brought before courts martial.
7^ADM 1/5365.
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Of the twelve men who stood trial in the Lesser Antilles 
between 1784 and 1812, eight were seamen or marines. Five 
of the tars were charged with striking a superior officer 
and three were tried for incidents resulting in grievous 
bodily damage upon another human being. The remaining 
four defendants were warrant or commissioned officers. 
Three of them allegedly attacked a fellow member of the 
quarter-deck and the fourth was indicted for assaulting a 
soldier on board a prison ship.
The mariners tried for striking a superior officer 
were not guilty of some lamentable, momentary 
indiscretion. Each had compounded his offense by behaving 
in a particularly outrageous or conspicuous manner. 
Representative of- the crimes prosecuted by courts martial 
is the case of William Connor, a seaman belonging to H.M. 
Sloop Gaiete. On 23 October 1799, Connor faced a tribunal 
at Fort Royal Bay, charged with delivering a blow to 
Midshipman James King. Several weeks earlier, he had 
complained about the vessel's provisions and begun to
abuse the purser's steward. Hearing the noise in his
cabin, a Lieutenant Douker called out to Connor, ordering 
him to return to his berth. Still heated, the seaman made 
his way toward Douker's quarters, stopping at the door. 
Thereupon Surgeon George Butt, "thinking from his furious 
look his intentions were to lay violent hands on
Lieutenant Douker,” rushed Connor. When Connor shoved
Butt aside, the surgeon hit him and the two men started to
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struggle with each other. "Mr. Fitzgerald, the 1st 
Lieutenant, then came out o£ the Gunroom and said 'You 
vagabond Connor what do you mean?' or words to that 
purpose. Connor immediately went a few yards further 
forward and turning about said he would not be imposed 
upon." At this point James King attempted to push the 
seaman out of the room. However, Connor "collared Mr. 
King and dragged him opposite the Midshipman's berth, 
where he struck him." Finally Connor was subdued by the 
master's mate and led away.8®
»
Like Connor, two of the three mariners found guilty by
naval tribunals of wounding another member of the fleet
81had committed heinous crimes. One stabbed a marine 
82with a knife. The other, Private Richard Cole, maimed 
a shipmate and was tried in English Harbour on 16 June 
1812. One afternoon several weeks earlier, Cole had been 
performing guard duty as a sentry on board the Amaranthe 
sloop. While patrolling the waist of the ship, he stopped 
in front of Humphry Clinker, a black sailor who was 
sitting quietly on the fore gun slide mending his pants.
80ADM 1/5350.
81The third, seaman Charles Coleman of the 
Excellent, was tried on 6 July 1802 because his antagonist 
died shortly after the altercation (ADM 52/2992). While a 
coroner's inquest did not find sufficient evidence to 
indict him for homicide (ADM 51/1404), he was court 
martialled for fighting primarily to serve as an example 
to others (ADM 1/5362).
82ADM 1/5382. Trial of Charles Lamb, 6 June 1807.
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Cole began to abuse Clinker verbally, calling him "a black 
bugger" and "a black quartermaster." Clinker asked Cole 
to leave him alone. Cole departed only to return and 
accost Clinker anew. Again Clinker asked him to go about
his business. According to one witness, "the sentry then
walked aft and immediately came forward again and said you
t  I
black bugger how dare you talk to a white man, and ran his
ramrod into his [Clinker's] eye." The wound deprived the
83unfortunate victim of sight in that eye.
While none of the four officers indicted for battery
was accused of deeds as grisly as the one perpetrated by 
Private Cole, their alleged crimes still were regarded as 
reprehensible. The offenses with which these men were 
charged were viewed in an unfavorable light not so much 
for the injuries they caused but for the bad examples they 
set for the members of the lower deck. This was clearly 
in evidence at the proceedings against Thomas Newnham, the 
gunner of H.M.S Excellent. Newnham was tried in Carlisle 
Bay on 31 December 1802 for striking the vessel's 
carpenter. The incident itself, arising from a dispute 
over mess accounts, was relatively minor since only one 
punch was thrown. Nevertheless, its gravity was reflected 
in several of the tribunal's questions to one of the 
witnesses, Midshipman Nathaniel Ratsey. "Are you of 
opinion," the court asked, "that a blow given from one
83ADM 1/5427.
238
officer to another in a ship, in a passion is likely to 
create a disturbance?" And again, "Do you consider it as 
the duty of the Gunner to keep peace and good order in the 
Gunroom?"®4
Despite the seriousness of these cases, naval 
tribunals did not act arbitrarily. Courts martial 
adjudicated indictments for battery in much the fashion 
that they were dealt with on shore. As at criminal 
proceedings, the central issue determining the verdict was 
the intention behind the blow. If the defendant 
deliberately used force to inflict pain, he was deemed
guilty. If he hit the victim accidentally or in jest, he
Q C
was found innocent. Hence courts went to considerable
lengths to establish the accused's motives. For example, 
during the examination of Andrew Pitts at Martin Keane's 
trial on 27 March 1797 "for riotous and mutinous behavior 
and striking his superior officers," the following
exchange took place:
Court - Do you think he meant to strike
the sergeant with the bayonet or
any other person?
Answer - The point of the bayonet was
towards me.
Court - Did there appear any wicked or
malicious design in making use of 
the bayonet?
Answer - Yes, I thought so.8®
84ADM 1/5362.
88Blackstone, vol 3, p. 120.
86ADM 1/5338.
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At the same time# the sentences given to mariners
convicted of battery conformed to the general pattern of
those rendered on shore. Like assizes, tribunals normally
penalized men who assaulted their social betters more
harshly than people who attacked their peers or 
87inferiors. Of the five seamen found guilty of striking 
their superiors, two were adjudged to be hanged by the neck 
until dead and the other three received a number of lashes 
through the fleet ranging from fifty to four hundred. 
Conversely, the three convicted of wounding another member 
of the lower deck were punished with floggings of 
thirty-six, sixty and one hundred and fifty strokes. 
Similarly, of the two officers convicted of assailing men 
of lesser rank, one was reprimanded and the other was 
reprimanded and dismissed from his ship. And the one 
officer who struck his equal was broken and dismissed from 
the service.
Unfortunately, the incidents of battery punished 
summarily do not lend themselves to analysis as readily as 
those adjudicated by courts martial. Once again, 
discussion is hamstrung by the brevity of the logs. 
Violent offenses were recorded in the journals in very 
general terms. Normally they were listed simply as 
"fighting" or "striking an officer." In the vast majority
87See Beattie, p. 458.
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of the cases reported on the ships surveyed no further
88information about the crime was provided. Moreover,
in the few instances in which some detail was included, it
only amounted to the identity of the victim of the
attack. For this reason, it is impossible to determine
such things as why the violence occurred, how it started,
or how vicious the conflicts really were. ♦
Nevertheless, several observations still can be made
concerning the violent offenses punished summarily in the
navy. Statistically, these crimes amounted to but a small
portion of the total number of infractions penalized on
His Majesty's vessels, accounting for only about six
percent of the infractions recorded in the logs of the
ships in the sample (see Table 3). Most acts involving
the use of illegal force were entered in the journals as
fights rather than assaults. Of the 544 cases in the
survey, eighty-three percent were described as the former,
while the remaining seventeen percent were listed as the 
89latter. At the same time, the great majority of such 
deeds were perpetrated by members of the lower deck. 
Ninety-one percent of the belligerents were registered in 
the muster books of the seventy-three men-of-war as able
880f the 544 cases, 521 were recorded in this manner. 
890f the 544 cases, 444 were recorded as fighting.
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seamen, ordinary seamen, landsmen or marine privates.
Most of the affrays involving members of the lower
deck appear to have been conflicts between mariners of
comparable rank. In 130 of the 143 instances in the
sample in which two or more men were punished for fighting
on the same day, the combatants held similar ratings.
Moreover, the majority of these altercations seem to have
taken place between members of the same branch of the
service. In only twelve percent of the cases just noted
was at least one of the miscreants a seaman and one a 
91marine. Furthermore, a fair number of the scuffles
seem to have been alcohol induced. Approximately fifteen
percent of the sailors punished for fighting also were
92charged with drunkenness. Finally, only a small
portion of the incidents of violence seem to have been
full-fledged brawls. On about eight percent of the days
in which punishment was inflicted for fighting were more
93than two men called to the gangway for this offense.
Although most of the violence occurring on the king's 
vessels seems to have been directed by mariners at other
90Three hundred and eighty-one of the 419 men held 
these ratings.
91Seventeen of the 143 instances witnessed members 
of the different branches of the service punished together.
92Sixty-five of the 444 belligerents were found 
guilty of drunkenness.
920n twenty-one of 255 punishment days, three or 
more men were corrected.
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mariners, a fair proportion of it was aimed at officers.
Almost sixteen percent of the offenses involving the use
of illegal force were entered in the logs of the ships
94surveyed as assaults on officers. However, from the 
few instances in which the officer assailed was recorded 
in the journals, it would appear that those usually 
attacked belonged to the lower echelons of the 
quarter-deck. Of the twenty officers identified, eight 
were boatswain's mates, three were marine sergeants, two 
were boatswains, two were carpenter's mates, one was a 
cook, one was a midshipman, one was a master at arms, one 
was a captain of the mizen mast, and one was a marine 
corporal. Significantly, none of these men held a 
commission. All were either petty or warrant officers. 
Moreover, with the exception of the cook, all were men who 
enforced policy at the ground level. This suggests that 
the physical manifestations of the lower deck's hostility 
to authority took place along the seam in the fabric of 
naval society uniting rulers and ruled.
In dealing summarily with violent crime, His Majesty's 
captains invariable resorted to the cat. Yet commanders 
appear to have been somewhat less severe in their 
punishment of these offenses than they were in their 
treatment of other infractions. Whereas about sixty 
percent of all the floggings administered on board the
94Eighty-four of the 544 instances were described as 
attacks on superiors.
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ships in the survey were of twelve lashes or less#
sixty-seven percent of those meted out for battery were
inflicted in like proportions. Nonetheless captains
exhibited the same general tendency shown by courts
martial in adjudicating such cases. On the whole, attacks
on officers were penalized with greater harshness than
fights between members of the lower deck. While
approximately half of the mariners flogged for striking a
superior officer received more than a dozen strokes with a
cat of nine tails, a little more than seventy percent of
the seamen punished for exchanging blows with their peers
95were given twelve strokes or less.
v
In addition to the serious social problems of
drunkenness, theft and physical violence, naval
authorities confronted a host of crimes against "morality
and good order." The number of moral offenses punished in
the Royal Navy appears to have been much smaller than the
9 6number corrected on shore. On board the ships in the
95por the former the numbers are: thirty-two of
twelve lashes or less and thirty-three of more than a 
dozen. Of the latter, 226 were twelve lashes or less and 
ninety-three were of more than a dozen.
^®See Landau, The Justices of the Peace. Chapter 
Six, passim. As noted in Chapter Three, it is impossible 
to determine the frequency with which fines were levied 
for misdemeanors like swearing. However, there is an
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survey, punishment of infractions like gambling, swearing,
lying and buggery amounted to less than one percent of the
9 7total correctional activity recorded in the logbooks.
Moreover, only six of the 362 mariners tried by courts
martial on the Leeward Islands station between 1784 and
1812 were charged with contraventions of the accepted
standards of decency and five of these men were accused of
sodomy. At the same time, the penalties inflicted for the
majority of such crimes were, by naval usage, relatively
mild. For example, nine of , the twelve floggings
administered exclusively for profanity were of no more
than a dozen lashes. And the lone warrant officer
convicted by a tribunal of using bad language received
9 8just a reprimand.
The one exception to the general leniency toward moral
incident related in William Richardson's memoirs that 
provides some indication of the general attitude of both 
officers and men toward the punishment of such petty 
transgressions. According to Richardson, when the young 
captain of the Minerva began flogging his crew for 
profanity in 1793, "it displeased the men very much." 
Indeed, it displeased them so much that one evening they 
staged a minor protest demonstration. "By-and-by the 
gunner's wads began to fly about in all directions, the 
lights were extinguished, the lanthorns knocked to pieces, 
and a wad rolled into the admiral's cabin as he walked 
there.” Seeing this discontent, the admiral instructed 
the captain "not to use the cat on such light occasions 
(Richardson pp. 105-106)."
97Fifty-one of the 8,610 offenses were described as 
such.
98ADM 1/5382. Trial of Walter Sands, held on 10 
July 1807.
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of£enses shown by the navy was the adjudication of crimes 
against nature. Buggery normally was penalized by naval 
authorities much more severely than other transgressions 
of morality. Of the five men punished summarily for 
sodomy on the vessels in the sample, two were forced to 
run the gauntlet and the other three were flogged with a 
number of lashes ranging from thirty-six to seventy-two. 
Furthermore, two of the three men convicted of anal 
intercourse by courts martial in the Lesser Antilles 
during the period under discussion were sentenced to death 
and executed and the third was given three hundred lashes 
through the fleet, two years solitary confinement and a 
stiff fine.
In an attempt to explain the severity with which
homosexual offenses were punished in the
eighteenth-century British fleet, Arthur N. Gilbert has
suggested that "sodomy brought into sharp focus the
99relationship between anality and death." According to 
Gilbert, the rectum, its fecal product and, by 
association, the act of buggery served as physical symbols 
of the ultimate reality. In the hostile naval 
environment, where the elements, disease and battle made 
life precarious at best, these symbols were particularly 
horrifying. "Sodomy was an unbearably vivid reminder, a
^Arthur N. Gilbert, "Buggery and the British Navy, 
1700-1861," Journal of Social History 10 (Fall, 1976), p. 
88.
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courting and embodiment, of the death that accompanied the 
warships of the navy wherever they went. As such, sodomy 
had to be exorcised as ruthlessly as devils: the sodomite
had to be killed for reminding men of their 
mortality. ,,10°
However, not all sodomites were killed. Indeed not 
even the majority of them were killed in the Royal Navy. 
Gilbert's interpretation rests entirely on the transcripts 
of courts martial. And although homosexuals found guilty 
by naval tribunals frequently were sentenced to death, 
most crimes against nature were not adjudicated in the 
courts. Whereas six mariners suffered summary correction 
on board the ships in the sample alone, only five men on 
the whole station were brought before judicial bodies on 
the same charge. Moreover, if the conviction rate for the 
vessels in the survey is projected for all of the 
men-of-war sent to the Lesser Antilles between 1784 and 
1812, that would mean that for each sodomite tried by a 
court martial, six were punished summarily by their 
commanding officers.101
And the punishments inflicted by individual captains, 
though harsh, hardly can be characterized as ruthless 
exorcisms. In every case from the Leewards, equal
IQOlbid.. pp. 89-90.
101There were 417 ships sent to the Leewards between 
1784 and 1812.
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penalties were administered £or other offenses. While
William Bayly, for example, received seventy-two lashes on
board the Perdrix on 28 June 1796 for a "breach of the
29th Article;" twenty more men on the ships in the sample
were given the same number of strokes for crimes ranging
102from desertion to neglect of duty. Moreover there is
even one case to be found among the surviving records from
the Leewards in which a sodomite made several homosexual
assaults on his shipmates without facing the wrath of a
court martial. Landsman Francis Frontain was flogged by
two different captains on two separate occasions for
buggery on H.M.S. Nvaden between September 1810 and May 
1031811. Finally, a few commanders simply turned
sodomites out of their ships. Thus, after confining 
Thomas Brooks for about a month, Captain Samuel Osborn 
discharged him from the Centurion on 27 May 1793 "for 
attempting an unnatural crime."1®4
All of this suggests that sodomites were treated no 
more harshly in the navy than they were on shore. While 
there is no complete statistical data on the incidence of 
the adjudication of buggery in eighteeth-century England 
or the frequency with which various types of punishment
102ADM 51/1264.
103ADM 51/2606.
lO^ADM 51/1 5 5; ADM 36/13833.
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were inflicted for it by the criminal courts, there is
enough evidence in the secondary literature to suggest
that the penalties meted out * at assizes and quarter
sessions were similar to those imposed in the service.
Both on land and at sea many homosexuals found guilty of
unnatural acts were condemned to death with little if any
105chance of a pardon. However, in the British Isles
the practices of flogging and running the gauntlet were 
not used to punish sexual deviants. Instead, miscreants 
were subjected to another form of corporal punishment, the 
pillory. Normally accompanied by a fine and imprisonment, 
the pillory actually could be a worse fate for sodomites 
than the lash or knittle. According to one scholar, the 
crowds which gathered on these occasions were at times 
"quite violent to such men, and at least one was
killed."1^  Hence, it seems that if naval authorities 
were casting out symbols of death in chastising
homosexuals, they were doing so with no more ruthlessness 
than their counterparts on shore did.
One offense which occasionally has been mistaken as a
107euphemism for sodomy is uncleanness. Yet comparison
of the entries in both the captain's and master's logs for
105See Beattie, pp. 433-434.
106Randolph Trumbach, "London's Sodomites:
Homosexual Behavior and Western Culture in the 18th 
Century," Journal of Social History 11 (Fall, 1977), p. 21.
107ciibert, "Buggery and the British Navy," p. 72.
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the same crime yields sufficient evidence to conclude that
the term was used in the journals to describe acts of
filthiness. In many of the extant cases from the ships in
the sample, it referred to the performance of bodily
functions in unauthorized areas. Seaman John Guttrick of
H.M.S. Queen, for example, received a dozen lashes on 19
August 1793 "for pissing from the main top upon 
108deck." In some, it denoted untidiness. Thus Robert
Collins, a marine private belonging to the Excellent. was
given eighteen blows on 8 January 1803 for "leaving dirty,
109stinking cloaths [sic] below." In others, it meant
befoulment. John Frazer, for instance, was punished with 
six strokes on board the Rattler sloop on 19 September 
1785 for "throwing dirt out of the port and dirting [sic] 
the ship's side.”110
As the prevalance of such practices as swabbing the 
decks and "holystoning" evinces, the importance of 
cleanliness was recognized widely by eighteenth-century 
British naval officers. 11'1‘ According to Patton, it was
108ADM 51/753; ADM, 52/3196.
109ADM 51/1404; ADM 52/2992.
H O a d M 51/770.
111mA holystone was a block of Portland stone the 
size of a large pillow, flat on one side and usually 
rounded on the other. An eyebolt was fitted on the 
rounded side and two lengths of rope were spliced to it. 
With the deck wet, sand was sprinkled over it, and men 
holding the ropes pulled the holystone back and forth, the 
stone, sand and water scouring the planking." Pope, Life, 
p. 167.
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"necessary to the health and comfort of the whole company"
112of a man-of-war. Yet# despite the concern for
hygiene afloat, immundity amounted to little more than one
percent of the infractions recorded in the logs of the
113ships surveyed. At the same time, only two mariners
on the Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 1812 were
indicted at courts martial for uncleanness, and both of
these individuals were charged also with buggery.
Moreover, the penalties normally imposed for filthiness
were not excessive. Sixty-eight percent of the seamen
punished summarily for it alone on board the vessels in
114the sample were flogged with a dozen lashes or less.
Uncleanness was but one of the two general forms of 
disorder in naval society. Disturbances of the peace were 
the other. Like filthiness, disturbances of the peace 
constituted only a small proportion of the total number of 
offenses adjudicated in the Royal Navy. On board the 
vessels in the sample, they amounted to slightly more than 
three percent of all the infractions recorded in the
112patton, Strictures, p. 47.
113one hundred and fourteen of the 8610 crimes were 
listed as uncleanness.
114pifty-eight of the eighty-five floggings were of 
twelve strokes or less. The number of lashes inflicted 
ranged from three to sixty.
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115logs. In addition, just eleven of the 362 mariners
tried by courts martial were indicted on similar charges.
The crimes in this category generally were defined as
riots or quarrels. However, the term "riot" did not mean
full blown uprisings. Rather, it was used to describe
commotions which disrupted the quiet of a ship.116 Not
surprisingly, many of these incidents were fueled by
liquor. Twenty-three percent of the men punished
summarily for tumultuous behavior also were accused of
117drunkenness.
In dealing with disturbances of the peace, naval
authorities followed the same general pattern that they
did in their adjudication of so many other social crimes.
Very few mariners were brought before courts martial for
such offenses and all but one of these men were charged
118additionally with drunkenness, contempt or mutiny.
115^0 hundred and seventy-eight of the 8610 crimes 
were listed as disturbances of the peace.
116For example, four days after engaging in a 
drunken songfest in the gunroom of the Hawke on 14 July 
1798, John Wools, William Lucas and John Wilson were tried 
by a court martial in Fort Royal Bay for "having . . .
been much intoxicated and behaved in a very riotous manner 
(ADM 1/5345)."
1170f the 278 punished for disturbing the peace, 
sixty-three were charged also with intoxication.
118The one exception was Lieutenant Cornelius 
Lascelles of H.M. Sloop Cvnet who was reprimanded on 29 
July 18.09 for "having used reproachful and provoking 
speeches and gestures tending to cause a quarrel to [sic] 
Lieutenant William Picking (ADM 1/5397)."
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The majority o£ tumults or squabbles were punished
summarily. Although flogging was the standard penalty
inflicted, the sentences imposed in most cases were
moderate. In seventy percent of the instances found on
the ships in the sample in which seamen were scourged
solely for quarrelling' or riot, the number of lashes
119administered did not exceed a dozen.
These, then, were the communal problems confronted by 
the floating society. In adjudicating them, naval
authorities adopted the same practices and standards 
employed by the judicial system in England. Nevertheless, 
justice at sea differed in two respects from its 
counterpart on shore. Not only did it rely moire heavily
on summary jurisdiction, but it resorted to corporal
punishment much more frequently. Yet such variations were 
more a matter of style than substance. Indeed the major 
difference between the two legal systems was not in the 
methods of judgement or the penalties inflicted, but in 
several types of crime dealt with excusively by the navy. 
And it is to service related offenses that the last 
chapter is devoted.
 ^Seventy-five of the 107 men punished for 
disturbances received twelve lashes of less. The number 
of lashes inflicted ranged from six to for forty-eight.
CHAPTER SIX 
THE WOODEN WALLS
i
William Falconer, the great nautical lexicographer, 
defined the word "navy" as a "fleet of vessels of war, 
that belong to a kingdom or state, to be employed either 
in assaulting and destroying its enemies, or protecting 
its commerce, and defending its coasts against hostilities 
or invasions."1 In fulfiling these functions, His 
Majesty’s service at sea encountered many of the basic 
problems that plagued most European military organizations 
of the eighteenth century. Like other fighting forces, 
the Royal Navy was beset with substantial losses through 
desertion. At the same time, it was faced with a number 
of challenges to the authority of its officer corps which 
ranged in gravity from mutiny to contempt to disobedience 
of orders. Finally, it confronted occasional difficulties 
arising from incompetent seamanship or failure to pursue 
an aggressive course of action in battle.
Service-related infractions were dealt with in much
^Falconer, Universal Dictionary. 1780 ed., s.v. Navy.
253
254
the same manner that social trangressions were. Like 
communal offenses, military crimes were prosecuted both 
summarily and by courts martial. Moreover, in most cases, 
the method of adjudication was left to the discretion of 
the commanders of His Majesty's ships. For instance, 
whereas there were fifty-eight mariners tried for mutiny 
or mutinous expressions by judicial bodies 'convened in the 
Lesser Antilles between 1784 and 1812, there were 220 
seamen punished at the gangways of the vessels in the 
survey for comparable misdeeds. Furthermore, the 
decisions rendered at the two levels of jurisdiction were 
reached on the basis of discernable legal abstractions. 
On the one hand, tribunals administered justice according 
to a relatively strict interpretation of these standards; 
on the other, captains acting singly upon their own 
authority followed the spirit, if not always the letter, 
of the law. For example, commanders as well as courts 
founded their judgements on the intentions of the 
defendant in proceedings against unauthorized absence from 
a ship.
While naval and social offenses were adjudicated by 
means of common judicial procedures, there was one notable 
difference in the way in which the two varieties of crime 
‘ were prosecuted. Because service-related infractions 
generally posed a much more serious threat to the 
well-being of the Royal Navy, they led to a far greater 
number of courts martial then did civil transgressions.
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On the Leeward Islands station during the period under
discussion, approximately seventy-five percent of the
members of the fleet made to feel the full weight of the
law by being subjected to a tribunal stood accused of
2mutiny, contempt, desertion, disobedience and the like.
• •
11
The service-related offense causing the greatest 
trouble for naval authorties was desertion. Throughout 
the eighteenth century, mariners absconded from the king's 
ships in substantial numbers. On board the vessels in the 
survey, tars ran at a rate which approached seven percent
o
of the aggregate population. But statistics alone do 
not reflect the extent of the problem. Not only did 
British captains have to find replacements for those who 
escaped, but the almost constant threat of men taking 
flight forced the members of the quarter-deck to go to 
considerable lengths to prevent them from doing so.
In the Royal Navy, desertion was largely, though not 
exclusively, a problem of the lower deck. Less than one 
percent of the mariners listed as "run" in the muster
2Two hundred and seventy-two of the 362 men tried in 
the Lesser Antilles were charged with military crimes.
3Of the 59,525 men who entered the seventy-three 
ships, 3,913 deserted.
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books o£ the vessels in the sample held a warrant or a 
commission.4 Moreover/ desertion was generally a 
phenomenon engaged in by the young. Over eighty-two 
percent o£ the sailors who absconded from the ships in the 
survey were under thirty years of age. Finally, it was 
not an activity confined exclusively to subjects of the 
crown. More than fourteen percent of the fugitives from 
the men-of-war examined for the present study were 
foreigners.**
Traditionally, historians have seen desertion 
primarily as a consequence of impressment and brutality. 
In this view, the inhabitants of the lower deck, forcibly
^Eighteen of the 3,913 fugitives walked the
quarter-deck.
5The youngest mariner to flee was twelve. The
oldest was sixty-five. The raw totals are:
Under 20 - 283
20 to 29 - 2,499
30 to 39 - 482
40 to 49 - 110
Over 50 — 19
Not Stated — 518
®The numerical distribution of the birth places of 
deserters is:
England 1620 USA - 227
Scotland 375 Europe - 248
Ireland 618 Asia 3
Wales. 409 Africa 7
Isle of Man 16 South America 3
Channel Islands - 17 Not Stated - 518
The Empire 149
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enslaved by the odious press, ran from the navy to escape 
the tyranny and oppression of His Majesty's officers. 
Such an interpretation is not completely without 
foundation. Some men certainly did take flight for these 
reasons. In 1793, William Richardson, for example, found 
the experience of being dragooned into the service so 
"shocking" that he resolved to slip away from his ship as
O
soon as the opportunity presented itself. And
according to Samuel Leech, Captain Waldgrave’s sadistic
delight in inflicting punishment for even the most
"trifling" infractions led to "frequent desertions" among
g
the crew of the Macedonian during his command.
Nevertheless, impressment and brutality could not have' 
induced many seamen to abscond. At least forty-eight 
percent of the mariners who ran from the ships examined 
for the present study were volunteers.1^ Moreover, only 
about six percent of the fugitives in the sample ever
7See Lloyd, The British Seamen, p. 144; Marcus, 
Heart of Oak, pp. 106-107; Masefield, Sea Life, pp. 54-55; 
and Neale, The Cutlass and The Lash, pp. 37-38.
^Richardson, A Mariner of England, p. 97.
^Leech, Thirty Years from Home, pp. 70-71.
10Given the nature of the musters, it is impossible 
to discover the original means of entry for "turned-over" 
men. The raw numbers are:
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experienced the lash or the knittle prior to flight.11
Furthermore/ there was no strong measure of association
between chastisement and desertion. Only about half of
the captains in the survey with a greater than average
rate of punishment suffered a greater than average rate of
desertion. Conversely/ only about half of those with a
lower than average rate of punishment enjoyed a lower than
12average rate of desertion. Even more telling/ a
canvass of one hundred and fifty periods of intense
correctional activity aboard the men-of-war in the
Leewards reveals that less than twenty-five percent of
them coincided with, or were followed the next month by, a
13noticable increase in that vessel's desertion rate.
Volunteers - 1665 Cartel - 56
Prest - 684 Returned Deserter - 33
Quota 18 Warrant - 18
Turned-over - 1005 Not Stated - 402
Prison 29
IlOf the 3,913 fugitives, 254 had been punished for 
some offense prior to their departures.
120f the twenty five captains with at least one year 
of continuous service aboard one of the ships in the 
sample who punished more than nine percent of the members 
of their companies, thirteen lost more than seven percent 
of their men through desertion. Of the fifteen commanders 
in the same group who corrected less than nine percent of 
the individuals comprising their crews, eight lost less 
than seven percent of their tars through desertion.
^-^Thirty-seven of these periods were followed by 
noticable increases in the rate of desertion. See 
Appendix C.
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Indeed/ as Dr. N. A. M. Rodger has shown recently,
tars ran for a variety of reasons that had nothing to do
with impressment or brutality.14 One factor which no
doubt weighed heavily was economics. During most of the
period under discussion the financial rewards to be had in
commercial shipping greatly exceeded the wages paid in the 
15Royal Navy. This was especially true on the Caribbean
stations where European sailors were always at a premium.
In 1809, for example, experienced mariners commanded as
much as £6 per month plying the West India trade —  or 
more than treble the amount earned in the same span by the 
highest naval rating.1® That many fugitives may have 
succumbed to the temptation to enrich themselves aboard a
14N. A. M. Rodger, "Stragglers and Deserters from 
the Royal Navy During the Seven Years' War," Bulletin of 
the Institute of Historical Research 57 (May, 1984), pp. 
56-79.
15privateers also attracted runaways who were 
motivated by economics. Here, of course, the lure was 
prize money. Sir Alexander Cochrane, for example, was so 
convinced of the pernicious influence of these men that he 
complained to the Admiralty on 8 August 1809: "they
encourage desertion to a very great extent from the ships 
at English Harbour; and are otherwise such pests in their- 
petty mode of warfare, that I again beg to call their 
Lordships attention to the subject of not allowing 
commissions to be issued to vessels of so small a class 
(ADM 1/330)."
16Patrick Holland of North Shields, "A Plan for 
Manning the Navy (1809)," reprinted in The Manning of the 
Roval Navv: Selected Public Pamphlets. 1693 - 1873. ed.
J.S. Bromley (London: Navy Records Society, vol. 119,
1974), p. 152.
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merchantman is suggested strongly by the fact that
seventy-three percent of those who fled the vessels in the
sample were able or ordinary seamen, that is, members of
the lower deck whose practical knowledge of sailing made
17them valuable additions to any crew. A further
indication of the allure of the merchant marine is 
provided by the seasonal pattern of desertion found on the 
ships in the survey. Slightly over a third of the losses
were sustained in the three months prior to 1 August, the
»
date by which trading packets were required to depart the
Lesser Antilles to avoid the increased insurance rates
18charged during the hurricane season.
Yet desertion was no more a function of economics than 
it was of impressment or brutality. A number of fugitives 
simply may have been unable to adjust to the unfamiliar 
environs of a new ship, a difficulty compounded perhaps by
170f the 3,893 deserters whose ranks were listed in
the musters of the seventy-three ships, 2,823 were able or 
ordinary seamen.
18p0pe, Life, p. 237. 
desertions in the sample is:
January - 267 
February - 254 
March - 352 
April - 325 
May - 389
June - 407
The monthly distribution of
July - 533
August - 269 
September - 242 
October - 353 
November - 267 
December - 290
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the likely prospect that they would remain in such
19surroundings for an indefinite period of time. For
example, Charles Pemberton's disgust for the "coarse and
ignorant" sailors of the Friendship and his "dread that
. . . [his] lot was cast irrevocably" with them led him to
contemplate running soon after he had volunteered for
20service aboard the tender. Significantly, fifty-three
percent of the deserters in the sample absconded within
21six months of entering their vessels.
Still others took flight for purely personal reasons. 
One such mariner was John Swan, a member of the crew of 
H.M.S. Unite. Together with several other men, Swan 
slipped away from a watering party which had been sent 
ashore at Barbados on the afternoon of 8 October 1800. 
Apprehended the next day, he was returned to the frigate 
and brought before a tribunal for desertion the following 
December. At his trial, he did not deny that he had
19There was no fixed term of enlistment in the Royal 
Navy in the eighteenth century. Once a mariner joined the 
service, he remained in it until either he was paid off, 
died or deserted.
20Pemberton, The Autobiography of Pel Veriuice, pp. 
125-126.
21Two thousand and sixty of 3,880 fugitives ran 
within half a year of their enlistment. Seventy-one cases 
are missing. This percentage is roughly the same as that 
found by N.A.M. Rodger in his study of desertion during 
the Seven Years War. See Rodger, "Stragglers and 
Deserters from the Royal Navy During the Seven Years War," 
p. 67.
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attempted to run. Rather, he told the court that he had 
done so because he had a wife and six children in Bremen, 
Germany who were dependent solely upon him for their 
support and "knowing them to be in distress his mind lead 
[sic] him to the help he should by returning give to 
them."22
Finally, a few mariners deserted at the suggestion of 
their officers. Instead of suffering extremely unruly or 
troublesome tars to remain part of their crews, some 
members of the quarter-deck subtly encouraged these men to 
depart. Albeit from a slightly later period than that 
under discussion, one instance of this practice is found 
in the memoirs of Captain John Harvey Boteler. While the 
Ringdove was fitting out in the Thames River for a voyage 
to- the West Indies in 1822, Boteler discovered two 
"scamps” among the ship's company whom he deemed 
particularly unsuited for the rigours of naval life. 
Shortly before the brig sailed, he confronted the 
malefactors. As he put it: "I told them they might do in
harbour, and significantly added they would find it
22ADM 1/5355. Swan came to trial on 3 December
1800. He was convicted of desertion, but, " in 
consideration of the strong and peculiar circumstances of 
the case," was not punished.
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very different when we get to sea. They took the hint and 
ran."23
Whatever the reasons predisposing tars to take flight, 
obviously they could not have absconded unless given the 
opportunity to do so. And opportunities for seamen to 
desert were readily available in the age of sail. Life 
aboard a British man-of-war in the eighteenth century was 
far from the existence that Doctor Johnson likened to 
"being in jail with a chance of being drowned."24 In 
fact, quite the opposite was true. Royal mariners had 
considerable access to shore. Not only were their ships 
often at anchor, but while in port they frequently were 
allowed on land in a variety of situations, all of which 
provided potential avenues of escape.
The avenue taken by the majority of fugitives was 
furnished by duty. Approximately fifty-nine percent of 
the deserters in the sample whose circumstances of
22Captain John Harvey Boteler, Recollections of Mv 
Sea Life from 1808 to 1830. ed. David Bonner-Smith,
(London: Navy Records Society, vol. 82, 1942), p. 105.
24Quoted in Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English 
Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries. (London: MacMillan & Co., 1962), p. 154.
25The ships in the survey spent a total of 54,310 
days in the Leewards, 30,436 of which were at anchor.
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departure were recorded in the muster books absconded from
26watering places, dockyards, launches, or the like.
Nor should this high percentage be surprising. In all 
probability, duty offered disgruntled tars the best 
opportunity to flee successfully. Because of the lack of 
storage space on board naval vessels and the 
impracticality of undertaking more than minor repairs to 
hulls, masts, rigging and sails at sea, it was the most 
common situation in which seamen found themselves ashore. 
Moreover, it was also a time when officers and marines
t
were likely to be distracted. The bustle and confusion
which characterized many tasks provided almost the perfect
cover for sailors to slip away undetected.
Rather than absconding while on duty, another
seventeen percent of the mariners whose general exit
routes were recorded in the musters ran from the hospitals
established on land by the service in the Lesser 
27Antilles. These facilities seem to have placed no 
great obstacles in the paths of tars bent on fleeing 
them. Indeed Sir Alexander Cochrane was so convinced of 
their inability to prevent desertions that he suggested to
260f the 887 fugitives in this category, 525 ran 
from duty.
2?One hundred and forty-seven of the 887 fugitives 
departed from infirmaries ashore.
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the Admiralty on 4 June 1805 that "an old line of battle
ship . . . stationed in Carlisle Bay" be used in their
28stead. However, very few potential fugitives were
able to take advantage of this convenient opportunity to 
escape. To have been in a position to do so, such men 
first had to be deemed sufficiently ill to be sent to sick
i I
quarters ashore and second, they had to have enough
29strength to slip away after arriving there. Hence, 
only a relatively small number of tars took flight from 
naval infirmaries.
An additional sixteen percent of the men in the group
30under discussion ran while on leave. Leave, of
course, offered an excellent opportunity to flee. But 
here again, it was a question of how many potential 
fugitives were able to take advantage of this chance. 
Each of the mariners absconding from holiday belonged to
one of twenty-six ships, or roughly a third of the vessels
31examined for the present study. Moreover,
28ADM 1/326.
28Most of the men who went to these facilities did
not desert. Of the 19,215 mariners listed in the
surviving hospital musters from the Lesser Antilles, 785,
or slightly more than four percent, absconded.
30One hundred and forty of the 887 fugitives took
flight while on leave.
S^Seventy-three ships were examined for the present 
study.
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seventy-three percent of these desertions occurred under
eight captains, all but one of whom appear to have allowed
members of their crews ashore rather indiscriminately.
For example, James Fitzgerald slipped away from the
Maidstone during liberty granted to him at Barbados by
Captain Henry Newcombe on 19 July 1789 —  a scant three
and a half months after he had been returned to the
32frigate following an earlier escape. Similarly, two
Americans took flight from H.M.S. Galatea at Buck Island
when given furlough on 17 November 1807 by George Sayer a
33mere four weeks after being prest at sea.
The remaining eight percent of the tars in the sample
34absconded directly from His Majesty's ships. That so 
few seamen deserted in this fashion reflects the 
tremendous difficulties involved in such attempts. In 
addition to having to slip past the sentries routinely 
stationed on the main deck, mariners had to make their own 
way to safe haven. Because men-of-war normally anchored 
at considerable distances from the shore, fugitives could 
reach land only by swimming, making off with the ship's
32ADM 36/10740.
33ADM 37/446. The names of these men were Isaac 
Smith and Thomas Jones.
3^Of the 887 fugitives, seventy-four deserted 
directly from their ships.
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boats or hiding themselves aboard privately owned service
tenders which had come alongside their vessels. Swimmers,
3 5of course, ran the risk of drowning. Those disposed
to fleeing in a launch were likely to find it without
3 fimasts, sails or oars and thus bereft of power. And
members of the fleet hiding themselves in visiting harbor
craft remained in jeopardy of being discovered until the
ship departed.37
Needless to say, the members of the quarter-deck did
not stand by idly as sailors absconded. In addition to
placing sentinels over their men, commanders resorted to a
variety of other devices. Some captains, like William
Fahie of the Perdrix, simply anchored their ships farther
3 8from shore after desertions. Others, such as George
Losack of the Prince George, went so far as to order guard
3 9boats to circle their vessels in harbor. A few even
35For example, on 10 April 1796 the master of the 
Hebe recorded in his log: "at midnight William Reynolds,
Quarter Gunner, was drowned in attempting to swim from the 
ship (ADM 52/3092)."
36These items normally were removed from the boats 
when they were not in use.
S^See, for instance, Richardson, A Mariner of 
England, pp. 98-99.
38ADM 51/1264.
39ADM 51/1693.
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assigned chaperons to tars who had been granted leave. 
For example/ when John Reynolds/ a mariner belonging to 
the Swaggerer was given liberty to visit the Tiore in 
February 1810/ he was escorted by an officer from the brig
whose duty was "to prevent . . . [him] from running
„40 away."
Occasionally, efforts to keep men front fleeing could
result in tragedy. One such incident occurred aboard the
Arachne at Trinidad on the night of 18 January 1812.
Between seven and eight o'clock, seaman Thomas Miller was
discovered swimming away from the sloop. Under strict
instructions to fire upon anyone found in the water
attempting to desert, the master of the Arachne. Peter
Inskip, hailed Miller and discharged a blank cartridge in
his direction. As Miller made his way back to the vessel,
Inskip reloaded the musguet with live ammunition. At this
point, Lieutenant John Middleton, who from his position on
the quarter-deck could not see that the fugitive was
returning, ordered Inskip to "shoot him, shoot him dead."
Obeying the command immediately, Inskip wounded Miller in
the shoulder. Bleeding profusely, the stricken mariner
41was brought on board and died forty minutes later.
40ADM 1/5413. Reynolds was tried for desertion on
20 February 1811 and sentenced to death.
41ADM 1/5425. Inskip was convicted of manslaughter
by a tribunal assembled on 13 April 1812.
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As well as attempting to prevent desertions, His
Majesty's captains pursued members of the fleet who had
managed to escape successfully. Thus, upon discovering
that Antonio Pye, Duncan Ranker, John Dumot and William
Brooks had absconded from the Glorie1 s launch on 3 April
1809, James Carthew dispatched "an officer and a party of
42marines" ashore to apprehend them. Moreover,
authorities belonging to one ship occasionally acted in
tandem with those of another in conducting these
manhunts. For example, on 3 March 1810, S.E. Watts
recorded in the log of the Forester; "sent the lieut. & 2
mids. received from H.M.S. Dannemark with our cutter to
Point Peter ‘ to look for deserters from the above
vessel."43 In a similar vein, some commanders
instituted searches for fugitives from other men-of-war
without requests for assistance. Even though the
Excellent had lost but a single mariner through desertion
in two months, John Nash ordered her boats' crews to
undertake such a quest in Carlisle Bay on 23 January
441803.
42ADM 52/1996.
43ADM 51/2371.
44ADM 51/1404; ADM 36/15238.
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The work of arresting fugitives performed by naval
officers was augmented by the efforts of people in the
localities. Because the service paid a cash reward for
every member of the fleet who was captured and returned to
his . vessel/ runaways were viewed in some quarters as
prized commodities. For instance/ the day after Robert
Waldron, Henry George and Thomas Connolly absconded from
the Inspector at Prince Rupert Bay, Dominica on 7 January
1795/ they were taken up by the local militia and brought
back to the ship, at which time Captain John Cook paid the
45soldiers "forty shillings sterling for each man."
Correspondingly, when Andrew Pringle, Malacy Calligan and
John Hendrick swam from the Forester on 1 April 1812 at
St. Vincent, they were "apprehended by the negroes of
46Prerbrook Estate."
If some people assisted members of the quarter-deck in 
tracking down fugitives, others did everything in their 
power to thwart such efforts. The masters of merchant 
vessels were notorious for aiding and abetting runaways. 
For example, when Lieutenant Henry Pine of H.M.S. Statira 
boarded the Tiger west indiaman in June 1810 at Carlisle 
Bay, he discovered almost a dozen royal mariners concealed
45ADM 51/1145.
46ADM 51/2371.
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t
in various parts of the freighter's hold/ some of whom had 
been in hiding for so long that they "looked as if they
A r7
were ready to faint." Privateers also offered
assistance to those who had fled from the king's ships. 
For instance/ the crew of the Promote was able to recover 
a deserter named Eagle in 1798 only after a heated
t I
encounter with a group of these quasi-servants of the
48crown on the Island of New Providence. At the same
time# the inhabitants of coastal towns often were willing
to grant sanctuary to men-of-war's men at large. In his
memoirs/ John Nicol recalled meeting a tar who had taken
flight from a British warship at Barbados/ married an
enterprising black publican and inherited her fortune
49before returning to England. Finally/ friends or
relatives occasionally became party to schemes designed to 
prevent the recovery of escapees from the navy. Thus, 
following his arrest for desertion from the Northumberland 
in 1806/ Henry Edwards spent eighteen months in a jail on 
Barbados "for a fictitious debt" brought against him by 
his wife "for the purpose of getting [him] clear of
47HCA 1/61. Trial of William Porter, 28 November
1811.
48Richardson, p. 153.
48John Nicol, The Life and Adventures of John Nicol. 
Mariner. (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1937), p. 8 6 .
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His Majesty's service."
Given such circumstances, what then was the 
probability that a mariner could take flight 
successfully? Statistically the chances were very good.
Less than eight percent of the tars who fled from the
51men-rof-war in the survey were ever apprehended. 
Moreover, those who were caught were arrested either in 
the act of or soon after departing their ships. Slightly 
under thirteen percent of the seamen in the sample 
punished for desertion had an "R" placed next to their 
names in the muster books, which was the symbol used
therein to designate those whose unexcused absence had led
52them to miss at least three successive roll calls. 
Hence, the overwhelming majority of British sailors who 
chose to abscond not only were able to slip away from 
their vessels but, having done so, faced little danger of 
being retaken.
Indeed some mariners who absconded were so sure of the 
navy's inability to recapture them that they actually
50ADM 1/327. Edwards was brought to trial on 3 
March 1808. He was convicted and sentenced to eighteen 
months in the Marshalsea.
51of the 4,209 mariners who either deserted or 
attempted to desert, 319 were caught.
520f the 302 men punished, thirty-nine had an "R" 
next to their names prior to their punishment.
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deserted one ship only to re-enlist in another to exploit
the system of cash bonuses employed by the king's
government to attract volunteers. One such seaman was
John Jacobs. In September 1796, Jacobs had entered H.M.S.
Eurus and collected a gratuity of £ 2.10.0. The following
December, while on shore at Portsmouth Yard on duty, he
slipped away from the frigate's work party and vanished.
Soon after his disappearance, he enlisted on board the
Roval William under the name John Francis, this time
receiving a bounty of £ 5.19.0. In all likelihood his
fraudulant scheme would have gone undetected had it not
been for one ironic twist of fate. Shortly before the
Eurus was to sail for the Lesser Antilles, her master was
sent aboard the Roval William to take custody of a draft
of a half dozen men to complete her complement. By an
incredible stroke of bad luck, Jacobs was one of the six.
Recognized immediately, he was returned to his former
53vessel and confined to await trial in the Leewards.
53ADM 1/5338. Jacobs was court martialled on 27 
March 1797. Found guilty, he was sentenced to three 
hundred lashes and "to be mulcted of five pounds nineteen 
shillings of his pay, to reimburse the Parish of Portsea, 
of which parish he fraudulently received that sum as part 
of a gratuity for entering into His Majesty's service 
although belonging at the time to His Majesty’s ship 
Eurus."
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In what amounted to a tacit admission of the navy's
inability to curb losses from desertion, the monarchy
endeavored to coax fugitives back into the service by
offering them clemency. During the period under
discussion, the crown issued a series of widely circulated
proclamations which granted a full and free pardon and
complete restitution of forfeited earnings to each runaway
surrendering himself to naval authorities by a specified 
54date. And these decrees were not completely without 
effect. "I went to the West Indies and entered our H.M. 
Ship Sappho, in the year 1812 to serve my country," wrote 
one escapee from a man-of-war, "having heard there was a 
proclamation given that all who had deserted in the
service returned again [sic], should be forgiven and
*>»
receive his wages and prize money which was due to 
him."55
Paradoxically, an even stronger indication of the 
impotency of His Majesty's captains in dealing with the 
problem of desertion is provided by the treatment accorded 
the few fugitives who were apprehended. As a rule, these
54See The Naval Chronicle. 6(1801): p. 162; The
Naval Chronicle. 22 (1809): p. 340; ADM 2/1082, 17 May
1808 and 29 November 1809.
55Thomas Blackey quoted in Baynham, From the Lower 
Deck, p. 102.
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culprits were made to serve as horrible examples for the
remainder of the fleet. A far greater number of mariners
were brought before courts martial —  the navy's most
terrifying legal engine —  for running from the king's
ships than for any other single offense. Between 1784 and
1812 almost one third of the men indicted on the Leeward
Islands station were so charged.56 Furthermore, ninety
percent of the tars who faced naval tribunals were found
57guilty and given relatively stiff sentences. Of the 
ninety-eight sailors convicted, five were adjudged to 
suffer the death penalty, ninety-two received a number of 
lashes through the fleet ranging from fifty to five 
hundred, and one was imprisoned in the Marshalsea for 
eighteen months.
Although treating captured deserters severely, courts 
martial did not act wantonly in such cases. In reaching 
their verdicts, tribunals employed one simple yardstick to 
determine a defendant's guilt or innocence. If the 
accused was deemed to have left his ship for the specific 
purpose of absconding, he was convicted. However, if he 
was taken up under circumstances which suggested that his 
departure was not motivated by a desire to flee his
56()ne hundred and twelve of the 362 individuals 
tried on the station stood accused of desertion.
57Ninety-eight of the 109 men for whom verdicts and 
sentences survive were convicted. Three cases are missing.
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vessel/ he was acquitted. Hence, seamen James Gouding and 
William Maven of H.M.S. Dragon were each sentenced to 
three hundred lashes by a court assembled at English 
Harbour on 15 June 1812 for "absenting... [themselves] with
c p
intent to desert." Conversely, Abraham Madison, who 
was tried for swimming from the Matilda by a judicial body 
convened on 21 December 1792 at Fort Royal Bay, was 
exonerated because it appeared to his judges that there 
was "much probability of his having fallen overboard by 
accident."59
A similar pattern of prosecution was followed in the 
summary adjudication of the crime of desertion. Like 
courts martial, captains distinguished between tars who 
intended to flee permanently and mariners whose 
debarkations were due to less sinister motives. While 315 
men were punished for absconding or attempting to abscond 
from the vessels in the survey, another 174 were chastised 
for staying on shore beyond leave, swimming alongside the 
ship, and so forth. At the same time, those found guilty 
exclusively of running generally received much harsher 
sentences than those convicted solely of unauthorized 
absences. Whereas eight-four percent of the culprits in 
the former category endured more than a dozen lashes,
58ADM 1/15427
59ADM 1/5342
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eighty-eight percent of the miscreants in the latter group 
were given twelve strokes or less.®**
• • •
111
As grievous an offense as desertion was, it paled in
t l
comparison to challenges to authority. Such challenges 
struck at the very heart of service discipline 
obedience. Indeed the principle of submission was held to 
be so inviolate that it was raised to the level of a 
religious tenet. Drawing the analogy between compliance 
with orders and the Fifth Commandment, Josiah Woodward 
preached:
...Honour is not to be restrained to your natural 
parents alone; for all interpreters are agreed, 
that we are.. .obliged not only to honour them, 
but also the King, and all that are put in 
authority under him, by 'submitting ourselves,' 
to all our governors, spiritual pastors and 
masters; and by ordering ourselves lowly and 
reverently to all our betters;' and as the 
Providence of God has placed most of you in the 
situation of common sailors, I beseech you to 
consider, and seriously attend to the advice
60Two hundred and twenty-four of the 266 floggings 
for desertion were of more than twelve strokes. The 
number of lashes ranged from one to ninety-six. One 
huridred and fifteen of the 131 scourgings for absence 
without leave were of a dozen blows or less. The number 
of stripes ranged from two to twenty-four.
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given by St. Peter I Peter ii 18/ 19/ 20.
•Servants be subjected to your masters with all 
fear, not only to the good and gentile/ but also 
to the froward...61
The most serious challenge to authority was mutiny.
Between 1784 and 1812 there were three major shipboard
rebellions in the Lesser Antilles. The first took place
among the company of the Castor on 13 December 1801.
During the evening, the hands were called to the gangway
to witness the punishment of several of their shipmates
for neglect of duty. Immediately upon being beaten to
quarters, about forty or fifty members of the crew began
to cheer in the bay of the frigate, demanding to speak
with the lieutenant assigned to supervise the correction.
Hearing the commotion below. Captain Robert Fanshaw
ordered the marines to charge the rioters. The ensuing
tumolt lasted but a short time. When it was over, four
men had been incarcerated to await trial for their 
62lives.
63-Josiah Woodward, The Seaman's Monitor: or Advice
to Seafaring Men, with Reference to Their Behavior before, 
in. and after their Vovaae. With Pravers for their use. 
Also an Address to the Officers and Seamen in His 
Majesty's Roval Navv. With a caution to profane swearers, 
and a seasonable Admonition against Mutiny and Piracy. 
14th ed. (London: F and C Rivington, 1799), p. 67.
62a d m  1/.5359. Trial of Daniel Colville, William 
Linfield, John Long and Bartholomew Reardon on 24 December
1801.
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The second mutiny occurred little more than a year
after the stillborn rebellion aboard the Castor. Flushed
by the news of the Peace of Amiens and thoughts of home,
the crew of the Excellent assembled themselves in a group
towards the rear of the vessel on Christmas Day, 1802.
When their officers instructed them "to go to their
duty[,] they dispersed[,] but with evident marks of 
63discontent." The next morning, Able Seaman Matthew
Loyal approached Commodore Stopford on the quarter-deck,
informing him of the men's desire to return to England to
"see if it was a war or not." Stopford told Loyal that
the "troublesome" state of international affairs precluded
the possibility of the ship departing the Leewards for at
least several months. Word of the Commodore's reply
spread quickly among the company with tragic results. At
2:30 that afternoon, the seamen gave three cheers on the
64lower deck and began to chant "home, home." The 
marines were armed immediately and ordered into the breach 
below. Following a brief struggle, the insurrection 
collapsed. The principal mutineers were arrested and sent 
on board H.M.S. Blenheim to be tried by a court
63ADM 51/1404
64ADM 1/5362. Trial of John Lovell Crabb, Matthew 
Loyal, et al. on 27 to 29 December 1802.
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martial.®®
The third and only successful mutiny in the Lesser
Antilles happened aboard the Dominica on the night of 21
May 1806 at Rosseau, Dominica. During the captain's
absence on shore, one of the crew appeared on the
quarter-deck and struck Midshipman Richard Osborn, the
acting commandfer, with- a cutlass. When Osborn asked the
sailor what was meant by the blow, he was told that the
hands were "all resolved for death or liberty." At this
point, the midshipman and those remaining loyal to him
were taken below and confined. The mutineers then weighed
anchor and sailed the sloop from the harbor. The next
morning the vessel arrived at Basse Terre, Guadaloupe,
where the rebels surrendered themselves, the ship and
their prisoners to the French authorities on the
island.®® Wasting little time, the French manned their
new-found prize and sent it out to prey upon the English
merchantmen in the area. However, on its maiden voyage
under the tri-color the Dominica, with two of the traitors
67on board, was captured by a British packet.
65a DM 50/33.
G^ADM 1/5324. Trial of William Proctor and William 
Manson on 30 June 1806.
67The Barbados Mercury and Bridae-town Gazette. 10 
June 1806.
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All of the men apprehended for allegedly having 
participated in these rebellions were tried by courts 
martial. In adjudicating their cases, naval tribunals did 
not proceed indiscriminately. On the contrary, judicial 
bodies made every effort to determine whether or not the 
accused had been an active party to insurrection. Hence 
courts went to lengths to establish the motives behind the 
defendant's behavior. Typical of the line of questioning 
pursued in these litigations was the following exchange 
during the testimony of Edmund Riley at the trial of one 
of the ringleaders of the mutiny of the Excellent:
Prosecutor -
Answer - 
Prosecutor -
Answer -
Do you know the prisoner 
Stafford!!?]
Yes
Relate to the court the 
conversation he had with you on 
the 25th instant.
Between four and five bells in the 
afternoon watch as near as I can 
guess, I was near the sick bay on 
the starboard side of the main 
deck smoking my pipe. I saw 
Stafford come along the starboard 
side of the main deck ordering the 
people down below. He came to me 
and asked me if I was not going 
down below. I asked him for 
what. He said go down either on 
the starboard or the larboard side 
of the bay. The[y] are settling 
some business there...4 or 5 
minutes after they gave three 
cheers.
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Court - Did you observe any of the people
go down in consequence of his
ordering them[?]
Answer - I 'saw several of the men go down
as he passed along deck.68
Given the circumspection of naval tribunals/ fourteen
of the thirty-two mariners accused of being involved in
the mutinies aboard the Castor, the Excellent and the
Dominica. or forty-four percent/ were exonerated
completely, which was a rate of acquittal almost twice
that for all cases heard in the Leewards between 1784 and 
6 9
1812. Yet, if the courts proceeded with caution in
reaching the verdicts, they also imposed very stiff
penalties upon those whom they found guilty of taking an
active part in these insurrections. Of the eighteen petty
officers and seamen belonging to the three ships who were
convicted, eight were adjudged to be hung and ten were
given a number of lashes through the fleet ranging from
70two hundred to eight hundred.
68ADM 1/5362. Trial of John Lovell Crabb, Matthew 
Loyal et al. on 27 to 29 December 1802.
69See Chapter Two, p. 89.
70Two mutineers from the Hermione also were tried on 
the Leeward Islands station during the period under 
discussion. One of these men was sentenced to death and 
executed; the other was acquitted. ADM 1/5344. Trial of 
Thomas Leach and William Mason on 1 May 1798.
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But/ as David Hannay has observed/ "mutiny was an 
71elastic word." A mariner need not have engaged in a 
full-blown insurrection to have been charged with this 
crime. As was the case in the adjudication of so many 
other infractions, the method of prosecuting individual 
acts of rebellion was left to the discretion of His 
Majesty's commanders. However, the majority of these 
incidents were dealt with summarily. Whereas 214 men were 
brought to the gangway for mutinous behavior on the ships 
in the survey alone, only twenty-six tars were tried by 
naval tribunals for the same offense in the Leeward 
Islands between 1784 and 1812.
Of the twenty-six mariners indicted for individual 
acts of mutiny, seventeen were seamen or petty officers, 
five were warrant officers, and three were commissioned 
officers. Twenty-two of these men, or approximately 
eight-five percent, were found guilty. Three were given 
death sentences, thirteen were adjudged to receive a 
number of lashes through the fleet ranging from fifty to 
six hundred, one was broken of his rank and condemned to 
fifty blows with a cat of nine tails, three were dismissed 
from the service and one was reprimanded severely and "put 
at the bottom of the Navy list." Yet the high rate of
71Hannay, Naval Courts Martial, p. 23.
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convictions and the relatively harsh punishments imposed 
should not be taken to indicate that tribunals adjudicated 
such cases arbitrarily. The four acquittals alone suggest 
otherwise.
Two cases provide ample illustration of the pattern of 
curial prosecutions for singular acts of rebellion. The 
first was heard by a court assembled aboard the Ramilies 
in Carlisle Bay on 30 May 1808. On that day, a Turkish 
sailor named William Riley was tried "for having conducted 
himself on the 2nd November 1807 in a most outrageous and 
mutinous manner to several of the officers on duty on the 
quarter-deck" of the Camilla. About three o'clock in the 
afternoon, Riley was found screaming and throwing objects 
about the forecastle. Upon being arrested and placed in 
irons, the seaman began to abuse the First Lieutenant, 
calling him a "bloody murdering bugger" and "threatening 
what he would do to him." Although repeatedly ordered to 
be silent, the prisoner continued in a rage until he was 
gagged. During his trial, he offered nothing further in 
his own defense than to claim that he was so intoxicated 
at the time of the incident that he could not remember it 
and that he had been beaten and ill used. For his crime, 
Riley was sentenced to three hundred lashes through the 
fleet.72
72ADM 1/5387
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The second trial took place on 23 December 1801 aboard 
the Tamer in Fort Royal Bay. The defendant, seaman John 
Driscole of H. M. Brig Gauchanin. was charged with "riot 
and mutiny." A few nights earlier, Driscole allegedly had 
behaved in a mutinous manner to Boatswain Brown, when 
Brown had refused to give him a light to search for his 
possessions. However, during the presentation of the 
evidence, it became clear that both of the prosecution's 
chief witnesses had been intoxicated at the time that the 
incident had occurred. Moreover, several attestants 
called on the prisoner's behalf established that after 
Driscole had been denied the candle he had done little 
more than reiterate his plea for illumination —  even
though he had been beaten and kicked by the Boatswain.
73Given such testimony, the court fully acquitted him.
Unfortunately, the acts of mutiny dealt with summarily 
by His Majesty's commanders do not lend themselves to 
analysis as readily as those adjudicated by naval 
tribunals. Once again, discussion is hamstrung by the 
silence of the sources. Virtually every instance of 
rebellion corrected at the gangways of the vessels in the 
sample was recorded in the journals simply as mutiny,
73ADM 1/5359
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mutinous behavior/ mutinous expressions or sedition.
Representative of this practice is the following entry in
the captain's log of the Jupiter, dated 16 August 1787:
"Punished Thomas Crookdeck with twelve lashes for
74mutiny." Hence, it is impossible to determine what
actually constituted these deeds or how disruptive and
threatening they really were.
Nevertheless, several observations still can be made
about the summary adjudication of mutiny. In the first
place, every one of the mariners who suffered correction
for this crime on the ships in the survey was either a
petty officer, a seaman or a marine private. Secondly,
each of these tars was brought to the gangway and whipped
with a cat of nine tails. Thirdly, the punishments that 
%
they received tended to be somewhat more severe than those
given to the perpetrators of most other offenses. Whereas
sixty percent of all scourgings on the vessels in the
sample were of a dozen blows or less, forty-eight percent
of the floggings administered exclusively for mutinous
75conduct were of more than twelve strokes
74ADM 51/481
750f the 125 floggings for mutiny, sixty were of 
more than a dozen blows. The number of lashes inflicted 
ranged from five to seventy-two.
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While rebelliousness was the most serious challenge to
authority# it was far from being the only affront to the
sovereignty of the ruling elite. Another was an offense
variously described as contempt# insolence or disrespect.
Cases of abusiveness to superiors were dealt with both
summarily and by courts martial. However# in selecting
the method of prosecution# naval officers exhibited a
marked class consciousness. As a rule# judicial bodies
were reserved for warrant and commissioned officers. The
few members of the lower deck who were brought before
tribunals were all deemed to have committed particularly
grievous acts of defiance. The overwhelming majority of
seamen and marines were corrected unilaterally by their
captains. Whereas approximately eighty percent of the
defendants tried for insubordination in the Lesser
Antilles between 1784 and 1812 walked the quarter-deck#
ninety-nine percent of those punished for the same crime
7 6on board the ships in the survey were enlisted men.
Analysis of the treatment that most naval tribunals 
accorded instances of contemptuous behavior to superiors 
is complicated by the fact that over three-quarters of the
"^Of the twenty-eight men brought before courts 
martial# twenty-two were warrant or commissioned
officers. Of the 966 members of the fleet dealt with
summarily aboard the ships in the sample# 957 were seamen# 
marines or petty officers.
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members of the fleet indicted for this offense in the
Leewards during the period under discussion were charged
simultaneously with additional crimes such as drunkenness,
77disobedience or mutiny. Still, some idea of the way 
in which courts martial dealt with insubordination is 
provided by the cases of the six mariners accused 
exclusively of the infraction. Although all of these men 
were found guilty, the sentences imposed upon them clearly 
indicate that judicial bodies distinguished between 
degrees of culpability. Of the five officers convicted, 
one was cashiered, two were dismissed from their ships, 
one was broken of his rank and one was admonished to be 
more circumspect in the future. The lone seaman was given 
three hundred lashes through the fleet.
Two cases well illustrate the general line of 
reasoning employed in curial proceedings against those 
charged with defiance. The first was heard by a tribunal 
assembled aboard H.M.S. Statira in Freeman's Bay, Antigua 
on 23 June 1812. The defendant, seaman Edward Newland of 
the Statira. was on trial "for having behaved himself in a 
most contemptuous and insolent manner” to several officers 
of the ship. More than a year earlier, Newland had been 
beaten with a rope's end for want of alacrity in furling
770f the twenty-eight men indicted, all but six were 
accused simultaneously of additional offenses.
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1
the main top gallant sail. As the punishment was 
inflicted, he was "very irritable," telling the lieutenant 
who had ordered it "that he wished to be reported to 
Captain Stacpoole, that he would not be started and 
flogged both, and that he would see further into this
matter." Upon being called to the quarter-deck to account
for his actions, he conducted himself flippantly, refusing 
to remove his hat in the captain's presence and answering 
the questions put to him curtly. Two days later, while 
awaiting correction for his impudence, he again showed 
great disrespect to his commander. When Stacpoole 
threatened to bring him before a court martial, Newland, 
"with a shake of the head,” dared him to do so. During his 
defense, he offered nothing more than a rather lame 
assertion that he had not meant to act so disdainfully. 
Rejecting his claim, the court convicted him and sentenced 
him to pass through the fleet.78
The second case was tried by a court martial convened 
at Choc Bay, St. Lucia on board H.M.S. Vengeance on 23 May 
1796. The defendant, Captain John Williamson of the 
Grampus. stood accused of "having replied in very 
disrespectful and contemptuous terms to an order" from
Rear Admiral Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian. Two days
78ADM 1/5427.
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earlier, Williamson had received a directive from
Christian instructing him to be "cautiously attentive' in
keeping several men on the Grampus until further notice.
When the Captain questioned the Admiral's use of the words
"cautiously attentive," Sir Hugh took umbrage and filed
charges against him. However, during the course of the
trial, Williamson was able to prove that he had spoken
frequently of the Admiral "with the greatest respect and
esteem." Under the circumstances, the tribunal found it
expedient to do nothing more than reprimand the 
79commander.
Sadly, the incidents of disdainful behavior 
adjudicated summarily cannot be examined in much detail. 
Here again, discussion is hampered by the brevity of the 
ships' books. As was the practice in recording so many 
other crimes, insubordination was noted in the journals 
simply as contempt, insolence or disrespect. Typical of 
this style is the following entry in the captain's log of 
the Galatea. dated 12 April 1804: "Punished James
7^ADM 1/5336. It should be noted that a number of 
petty disputes of this nature between officers were 
resolved in a much more informal manner. For example, 
when Captain Horatio Nelson took offense at several 
"disrespectful" letters that he had received from Surgeon 
William Lewis of the Rattler sloop in 1786, he complained 
about them to the Admiralty. Their Lordships settled the 
matter simply by forcing Lewis to apologize to the young 
commander of the Boreas. (ADM 1/2223. Cover letter dated 
4 February 1787).
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80Cochrane with 12 lashes for insolence." In all but a
handful of instances, no further information was
provided. For this reason, it is impossible to determine
such things as the events comprising the offenses or how
serious these episodes really were.
Despite the terseness of the logs, several
observations still can be made about the crimes punished
summarily. Many of these incidents appear to have been
fueled by alcohol. Almost seventeen percent of the
mariners punished for insubordination on board the ships
in the sample were charged concurrently with 
81drunkenness. Moreover, a considerable number of the
offenses may have been protests against what the culprits
perceived to be unfair treatment. Approximately twenty-one
percent of those deemed guilty of contemptuous behavior
were corrected at the same time for disobedience or 
82neglect. Finally, much of the abusiveness seems to 
have been directed at immediate superiors. In eleven of 
the sixteen cases in which the rank of both the 
perpetrator and the officer were recorded, the object of 
disdain was almost directly above the delinquent in the
80ADM 1/1540.
810f the 648 men corrected for insubordination, 110
were charged at the same time with drunkenness.
82one hundred and thirty-six of the 648 men deemed
insubordinate were found guilty of disobedience or neglect
at the same time.
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83chain of command.
Though the logs reveal very little about the crimes,
they do provide a clear picture of the way in which
insubordination was punished. Over ninety-nine percent of
the mariners corrected exclusively for this offense on
board the ships in the sample were flogged with a cat of 
84nine tails. At the same time, captains, like courts 
martial, distingished between degrees of culpability, the 
number of lashes administered on the vessels in the survey 
ranging from three to sixty. However, most instances of 
contempt were not chastised with pronounced severity. 
Whereas sixty percent of all floggings inflicted aboard 
the men-of-war examined for the present study were of 
twelve lashes or less, sixty-seven percent of those given 
solely for contemptuous behavior were of like 
proportions.85
A much more passive challenge to authority than
83por example, Marine Private Henry Grange was given 
twenty-four lashes aboard H.M.S. Invincible on 9 December 
1797 "for insolence to his corporal (ADM 52/3182)." 
Similarly Armourer James Black received two dozen strokes 
on board the Trusty on 13 July 1790 "for insolence to the 
Gunner (51/985)."
840f the 512 men punished, 507 were scourged. Four 
of the five men who did not endure the lash were members 
of the quarter-deck. Three lieutenants were arrested and 
one boatswain was suspended. The lone seaman had his grog 
stopped.
85Three hundred and forty of the 507 mariners 
flogged for insubordination received a dozen blows or less.
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insubordination was disobedience o£ orders. Like
insolence, contempt and disrespect, disobedience was
prosecuted with a definite class bias. Whereas officers
tended to be brought before naval tribunals, enlisted men
normally were dealt with unilaterally by their
commanders. Approximately eighty-seven percent of the
defendants indicted for recalcitrance at courts martial in
the Lesser Antilles were warrant and commissioned
86officers. Conversely ninety-eight percent of those
punished summarily aboard the ships in the survey were
87members of the lower deck.
All but three of the thirty-eight officers and seamen 
tried for disobedience in the Leewards between 1784 and 
1812 were charged simultaneously with additional
offenses. Though this fact clouds the treatment which 
judicial bodies at sea accorded cases of recalcitrance, it 
does not obscure the method used to prosecute them. In 
rendering verdicts in such cases, tribunals applied one 
simple rule of thumb. If the defendant willfully and 
intentionally had refused to comply with a directive, he 
was convicted. However, if circumstances prevented him
86of the thirty-eight men tried for this offense, 
thirty-three were members of the quarter-deck.
87Seven hundred and forty-four of the 757 men dealt 
with unilaterally by the commanders of the vessels in the 
survey were seamen, marines or petty officers. There were 
156 missing cases.
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from obeying the commands of his superior, he was
acquitted. Thus while Purser Charles Crandon of H.M.
Sloop Drake was court martialled on 13 and 14 June 1803
for, among other crimes, violating the Fortieth Standing
Order of the squadron by sleeping out of his ship on two
occasions, he was found guilty of only one infraction
because "in the first instance . . .  it appeared that Mr.
Crandon had permission to remain on shore till 8 o'clock
of [sic] the evening of the 22nd December in Falmouth Bay,
and having repeatedly been in quest of a boat, and none
having been sent from the Drake that evening it was not
88practicable for him to get on board."
In applying this standard, naval tribunals convicted
almost ninety percent of those indicted for recalcitrance
89on the Leeward Islands station during the period. Yet 
such a high rate does not imply that courts adjudicated 
these cases in an unbending manner. As the sentences 
imposed upon the mariners condemned exclusively for 
disobedience suggest, judicial bodies made every effort to 
distinguish shades of blameworthiness. Of the five 
officers found guilty solely of the offense, three were 
dismissed from their ships, one was disrated and one was 
not punished at all. The single seaman among this group
88ADM 1/5363.
890nly four of the thirty-eight men indicted on this 
charge were found innocent.
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received just twelve lashes.
Because the incidents o£ disobedience treated
summarily were recorded in the logs only in the most
general terms, it is virtually impossible to establish
what acts specifically constituted the offenses. Yet even
without reference to the details of the crimes, something
still can be said of the pattern of their prosecution
aboard the king's floating dominions. Approximately
forty-three percent of the mariners punished for
*
noncompliance on the ships in the survey were charged
simultaneously with one or more additional infractions
90ranging from drunkenness to neglect. At the same
time, all but four of the 913 culprits dealt with
unilaterally by the captains of these vessels were
91chastened corporally. However, the penalties imposed
were not excessive by naval standards. Whereas sixty
percent of the floggings administered on the men-of-war in
the sample were of twelve lashes or less, seventy-seven
percent of those inflicted exclusively for recalcitrance
92were of like proportions.
90Of the 913 mariners punished for disobedience, 395 
were found guilty of more than one offense.
9!a  gunner was confined. A purser was arrested. A 
boatswain was reprimanded. And a lieutenant was suspended 
from duty.
92Three hundred and ninety-eight of the 518 mariners 
flogged exclusively for disobedience received twelve 
lashes or less. The number of lashes inflicted ranged 
from three to forty-eight.
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A crime not far removed from disobedience of orders
was neglect of duty. Inattentiveness was prosecuted both
summarily and by courts martial. However, the method of
adjudication was largely a function of rank. While all of
the members of the fleet brought before naval tribunals
for negligence in the Lesser Antilles during the period
under discussion were warrant or commissioned officers,
over ninety-nine percent of those punished for the same
offense unilaterally by the commanders of the vessels in
93the survey were seamen, marines or petty officers.
Of the twenty-four members of the quarter-deck 
indicted at courts martial for neglect of duty, nineteen 
were found guilty of the charge and five were acquitted 
fully. In rendering verdicts in these cases, tribunals 
employed much the same standard that was used in the 
arbitration of allegations of disobedience of orders. If 
the defendant was deemed to have performed his functions 
with inattention or carelessness, he was convicted. If, 
however, the situation was such that it prevented him from 
successfully carrying out his task, he was exonerated 
completely.
This line of reasoning was clearly in evidence in the
930f the 1,997 corrected for neglect on the ships in 
the sample, 1,987 were members of the lower deck.
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proceedings against the lone officer on the Leeward
Islands station who was indicted exclusively for
negligence. The trial took place board H.M.S. York on 1
March 1808. The defendant, Lieutenant William Stevenson
of the Defence, was brought before the court "for having
about 2 of [sic] o'clock in the morning of the 23rd
instant [i.e. February], by neglect of duty and great
misconduct, in endeavouring to pass windward of the
Ramillies when it was his duty to have borne away under
her lee to get into her wake, and for neglecting to
consult or inform his captain of the damages that was
[sic] likely to happen by the relative position of the
ship, by which neglect of duty and misconduct the two
ships were run foul of each other and the Defence thereby
considerably damaged." Because Stevenson was able to
demonstrate to the tribunal's satisfaction that he had
obeyed all the signals to tack and had done everything
possible' to remain astern of the Ramilles. he was
acquitted of the principal charge. But, since he had
failed to keep his commander completely abreast of the
evolutions of the two vessels prior to the accident, he
was found guilty "in part" of the later accusation and
"reprimanded . . . to be more cautious and attentive in
9 4future."
Needless to say, the incidents of negligence dealt
94ADM 1/5386.
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with summarily were hardly as catastrophic as that leading
to Stevenson's court martial. From the £ew instances
recorded in the logs in any detail, it appears that these
crimes were of a more mundane nature. Some were simply
the result of inattentiveness. Marine Private John
Felcher, for example, was given a dozen lashes aboard the
Stork on 10 April 1809 "for not having his musquet 
95clean." Others were the product of carelessness.
Seaman John Conolly of the Rattler sloop, received twelve
strokes on 23 October 1785 "for negligently losing his
s h i r t . S t i l l  others were the upshot of attempts to
avoid work. Thus, Landsman John Jones suffered twenty-four
blows at the gangway of the Forester on 4 May 1812 "for
sculking below when all hands was [sic] ordered on 
97deck." Finally, a number were the consequence of
failure to abide by the naval routine. A case in point
was William Nugent, a Boy Third Class, who endured twelve
stripes on the Galatea on 1 August 1807 "for missing . . .
9 8muster and drunkenness."
In dealing summarily with these infractions, His 
Majesty's captains almost invariably resorted to the cat
^5ADM 52/4338; ADM 51/1980. 
96ADM 51/770.
97ADM 51/2371.
98ADM 52/3762, sections 8 and 9.
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of nine tails. Of the more than nineteen hundred mariners
corrected for neglect of duty aboard the ships examined
for the present study, all but three were flogged at the 
99gangway. Although the number of lashes inflicted upon 
the culprits deemed guilty solely of this offense ranged 
from two to seventy-two, commanders exercised relative 
moderation in the punishment of negligence on the whole. 
Whereas sixty percent of all scourgings administered on 
the vessels in the sample were of a dozen lashes or less, 
seventy-three percent of those meted out exclusively for 
laxness were of the same proportions.100
The worst possible consequence of dereliction of duty 
was the loss of a ship. Not only did such a catastrophie 
imperil the lives of many men, but it meant an added 
financial burden on the Navy Board and the Treasury. 
Between 1784 and 1812, thirty-four British naval vessels 
were taken or destroyed in the Leeward Islands —  or over 
eight percent of the entire number of those officially 
listed as having been sent to the station in this
" T w o  tars had their grog stopped and a lieutenant 
was reprimanded.
lOOjjine ^un^re<^  an^ sixty-one of the 1,309 floggings 
were of no more than twelve strokes.
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period.101 A little more than half of these were
102wrecked as a result of maritime accidents. With one'
103exception, the remainder were captured by the enemy.
Each of the cases arising from both types of calamity 
was adjudicated by a court martial. While the normal 
practice was to indict all of the surviving officers and 
crew of the stricken vessel, these proceedings were 
primarily inquiries into the actions of the governors of 
the ship in question at the time of the disaster.104 
Thus, of the twelve men convicted at such prosecutions on 
the Leeward Islands station during the period under 
discussion, one was a captain, six were post commanders, 
one was a lieutenant and four were masters. Two of those 
found guilty were cashiered, two were broken of their 
rank, four were reprimanded, two were admonished to be 
more careful in the future, one was placed at the bottom 
of the lieutenant's list and barred from obtaining command 
of a man-of-war for five years and one was imprisoned in 
the Marshalsea for a calendar year and rendered incapable
lOlThere were 417 ships in the Lesser Antilles 
between 1784 and 1812.
102Eighteen of the thirty-four ships foundered or 
sank.
103rifteen of the thirty-four ships were taken by 
the enemy and one, the Dominica, was seized by mutineers.
104in f0ur 0f the thirty-four indictments, only the 
commander of the lost vessel was charged.
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o£ walking the quarter-deck for the space of half a decade.
In reaching decisions in the trials resulting from 
shipwrecks, naval tribunals applied one simple standard. 
If the defendants had taken proper precautions to avoid 
the accident and had done everything in their power to 
prevent the vessel from foundering once the disaster had 
occurred, then they were acquitted. Hence, the court 
assembled at Fort Royal Bay on 27 February 1796 to try
Lieutenant Christopher Pawle for the loss of the St.
♦
Pierre exonerated him completely because he had made
repeated efforts to haul the sloop away from some rocks
off Pidgeon Island before it was driven aground on them by 
105the current. Conversely, if the calamity had
resulted from the negligence of the defendants or they had 
not done their utmost to save their ship as soon as it had 
become imperiled, they were convicted. Thus, Lieutenant 
Henry Witby was reprimanded and Luke Winter was "broke of 
his situation as Master" by a judicial body convened at 
Martinique on 7 November 1801 for running the Proselyte on 
a shoal off St. Martins despite warnings from Admiral 
Duckworth of the existence and location of the
v n  106shallows.
105ADm  1/5335. 
106ADM 1/5359.
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As the following two cases suggest/ much the same
criteria were employed to assess the guilt or innocence of
members of the quarter-deck whose ships had been taken
from them by hostile forces. The first was heard on 12
June 1809 at English Harbour. On this occasion/ a
tribunal was assembled "to enquire into the conduct of Mr.
Joseph Dyason[/] Master[,] [and] the other surviving
officers and crew on board the Maria at the time she
struck to the enemy." The previous September/ the Maria
had given chase to a strange sail off Point Antigua,
Guadaloupe. Drawing near to their quarry, the brig’s
company discovered the vessel to be a French National
frigate of twenty-eight guns. Although at a marked
disadvantage in fire-power, Lieutenant James Bennett, the
Maria * s commander, ordered his tars mustered at quarters
and the decks cleared for action. Midshipman John Tennant
described the ensuing struggle to the court:
At a quarter before seven [A.M.] we came up with 
her, showed our colours and fired a gun. We 
keeping close to the land to cut her off, a flaw 
from the land took us back and it instantly fell 
calm; from the position we were in the enemy had 
an opportunity of raking us, which he did twice; 
Lieutenant Bennett and all the officers and crew 
using their utmost exertion in getting sweeps out 
to get the broadside to bear; after our broadside 
bore we kept up a constant fire, our ensign being 
shot away, an officer from the French ship asked 
had we struck? Lieutenant Bennett answered no: 
Lieutenant Bennett then came to the waist[,] 
elevated the gun and repeatedly fired it himself; 
he asked Mr. Dyason the Master who was then on 
the forecastle, how do you think we get on 
Dyason? Mr. Dyason*s answer was, she is rather 
heavy sir but I am in hopes of a breeze.
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Lieutenant Bennett immediately went aft, when 
standing on the hen coops received three grape 
shot in the body; for some minutes afterwards I 
did not know the death of Lieutenant Bennett
until Mr. Joseph Dyason said to me our poor 
commander is gone; I cannot ascertain the time we 
fought her after the Lieutenant was killed but 
kept up the same discipline as when he was alive; 
finding the vessel in a sinking state the
officers in the presence of the crew consulted
and thought it most prudent to strike, finding it 
impossible to save His Majesty's Brig Maria:
during the action the seamen behaved in a most 
gallant manner; had there been a breeze even in 
the early part of the action it would have been 
impossible for us to have escaped from the 
rigging being so much damaged.
Given Tennant's glowing account of the bravery of these
men in the face of . a superior foe and the battered
condition of the Maria, the judges exonerated the entire 
107complement.
The second case came before a tribunal assembled 
aboard H.M.S.’ Galatea in English Harbour on 4 October 
1804. Acting Lieutenant Benjamin Westcott, the officers 
and crew of the Fort Diamond were on trial for allowing 
their vessel "to be captured in Roseau Bay, St. Lucia by 
two of the enemy's boats." Several months earlier, the 
Fort Diamond had been sent to Roseau Bay to collect wood 
and water for the naval outpost on Diamond Rock. On the 
sloop's third night in the inlet, Westcott was fishing at 
the taffrail while most of the company was below. At 7:30 
that evening, he noticed a launch approaching his ship.
107ADM 1/5397.
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Upon demanding that the craft identify itself# he received
no answer. Undaunted# he hailed her again. From the
darkness came a volley of French musguet fire. After
calling for the cutlasses to be dispensed# Westcott went
down into the hold. There# according to one witness# "he*
stood by the hatchway a while and then turned about and
said: 'It was no use. It was too late.'" By this time
the attackers had boarded the Fort Diamond and secured
control of the main deck. Conceding defeat# the
lieutenant advised his men to offer no resistance. During
the proceedings# Westcott attempted to defend himself by-
claiming that circumstances had thwarted his subsequent
plans to retake the vessel. However, he was unable to
produce any evidence in support of his assertion. For his
crime, he was cashiered and rendered incapable of
108obtaining another commission in the Royal Navy.
Encounters with the enemy also gave rise to several
prosecutions against commissioned officers for failure to
109pursue an aggressive course of action in battle. 
Because charges of this nature impinged so heavily on both 
the accused's reputation and the future of his
108ADM 1/5357.
109Only one case of this nature was handled
summarily on board the ships in the survey. On 17 August 
1804# John Pollett of the Galatea was given sixty lashes 
for cowardice (ADM 51/1540).
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professional career/ courts martial were extremely 
scrupulous in distinguishing degrees of culpability. From 
the few cases tried in the Lesser Antilles, it seems that 
every mitigating circumstance was taken into 
consideration. Only men who were deemed guilty of blatent 
incompetency, negligence or cowardice felt the full weight 
of the law. Hence, of the three members of the 
quarter-deck indicted for this offense in the Leewards, 
two merely were reprimanded and one was "honourably 
acquitted."
Once again, two examples provide sufficient 
representation of the line of reasoning used in the 
adjudication of the cases. The first trial took place on 
5 and 6 November 1807 aboard H.M.S. Ethalion off the 
Island of St. Thomas. The defendant, Captain William 
Combe of the Hart sloop, had requested the proceedings 
himself to clear his name of aspersions that he had failed 
to do his utmost during the capture of a French corvette 
several weeks earlier. The disparaging remarks 
circulating about Combe stemmed from the fact that he had 
not boarded the enemy vessel until the conflict was over, 
even though he had been alongside the craft in one of the 
Hart1s boats throughout the engagement. However from the 
testimony of the witnesses for both the prosecution and 
the defense alike, it was apparent that there were good
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reasons for his absence from the fracas. Combe, an
amputee with a wooden leg, had been shot in the thigh as 
the sloop's launch neared its prey; and, after receiving 
the wound, he had had the misfortune to be pinned beneath 
a dead man who had collapsed on top of him. As a result, 
he was in no position to do much more than what he
I
actually did, which was to encourage his men by cheering 
them on. In view of the evidence, the court acquitted 
Combe, noting in its decision that not only were the 
insinuations against him "unfounded" but that he had acted 
with "the utmost zeal and gallantry."111
The case of Captain Alexander Nesbitt of the Epervier 
brig, which was heard by a tribunal assembled aboard
H.M.S. Pomoee in Fort Royal Bay on 10 and 11 January 1809, 
was hardly as clear-cut as that of Combe. Captain Nesbitt 
stood before the court "for a breach of the 12th Article 
of War when in action with the enemy on the 13th day of 
December 1808." The crux of the charge lay in the fact 
that Nesbitt had not drawn the Epervier closer to a French 
vessel sweeping along the shore during a British descent 
upon some hostile batteries situated on a beach on the 
Island of Martinique. In the course of the trial it
llOflecause Coombe had requested his own court 
martial, the prosecutor in this case was Master's Mate 
John Green, one of the captain's leading accusers.
lllADM 1/5384.
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became evident that the young commander had made several
mistakes. Although there was very little wind at the time
o£ the engagement/ he had £ailed to order the sky sails
set to increase the brig's speed. Moreover/ he had
continued to expend his shot despite being directed by the
captain of the Amaranthe to refrain from firing until his
ship was within "pistol shot" of its targets.
Nevertheless, in the opinion of his men, he had conducted
himself with "every appearance of personal bravery and
coolness." Thus, while his judges found him guilty in
part of neglect of duty, they did not "conceive that it
proceeded either from cowardice or disaffection and that
the negligence proceeded more from extreme inexperience
than any other cause." They, therefore, sentenced him
only "to be severely reprimanded and rendered incapable of
112attaining the rank of post captain for three years."
Yet, if the officers of the fleet were expected to 
maintain an aggressive posture towards the king's enemies, 
they were not to be rash in their dealings with his foes. 
Mercifully, incidents of overzealousness were extremely 
rare on the Leeward Islands station between 1784 and
1812. Indeed, the only member of the quarter-deck in the 
Lesser Antilles charged with such an offense was 
Lieutenant William Purvis of H.M.S. Belleisle. who was
1!2a d m  1/5391.
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brought be£ore a tribunal assembled on the York at
Barbados from 5 to 10 May 1808. Two days earlier,
Lieutenant Purvis had boarded the French schooner La Fine
under a flag of cartel in Carlisle Bay. Rather
imperiously, Purvis ordered the vessel's captain to send
his officers to their cabins. When the commander refused
to comply with his directive, he collared the man and
tried unsuccessfully to have him taken aboard the launch.
Through the intervention of a British mediator tempers
quickly cooled and Purvis departed the ship. However, he
soon returned, demanding to see some papers. At this
point, unfortunately, a Monsieur Fraboulette renewed the
hostilities by drawing a sword and pointing it toward the
lieutenant. In the ensuing scuffle, Purvis and his men
drove the French down into the hold. There, sporadic
fighting continued until Lieutenant Treeve of the York was
able to restore order by separating the combatants.
Finding his conduct during the affair "violent,
unofficerlike and very offensive to communication by
cartel in which high character the officers and crew of La
Fine were entitled to the most unreserved respectful
113attention and behavior," the court cashiered Purvis.
A crime almost as unheard of in the Lesser Antilles as 
the ill usage of enemies was traitorousness. Whereas
113ADM 1/5387.
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there were no summary punishments administered for this 
offense on board the ships in the survey# there were only 
three members of the service tried by naval tribunals for 
disloyalty on the Leeward Islands station during the 
entire period. Each of the mariners indicted at these 
proceedings belonged to the lower deck. In adjudicating 
their cases, the courts exhibited maxked restraint. While 
all of the defendants were convicted, none was given the 
death penalty. Two were sentenced to five hundred lashes 
through the fleet and one to six hundred strokes.
The cases of James Brady and James Sullivan of the 
Surinam, who were tried jointly on H.M.S. Diana in Fort 
Royal Bay on 15 June 1801, give clear illustration of the 
treatment that naval tribunals accorded those accused of 
disloyalty. The previous October, Brady, Sullivan, 
Master's Mate George Evelyn and two Portuguese blacks had 
been assigned the duty of taking a Swedish prize to St. 
Christophers for condemnation. As the schooner approached 
the island, her captain overpowered Mr. Evelyn and 
regained control of the ship. During the brief struggle, 
Brady and Sullivan not only refused to come to the 
assistance of their officer, but complied immediately with 
the orders of the commander of the merchantman, who 
earlier in the day had spoken to them about the 
possibility of joining the employ of the "states." 
Further proof of their traitorous designs was provided by 
the fact that after the vessel had anchored at St.
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Bartholomews they quickly entered a small Swedish ship 
bound for Guadeloupe and were prevented from deserting 
only by the efforts of the colonial governor. Found 
guilty in part, they were sentenced to five hundred lashes 
apiece.114
Such were the service related offenses encountered on 
the Leeward Islands station between 1784 and 1812. In 
adjudicating them, naval authorities followed the same 
basic principles and practices employed in the prosecution 
of social crimes. Like civil transgressions, naval 
infractions were dealt with both summarily and by court 
martial. Moreover, the theatre of judgement was left to 
the discretion of His Majesty’s commanders. Finally 
abstract legal standards were used to determine guilt or 
innocence in these cases. In short, the precepts 
governing the treatment of military problems within the 
wooden walls were grounded firmly in the traditions of the 
criminal law.
114ADM 1/5356.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to 
show that the system used to maintain order aboard His 
Majesty's sailing ships was a branch of eighteenth-century 
British criminal law. Within its own narrowly restricted 
domain, naval discipline .applied the principles and 
practices of the criminal law in adjudicating offenses
committed at sea, wherever feasible. As on shore, a
sanguinary penal code was administered with relative 
moderation at both the summary and curial levels. Like
quarter sessions and assizes, courts martial rendered 
verdicts in conformity with the accepted procedural
guidelines and legal abstractions of the day. And 
captains, behaving in much the same manner as their 
magisterial counterparts in England, carried out the 
spirit, if not always the letter, of the regulations 
governing life aboard the king’s vessels. Indeed, with 
the exception of the absence of a true jury system at 
naval law, the differences between the civilian and 
nautical divisions of criminal jurisprudence were more 
style than substance. In short, justice afloat was
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founded on the Georgian conception of the rule of law.
If this analysis is correct, what are its implications
for the administration of the criminal law in Hanoverian
England? In a very influential essay published in 1975,
Douglas Hay argued that the eighteenth-century penal code
was "one of ... [the] chief ideological instruments" used
%
by the ruling class to maintain its hegemony over the rest 
of British society. By conspiring to manipulate the 
"lessons of justice, terror and mercy", the kingdom's 
governors were able to consolidate and legitimize their 
authority and enforce a grossly unequal distribution of 
property.1 Although several scholars have offered 
cogent modifications of Hay's interpretation, his basic 
contention that the unreformed law was an important and 
effective tool in the maintenance of the power-structure 
of the status quo remained unchallenged until the 
appearance of John Langbein's critique of his thesis. 
Reacting to the Marxist excesses inherent in Hay's view, 
Langbein has insisted that "The criminal law is simply the 
wrong place to look for the active hand of the ruling
^-Hay "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," pp. 
56-63.
2John H. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," Past and 
Present 98 (February, 1983): pp. 96-120. For revisions
of Hay's thesis: John Brewer and John Styles, eds., An
Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1980), pp. 11-20 and Peter King, 
"Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the English 
Criminal Law," Historical Journal 27(1984), pp. 25-58.
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classes." In his opinion, it "and its procedures 
existed to serve and protect the interests of the people 
who suffered as victims of crime, people who were 
overwhelmingly non-elite."4
The study of naval discipline in the age of sail 
suggests something of a middle ground between these two 
positions. While the law at sea was used by the nautical 
gentry to bolster and legitimize their authority, it was 
not abused in such a callous and calculating 
conspiratorial manner , as to become little more than a 
vehicle for the unbridled self-interests of the elite. As 
the theorists of order afloat clearly understood, the 
brute force at the disposal of His Majesty's officers 
could cow potential criminals, but it alone could not 
serve as a secure foundation for maritime government. To 
achieve stability, that government had to be just, and to 
be just it had to based on the rule of law. In striving 
to abide by this notion, the rulers of the king's fleet, 
as N.A.M Rodger has shown them to be in other connections, 
were no more, yet certainly no less, than the products of 
their time.
^Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," p. 119. 
4 Ibid.. p. 97.
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APPENDIX A
SHIPS IN THE SURVEY
Ship Guns
Dates
Examined Complement
No. of Men No. of Men 
Punished Deserted 
(Percent) (Percent) References
ADAMANT 50 1 November 1783 -
15 September 1786
763 36
(5%)
112 ADM 51/8, 9
(15%) ADM 36/10433
ADAMANT 50 1 September 1794
31 December 1795
- 806 15
(2%)
21 ADM 51/10/ 1153/ 
(3%) 1115/ 1126
ADM 36/13045
AFRICAINE 44 1 February 1805 - 
31 December 1805
538 58
(11%)
17 ADM 51/1521
(3%) ADM 36/15842
ANDROMACHE 32 1 May 1795 - 
31 March 1796
435 11
(3%)
8 ADM 51/1101/ 1185
(2%) ADM 36/12919
ANDROMEDA 32 15 November 1800 
5 October 1802
546 75
(14%)
57 ADM 51/1364/ 1428
(10%) ADM 36/14523
ARETHUSA 38 15 January 1796 -
30 September 1796
471 8
(2%)
45 ADM 51/1102/ 1191
(10%) ADM 36/12924
APPENDIX A CONTINUED
No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
ARETHUSA 38 1 October 1796 - 406
30 September 1797
29
(7%)
19 ADM 51/1191, 1201
(5%) ADM 36/12925
LA BABET 24 1 November 1795
31 July 1798
394 83
(21%)
68 ADM 51/1167, 1232
(17%) ADM 36/13133
BARBADOS 18 7 March 1804 -
30 September 1805
847 30
(4%)
72 ADM 51/1636, 1483
(9%) ADM 36/15787
BEAULIEU 38 1 June 1804 -
14 March 1806
563 76
(14%)
52 ADM 51/1518, 1543
(9%) ADM 36/15859
BEAVER 16 1 February 1796
31 October 1798
323 42
(13%)
61 ADM 52/2750, 2751
(19%) ADM 36/13429
BELLEISLE 74 1 January 1807 
31 May 1809
1446 233
(16%)
114 ADM 51/1696, 1666,
(8%) 1920, 1866, 1888
1870 
ADM 37/795
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
BELLONA 74 1 October 1794 - 1419
30 September 1797
BLANCHE 32 1 May 1789 - 399
16 June 1792
1
BLENHEIM 74 1 October 1802 - 1392
30 September 1804
BOREAS 28 1 May 1784 - 334
31 July 1787
BOYNE 98 1 November 1793 - 1523
28 February 1795
CAMILLA 24 1 April 1807 - 346
31 August 1808
74 96 ADM 51/1128, 1181,
(5%) (7%) 1194, 1223
ADM 36/11592
91 55 ADM 51/95, 112
(23%) (14%) ADM 36/11010
223 67 ADM 52/3571
(16%) (5%) ADM 36/17338
86 21 ADM 51/125, 120
(26%) (6%) ADM 36/10528
32 35 ADM 51/4421
(2%) (2%) ADM 52/2743
ADM 36/11251
79 37 ADM 51/1667, 1745,
(23%) (11%) 1906
ADM 37/886
W
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
CAPTAIN 74 1 November 1807 - 1459
30 September 1809
286
(20%)
26 ADM 51/1735/ 1826, 
(2%) 1971
ADM 37/896
CARYSFORT 28 1 March 1804 - 
30 August 1806
510 50
(10%)
48 ADM 52/3591 
(9%) * ADM 36/16181
CENTAUR 74 1 November 1802
31 January 1806
- 1642 331
(20%)
200 ADM 51/1460/ 4425/ 
(12%) 1530/ 1492/ 1523/
1549, 1526 
ADM 36/16310
CENTURION 50 6 December 1792 
31 August 1793
683 40
(6%)
46
(7%)
ADM 51/115 
ADM 36/13833
CHARON 44 1 December 1795
31 October 1796
811 13
(2%)
26 ADM 51/1184
(3%) ADM 36/11835
CULLODEN 74 1 March 1793 - 
31 October 1793
761 23
(3%)
20 ADM 51/202
(3%) ADM 36/12167
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted'
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
EURUS 32 1 December 1796 - 425
3 September 1798
25
(6%)
58 ADM 51/1235
(14%) ADM 52/2963
ADM 36/14769
EXCELLENT 74 1 February 1802 
19 May 1803
- 1157 117
(10%)
16 ADM 51/1429, 1404
(1%) ADM 52/2992
ADM 36/15238
FAIRY 16 1 August 1791 -
13 June 1793
240 23
(10%)
29 ADM 51/334
(12%) ADM 52/3013
ADM 36/11924
FORESTER 18 15 August 1808
31 July 1812
807 98
(12%)
105 ADM 51/1933, 2371
(13%) ADM 37/4575
GALATEA 32 1 January 1804
30 January 1809
1121 184
(16%)
201 ADM 51/1498, 1540, 
(18%) 1518, 1828
ADM 52/3762 
ADM 37/446 340
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
GANGES 74 1 September 1794 - 1077
31 October 179’6
66
(6%)
29 ADM 51/1162, 4451, 
(3%) 1139
ADM 52/3041 
ADM 36/11810
GLORIE 38 1 November 1808
27 June 1812
903 195
(22%)
90 ADM 51/1875, 1996, 
(10%) 2391
ADM 37/3576
HANNIBAL 74 1 March 1793 -
31 October 1793
670 45
(7%)
18 ADM 52/2824
(3%) ADM 36/11165
HEBE 38 14 January 1796
31 October 1796
486 40
(8%)
24 ADM 52/3092
(5%) ADM 36/11431
HECTOR 74 1 March 1793 -
31 October 1793
816 36
(4%)
17 ADM 51/448
(2%) ADM 52/3545
ADM 36/11189
APPENDIX A CONTINUED
No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
HEROINE 32 1 March 1793 -
31 October 1793
272 12
(4%)
7 ADM 51/448
(3%) ADM 52/3158
ADM 36/12377
HORNET 16 1 December 1799 - 1225
30 September 1804
108
(9%)
69 ADM 51/1322, 1364, 
(6%) 1417, 1440, 1471,
2480, 1473 
ADM 36/15650
HUSSAR 38 1 December 1807 - 1303
30 July 1809
62
(5%)
21 ADM 51/1752, 1898, 
(2%) 2459
ADM 37/1500
HYANA 24 1 November 1804 
1 November 1805
646 22
(3%)
42 ADM 51/1609, 4458, 
(7%) 1526
ADM 36/16971
HYDRA 38 1 December 1798 -
31 January 1801
583 70
(12%)
40 ADM 51/1253, 1320, 
(7%) 1338
ADM 36/15270
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
INSPECTOR 16 1 December 1793 
28 October 1795
371 65
(18%)
51 ADM 51/1162, 1145, 
(14%) 1137, 4461
ADM 52/3121, 3119 
ADM 36/13467
INVINCIBLE 74 1 March 1796 - 2942
30 September 1800
149
(5%)
211 ADM 51/1327
(7%) ADM 52/3132, 3122
ADM 36/13987
JUPITER 50 1 March 1787 -
24 June 1790
703 113
(16%)
71 ADM 51/481
(10%) ADM 36/10737
L 1AIMABLE 32 1 April 1795 - 
30 September 1798
1185 72
(6%)
110 ADM 51/1108, 1221, 
(9%) 1189, 1235
ADM 36/11876
LAPWING 28 1 September 1795 - 1048
31 October 1800
168
(16%)
62 ADM 51/1138, 1214, 
(6%) 1311, 1358
ADM 52/3150 
ADM 36/15293
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No. o£ Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
LATONA 38 1 November 1783 -
19 October 1786
578 78
(13%)
58 ADM 51/527, 1671
(10%) ADM 52/2372, 2369
ADM 36/10641
MAIDSTONE 28 1 December 1786 
28 June 1790
431 83
(19%)
34 ADM 51/578
(8%) ADM 36/10740
MAJESTIC 74 1 October 1794
30 June 1796
2169 60
(3%)
71 ADM 51/1122, 1134
(3%) ADM 52/3228
ADM 36/11794
MEDIATOR 44 1 October 1783 
3 August 1786
419 49
(12%)
71 ADM 51/567, 589
(17%) ADM 36/10483
MERMAID 32 1 October 1790 
4 May 1791
276 9
(3%)
11 ADM 51/590
(4%) ADM 36/10945
MERMAID 32 1 April 1795 -
31 August 1797
753 66
(9%)
49 ADM 51/4474, 1118,
(7%) 1169, 1257
ADM 36/13090
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
MEROPE 12 1 March 1809 - 
1 January 1811
314 43
(14%)
44 ADM 51/1990, 2584
(14%) ADM 37/3100
MONARCH 74 1 March 1793 -
31 October 1793
1016 10
(1%)
68 ADM 51/568
(7%) ADM 52/3196
ADM 36/11747
NYADEN 36 1 January 1810
30 June 1811
801 97
(12%)
72 ADM 51/4552, 2606
(9%) ADM 37/2619
OPOSSUM 14 1 October 1809
31 October 1813
510 70
(14%)
74 ADM 51/2616, 2624
(15%) ADM 37/4697
ORION 74 1 March 1793 -
31 October 1793
945 41
(4%)
6 ADM 51/652, 1148
(1%) ADM 36/11335
PERDRIX 24 22 December 1795
13 August 1799
567 53
(9%)
99 ADM 51/1264, 1275
(17%) ADM 36/12548 345
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No. of Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
PLOVER 16 1 April 1801 -
14 September 1802
243 42
(18%)
8 ADM 51/1428, 1430
(3%) ADM 36/14450
PRINCE
GEORGE
98 1 December 1806 - 1042
28 September 1807
168
(16%)
37 ADM 51/1617, 1693
(4%) ADM 36/17284
PROMPTE 28 1 March 1796 -
31 July 1797
586 20
(3%)
31 ADM 52/3323
(5%) ADM 36/13328
PROSELYTE 24 1 January 1805 - 
28 November 1805
308 28
(9%)
58 ADM 52/3669
(19%) ADM 36/16810
QUEBEC 32 1 November 1793 -
31 August 1795
698 23
(3%)
49 ADM 51/1110
(7%) ADM 52/3330
ADM 36/11595
QUEEN 90 1 March 1793 -
31 October 1793
1161 24
(2%)
41
(4%)
ADM 51/753 
ADM 36/11364 346
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No. o£ Men No. of Men 
Dates Punished Deserted
Ship Guns Examined Complement (Percent) (Percent) References
RAMILLIES 74 1 October 1794 - 
30 November 1795
673 106
(16%)
14 ADM 51/1147, 1127
(2%) ADM 52/3340
ADM 36/11868
RATTLER 16 1 January 1784
31 August 1787
219 67
(31%)
39 ADM 51/762, 770
(18%) ADM 36/10608
SATURN 74 1 December 1801
30 July 1802
755 48
(6%)
10 ADM 51/4497
(1%) ADM 52/3400
ADM 36/14559
SCORPION 16 1 January 1788 -
25 June 1790
177 27
(15%)
10 ADM 51/873
(6%) ADM 36/10742
SCOURGE 16 1 May 1797 -
11 September 1800
394 40
(10%)
61 ADM 51/1259, 1314
(15%) ADM 52/3409
ADM 36/13523
SOLEBAY 32 1 March 1790
23 May 1792
451 55
(12%)
26 ADM 51/896, 874
(6%) ADM 36/10983
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Ship Guns
Dates
Examined Complement
No. of Men
Punished
(Percent)
No. of Men 
Deserted
(Percent) References
STORK 16 1 June 1808 - 741 79 10 ADM 52/4338, 4339
31 October 1810 (11%) (1%) ADM 36/3174 ‘
SYBIL 28 1 March 1787 - 450 68 30 ADM 51/873
4 October 1790 (15%) (7%) ADM 52/2526
ADM 36/10976
TAMER 38 1 June 1799 - 1224 141 125 ADM 52/3481
16 August 1802 (12%) (10%) ADM 36/14400
TRUSTY 50 1 March 1790 - 942 112 52 ADM 51/985, 981
10 August 1793 (12%) (6%) ADM 36/11216
YORK 74 1 November 1807 - 3885 137 61 ADM 51/1899, 2989
31 July 1809 (4%) (2%) ADM 37/1134
348
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APPENDIX B
Captain 
ROBERT BARTON
PAGET BAYLY
SIR RICHARD 
BICKERTON
THOMAS BOSTON 
JOHN BOWEN 
JAMES BRADBY
CAPTAINS SURVEY
Ship
Time on 
Board
Months Months 
Since Since 
Lt. Capt. 
Comm. Comm.
No. of Men No. of Men 
Total Punished Deserted
Crew (Percent) (Percent)
York 1 November 1807- 365 
31 July 1809
163 3885 137
(4%)
61
(2%)
Scorpion I January 1788-
II March 1790
143 173 27
(16%)
10
(6%)
Ramillies 1 October 1794- 202
30 November 1795
164 673 106
(16%)
14
(2%)
Latona 1 November 1783- 257 
13 June 1784
27 260 10
(4%)
37
(14%)
Camilla 1 April 1807- 60
31 August 1808
15 346 79
(23%)
37
(11%)
Andromeda 15 November 1800- 224 
4 June 1801
45 318 12
(4%)
21
(7%)
APPENDIX B CONTINUED
Captain Ship
Months 
Since 
Time on Lt. 
Board Comm.
Months 
Since 
Capt. 
Comm.
Total.
Crew
No. of Men 
Punished 
(Percent)
No. of Men 
Deserted 
(Percent)
JAMES BRISBANE Saturn
4
1 December 1801- 86 09 755 48 10
20 July 1802 (6%) (1%)
RICHARD BROWN Beaver 1 February 1796- 157 0 247 22 46
22 September 1797 (9%) (19%)
WILLIAM HENRY Onossum 1 October 1809- 167 0 110 15 21
BYAM 12 December 1810 (14%) (19%)
JAMES CARTHEW Glorie 1 November 1808- 216 88 903 195 90
27 June 1812 (22%) (10%)
WILLIAM CAYLEY Invincible 1 March 1796- 392 166 2942 149 211
30 September 1800 (5%) (7%)
CUTHBERT Mediator 1 October 1783- 99 42 419 49 71
COLLINGWOOD 3 August 1786 (12%) (17%) 350
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Months Months
Since Since No. of Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total Punished Deserted 
Captain Ship Board Comm. Comm. Crew (Percent) (Percent)
WILFRED 
COLLINGWOOD
Rattler 1 January 1784- 
21 April 1787
68 207 65
(31%)
39
(19%)
JOHN COLPOYS Hannibal 1 March 1793- 
31 October 1793
364 233 670 45
(7%)
18
(3%)
JOHN COOK Insnetor 5 May 1794- 
25 June 1795
156 211 40
(19%)
32
(15%)
FREDERICK
COTTERELL
Nvaden 1 January 1810- 108
19 April 1811
77 775 90
(12%)
70
(9%)
H.D.E. DARBY Adamant 27 September 1794- 274 
20 December 1795
128 806 15
(2%)
14
(2%)
CHARLES SIDNEY 
DAVERS
L*Aimable 26 June 1795- 
26 April 1796
56 461 16
(3%)
22
(5%) 351
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Captain Ship
Time on 
Board
Months Months 
Since Since 
Lt. Capt. 
Comm. Comm.
No. of Men No. of Men 
Total Punished Deserted 
Crew (Percent) (Percent)
JOHN DREW Trusty 1 March 1790-
10 August 1793
149 85 942 112
(12%)
52
(6%)
JOHN THOMAS 
DUCKWORTH
Orion 1 March 1793- 
31 October 1793
268 154 945 41
(4%)
6
(16%)
CHARLES EKINS Beaulieu 1 June 1804- 
14 March 1806
165 90 563 76
(14%)
52
(9%)
GEORGE EYRE Promote 1 March 1796- 
31 July 1797
64 586 20
(3%)
31
(5%)
WILLIAM FAHIE Perdrix 22 December 1795- 155 
13 August 1799
567 53
(9%)
99
(17%)
EDWARD FLIN Merone 29 May 1810- 66
31 January 1811
139 14
(10%)
17
(12%) OJ
ui
APPENDIX B CONTINUED
Months Months
Since Since No. of Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total Punished Deserted 
Captain Ship Board Comm. Comm. Crew (Percent) (Percent)
EDWARD GALWAY Plover 1 April 1801-
14 September 1802
94 X 237 42
(18%)
8
(3%)
ALAN H. 
GARDINER
Heroine 1 March 1793- 
31 October 1793
X 27 272 12
(4%)
7
(3%)
GEORGE GREY Bovne 1 November 1793- 154
28 February 1795
1523 32
(2%)
35
(2%)
WILLIAM
HARGOOD
Bellisle 1 January 1807- 
14 July 1807
324 193 616 69
(11%)
17
(3%)
THOMAS HARVEY Lapwing 1 November 1797- 
12 July 1800
37 7 725 133
(18%)
30
(4%)
HENRY HEATHCOTE Galatea 1 January 1804- 
20 April 1805
99 71 469 38
(8%)
60
(13%) CO
U1
CO
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Captain Ship
Months Months
Since Since No. of Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total , Punished Deserted
Board Comm. Comm. Crew (Percent) (Percent)
PETER HUNT Hornet 5 July 1802-
3 October 1803
93 322 16
(5%)
20
(6%)
JOHN HUTT Queen 1 March 1793- 
31 October 1793
239 122 1161 24
(2%)
41
(4%)
W.H. KELLEY Adamant 22 November 1783- 91
30 September 1786
3 763 36
(5%)
112
(15%)
SIR FRANCES 
LAFOREY
Hvdra 1 December 1798- 111
31 January 1801
54 583 70
(12%)
40
(7%)
GEORGE LE GEYT Stork 1 June 1808-
31 October 1810
136 0 741 79
(11%)
10
(1%)
B.R. LITTLEHALES Centaur 1 November 1802- 145
25 June 1803
31 658 44
(7%)
10
(2%) 354
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Captain Ship
Time on 
Board
Months Months 
Since Since 
Lt. Capt. 
Comm. Comm.
No. of Men No. of Men 
Total Punished Deserted
Crew (Percent) (Percent)
----------9--------------------
ROBERT LLOYD Hussar 1 December 1807- 
1 June 1809
205 96 951 57
(6%)
21
(2%)
WILLIAM 
GRANVILLE LOBB
La Babet 1 November 1795- 
1 February 1797
202 307 56
(18%)
30
(10%)
GEORGE LOSACK Prince 1 December 1806- 344
George 25 September 1807
192 1042 168
(16%)
37
(4%)
R. MCDOUALL
K. MACKINZIE
Ganges
Carvsfort
2 April 1796- 440
31 October 1796
(
1 March 1804- 68
30 August 1806
176 554
510
10
(3%)
50
(10%)
8
(1%)
48
(9%)
JEMMETT La Babet 1 February 1797- 90 19 256 25 38
MAINWARING 31 July 1798 (10%) (15%) 355
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Months Months
Since Since No. o£ Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total Punished Deserted 
Captain Ship Board Comm. Comm. Crew (Percent) (Percent)
THOMAS MANBY Africaine 1 February 1805- 111
31 December 1805
72 538 58
(11%)
17
(3%)
CHARLES JOHN 
MOORE MASEFIELD
Andromache 1 May 1795-
31 March 1796
186 435 11
(3%)
8
(2%)
RICHARD MATTSON Beaver 22 September 1797- 36 
25 May 1798
291 2
(8%)
15
(5%)
WILLIAM MAUDE Bellisle 1 November 1807- 
31 July 1808
85 646 43
(7%)
37
(6%)
MURRAY MAXWELL Centaur 25 June 1803- 
12 August 1804
80 769 198
(26%)
132
(17%)
GEORGE MONTAGU Hector 1 March 1793-
31 October 1793
266 227 816 » 36 
(4%)
17
(2%) 356
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Captain Ship
Time on 
Board
Months Months 
Since Since 
Lt. Capt. 
Comm. Comm.
No. o£ Men No. o£ Men 
Total Punished Deserted 
Crew (Percent) (Percent)
ROBERT MURRAY Blanche 1 May 1789- 
16 June 1792
100 77 399 91
(23%)
55
(14%)
JOHN NASH Hornet 1 December 1799- 
19 June 1802
75 424 85
(20%)
34
(8%)
HORATIO NELSON Boreas 1 May 1784- 
31 July 1787
85 59 334 86
(26%)
21
(6%)
HENRY NEWCOME Maidstone 1 December 1786- 
28 June 1790
54 431 83
(19%)
34
(8%)
JOSEPH NOURSE Barbados 7 March 1804- 40
30 September 1805
847 30
(4%)
72
(9%)
SAMUEL OSBORN Centurion 6 December 1792- 
31 August 1793
129 683 40
(6%)
46
(7%) 357
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Captain Ship
Time on 
Board
Months Months 
Since Since 
Lt. Capt. 
Comm. Comm.
No. of Men No. of Men 
Total Punished Deserted
Crew (Percent) (Percent)
ROBERT W. OTWAY Mermaid 19 November 1795- 28
24 April 1797
298 29
(10%)
27
(9%)
WILLIAM PARKER Jupiter 1 March 1787- 
24 June 1790
224 114 703 113
(16%)
71
(10%)
SIR THOMAS RICH Culloden 1 March 1793-
31 October 1793
419 265 761 23
(3%)
20
(3%)
CHARLES
RICHARDSON
Centaur 12 August 1804- 120
18 March 1805
0 728 89
(12%)
22
(3%)
JOSIAS ROGER Quebec 1 November 1793- 180
6 May 1795
71 698 21
(3%)
36
(5%)
JAMES ROSS Eurus 1 December 1796- 73
3 September 1798
29 425 25
(6%)
58
(14%) 358
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Months Months
Since Since No. of Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total Punished Deserted 
Captain Ship Board Comm. Comm. Crew (Percent) (Percent)
CHARLES SANDYS Latona 14 July 1784- 
7 March 1786
138 17 388 48
(12%)
13
(3%)
MATTHEW HENRY Hebe 
SCOTT
14 January 1796- 109
31 October 1796
21 486 40
(8%)
24
(5%)
M.C. SQUIRE Solebay 1 March 1790- 
23 May 1792
294 125 451 55
(12%)
26
(6%)
JAMES
STEVENSON
Charon 1 December 1795- 
31 October 1796
60 811 13
(2%)
26
(3%)
WILLIAM TRUSCOTT Ganges 1 September 1794- 451 
1 October 1795
188 602 37
(6%)
14
(2%)
SIR JAMES 
WALLACE
Monarch 1 March 1793- 
31 October 1793
456 266 1016 10
(1%)
68
(7%) 359
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Captain Ship
Months Months
Since Since No. o£ Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total Punished Deserted
Board Comm. Comm. Crew (Percent) (Percent)
SAMUEL WARREN Scourge 1 May 1797- 80
11 September 1800
394 40
(10%)
61
(15%)
G.B. WESTCOTT Majestic 1 October 1794- 206
30 June 1796
48 2169 60
(3%)
71
(3%)
THOMAS WESTERN Tamer 1 June 1799- 
16 August 1802
224 43 1224 141
(12%)
125
(10%)
GEORGE WILSON Bellona 1 October 1794- 225
30 September 1797
177 1419 74
(5%)
96
(7%)
ISSAC WOOLEY Captain 1 November 1807- 
17 November 1808
168 122 1209 161
(13%)
16
(1%)
THOMAS WOLLEY Arethusa 10 February 1796- 194 
30 September 1796
25 471 8
(2%)
45
(10%) GO
O'!
o
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Months Months
Since Since No. of Men No. of Men
Time on Lt. Capt. Total Punished Deserted
Captain Ship Board ; Comm. Comm. Crew . (Percent) (Percent)
THOMAS WOLRIGE Opossum 13 December 1810- 105 0 400 55 53
31 October 1813 • (14%) (13%)
JAMES ATHOL WOOD Captain 18 November 1808- 361 140 1275 124 10
25 July 1809 (10%) (1%)
ABBREVIATIONS: Capt. - Captain, Comm. - Commission, Lt. - Lieutenant, X - Missing.
Commission times are computed from the dates listed in The Commissioned Sea Officers of 
the Roval Navy. 1660-1815. 3 vols. (London: National Maritme Museum, 1954).
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REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF PUNISHMENT PATTERNS
KEY:
- Punishments
- Desertions
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Captain: THOMAS HARVEY
Ship: Lapwing
Dates of Command:
1 November 1792 - 12 July 1800
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MONTHS IN COMMAND
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Captain: GEORGE LE GEYT
Ship: Stork
Dates of Command:
1 June 1808 - 31 October 1810
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5 25 30 3510 4015 20
MONTHS IN COMMAND
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Captain: JOHN BOWEN
Ship: Camilla
Dates of Command:
1 April 1807 - 31 August 1808
25
20
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10 15 20 25 30 35 40
MONTHS IN COMMAND
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Captain: ROBERT MURRAY
Ship: Blanche
Dates of Command:
1 May 1789 - 16 June 1792
25 30 35 40
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Captain: JOHN NASH
Ship: Hornet
Dates of Command:
1 December 1799 - 19 June
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Captain: CHARLES EKINS
Ship: Beaulieu
Dates of Command:
1 June 1804 - 14 March 1806
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Captain: WILLIAM PARKER
Ship: Jupiter
Dates of Command:
1 March 1787 - 24 June 1790
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Captain: G. B. WESTCOTT
Ship: Majestic
Dates of Command:
1 October 1794 - 30 June 1796
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Captain: THOMAS WESTERN
Ship: Tamer 
Dates of Command:
1 June 1799 - 16 August 1802
25
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MONTHS IN COMMAND
3010 35 40
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Captain: GEORGE WILSON
Ship: Bellona
Dates of Command:
1 October 1794 - 30 September 1797
25
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